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CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION

I

TO

I
THE

STUDY

According to social psychologist Muzafer Sherif, one of the most
cha 11 engi ng human prob 1ems of contemporary 1 ife is that of "intergroup

I relations" which refers to "the states of friendship or enmity, coope1 ration or competition, conflict or harmony, alignment or nonalignment
~ between groups and combinations of groups, small or lar~e." 1

I
ij
I~

With the advent of collective bargaining in pub1ic education in
the early 1960s, the state of intergroup relations between teachers,
administrators, and school boards has become increasingly characterized
by

competit~on

and conflict.

Teachers, traditionally a passive group in

reference to welfare and working conditions, school policies, and

1 educational programs, are now via the social system of collective barI gaining, abandoning this posture by becoming active, equal partners in
~
~

j

~
~

determining these decisions.

This revolutionary power relation change

from unilateral school management control to the bilateral decisionmaking found in the collective bargaining process has strained the
employment relationship in the education industry, a stress which is
frequently manifesting itself in bitter controversy, bargaining deadlocks

I
~

lMuzafer Sherif,.In Common Predicament: Social Ps cholo Of
Intergroup Conflict And Cooperation Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1966 j' p.1.

------------------·~------M----5----~~~----=-----------------~
2

rand a series of trial-and-error conflict resolution schemes which include
mediation, fact-finding, third-party umpiring systems, court injunctions,
strikes, and teacher firings.

1

It can be assumed that collective bargaining in the American school

I system
1 pace.l

is here to stay and indeed will continue to grow at an accelerated
Moreover, since conflict is the basic ingredient in the collective

I bargaining

process, it can furthermore be assumed that there will be a con-

current growth in the number of school bargaining disputes and teacher strikes.

ll

Acceptance of these two assumptions clearly necessitates a search for methods

~

~ which

I
I

facilitate the resolution of negotiations conflict between teachers and

school management. To phrase the problem another way, public education

l negotiators, unsure about what conflict management schemes to use in the event
of a bargaining dispute, are in need of viable machinery which can serve to

~

control the conflict which is inherent in the collective bargaining process.

1
~

Several labor relations authorities maintain that the impasse resolution

I
~

problem is one of the key issues in public education labor relations.

Robert

Doherty, for example, emphasizes that all other issues in teacher bargaining

are ••relatively insignificant issues when contrasted with the problem of
resolving negotiating impasses.••2 Relative to this contention, a fundamental
question can be asked:

11

Hhat conflict management or conflict resolution

1James D. Koerner, Who.Controls American Education? (Boston: Beacon
. Press, 1968), p. 42.
2Robert E. Doherty, Teacher Bargaining: The Relevance Of Private Sector
1
~ Experience, .. The Collective Dilemma: Ne otiations In Education, ed. by Patrick
1 W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwin Worthington~ Ohio: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1969), p. 193.

i

11

I)

i
~
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3
processes function to bring about more agreement, less conflict, and posi-

~ tive negotiatory relationships between teachers and school management?

I This question is diffiCult to answer because the impasse resolution
~

I•
I~

I

11

probl~m

in school negotiations is still in the laboratory experimental stages of
trial-and-error, and therefore, little empirical data exist on the use or
effectiveness,of the various procedures utilized to resolve public education

I bargaining disputes. As a consequence to the noteable lack of research on
i this critical problem, participants in the school bargaining process remain
t ignorant of how to effectively resolve, manage, or prevent collective bargaining impasses which may arise during at-the-table negotiations.

In sum,

because teachers and school management representatives are adrift without
adequate information, it is logical to research and analyze the alternate
social technologies for impasse resolution.

This study is such an attempt.

PURPOSE

The general purpose of this study was to analyze the various impasse
resolution strategies which are available to public education negotiators.
Specifically, the study

included:

(1) a description of five alter-

native methods available to negotiators for resolving school bargaining
disputes; (2) a presentation and analysis of the perceptions held by
teacher negotiation representatives and school management representatives
towards the five alternate impasse resolution methods for the purpose of
It should be noted that both

___._______
. M"" '"_._.

mr,llllj---------------------~~~WA;C----~
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school systems to

~iscover

what significant factors influenced the

success or failure of particular impasse resolution strategies.

RESEARCH METHOD AND PROCEDURE
In correspondence to the three purposes listed above, three
approaches or phases were utilized in this study:

First, a research

of the relevant literature was conducted to ascertain from authorities
what impasse resolution procedures can or should be employed in school
bargaining disputes.

In the second phase, the author tested several

hypotheses in order to identify the impasse resolution method that
public education negotiators prefer to use in the event of a collective
bargaining deadlock.

The hypotheses, derived by searching professional

literature for the opinions of authorities who have worked in either
the field of collective bargaining or other environments where intergroup conflict may exist, were as follows:
I.

II.

III.

Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the· human
relations strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or
resolve collective bargaining disputes.
School management negotiation representatives agree that the
human relations strategy would not function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective bargaining disputes.
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation
strategy is an appropriate mechanism to use in resolving
school bargaining disputes.

IV. Teacher negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding
strategy.is not an effective procedure for resolving public
education bargaining disputes.

_ _ _..-________....._.._ _ _ _...,_..,...,.,_.______,.,_..,..__
.._..__

v.

----·

-- 5

"l

Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation
representatives both agree that the arbitration strategy would not
be an.a~pro~riate dispute settlement mechanism in public education
barga1n1ng 1mpasses.

VI.

Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining
disputes.

VII.

School management negotiation representatives agree that the strike
strategy should not be available as a means to resolve collective
bargaining disputes.

1

1
1
j

To test the above hypotheses, the author devised a series of questions
related to the hypotheses and placed them in a fixed-response questionnaire
{see APPENDIX A) which v1as personally administered to forty-two negotiation
representatives.

The negotiators, twenty-one representing teacher organi-

zations and twenty-one representing school boards, were for the most part,
at-the-table-negotiators during bargaining disputes which occurred in seven
school systems in the fall of 1972.
The population studied during phase two covered selected schools. That
is, the research focused on all Illinois school systems which in 1972 used

I

at least two of the impasse procedures available to public education negotia-

J.

tion teams.

i,:

fied by number rather than by name.

~

~
~
~

't

I~

In order to preserve anonimity, the school districts are identiThe .school systems are listed in TABLE 1.

The third phase of the study included a case study analysis of three
of the seven school systems for the purpose of clarifying or identifying any
salient factors which

influe~ced

the impasse resolution process in those

i

school systems.

~

an open-ended questionnaire or interview guide (see APPENDIX B).

I

This information was collected in an interview by using
This guide

was administered to eighteen negotiation representatives who also had

~,'Oi,,.Nii________
!I:I:_ _~--------........---_.,,..,._"*WD<~---·--------·

'~ Schoo 1 Sys tern

Length of Strike

· Impasse Procedures Used

1

4 Days

Mediation, Fact-:Finding, Strike

2

6 Days

Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike

3

3 Days

Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike

4

5 Days

Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike

5

2 Days

Mediation, Fact-Finding, Strike

6

3 Days

Mediation, Strike

7

1 Day

r~edi ation ~

Strike
~-··-----

j participated

in the phase two interview.

The data are placed in a modified

:.t

l

~

~

case study form·.

4
~

SIGNIFICANCE l\i'!O

;

.EJ~1CTICAi"'-

ASPECTS OF THE STUDY

I

l

It is anticipated that this study will be beneficial in the following

i

j

J

, ways:

~

l

(1)

I
Il

The amount of intergroup conflict generated by the momentum of

·l

' teacher negotiations will be more easily managed.

'I

While social conflict is

inevitable when individuals and groups work together, it is nevertheless,

i

imperative to search for and develop appropriate social technology for
the management of collective bargaining conflict.

l
I

If, through research,

j

functional conflict management strategies can be determined, the dynamics of
the negotiating processs could produce more efficient results with less overt
;,
:·

confl; ct.

.

l

Il

·~w.~-~~·~·~~t...•""~".JJ••'L<t.'~~*"'".t".>rr,."';~~~;;,.~<Blo't-l>,....~.·..;,.;.~~:w~.:.t~'i.,.~.,-,~T.>..treft.na:•~~~.:.o::t"-'U'..ltil:l'ff'~~.,.._.\.'m..":'>'""'·""'"'~&.:::.~..:l!lllr..V..t.:::~~~jl,jQ~;;.',..,..,...;~t~•

r:~-:tudy
5

should be beneficial to those

teach=~:~-:anag~l

ment personne 1 who are! i nvo 1ved in negotiating 1oca 1 contracts by pro vi ding a

I' clue or answer to

the following question:

11

Hhat impasse procedures function

Ii to increase the probability of peaceful settlement and conversely decrease the
~

possibility of a disruptive confrontation?

I; experience

11

Hopefully, an analysis of the

of negotiators involved in crisis bargaining situations will

!

suggest what impasse procedures or dispute settlement techniques should be

!l utilized
I

in public education labor conflicts.

Stated otherwise, the outcome

of the study may provide knowledge that may reveal new alternatives to more

I' effectively

I' school

I
I

accommodate bargaining conflict between teacher organizations and

management.
(3)

The research should assist legislators formulate appropriate

school law relevant to the topic of collective bargaining in public education

and specifiCally to the key issue in this arena, namely, the resolution of

ti

impasse disputes.

I statutes,

I industrial
~

Regarding the importance of relevant school bargaining

it is questionable if we can legislate ourselves into decades of
harmony.

No matter how wisely formulated, laws are not cure-alls

for disturbed human relations.

In the short run, laws tend to destroy or to

change established patterns and to impose unfamiliar techniques and restrictions of the parties; thus the period of adjustment to a
turbulent one.

maj~r

labor law is a

However, while maturity and peace in collective bargaining

are not established by legislative fiat, labor law can be justified indirect-

I
~

~

fi

~~

~
L

ly.

That is, long run constructive collective bargaining can be facilitated

through statutory ground rules which govern the activities of both the employees and management.

The effect of such rules is to promote, in the long run,

\ ..
,.........,.1\t:

r

,

..w.-•··er·

l._.<U""WW'«_

__,...,=.._,_,______
...,..,.•.

___

,..,ll:~~&~:..,,.,""',.:il

rmatur~ty of the bargaining relationship,!
(4)

-----1
8

Notwithstanding the concept that conflict can sometimes function to

positive social change, certain forms of conflict, such as collective

~effect

I

bargaining disagreements, can be viewed as dysfunctional in the educational
Restated, it seems justifiable to assume that quality education for

setting.

students is best achieved in an atmosphere of reasonable peace and harmony and
that disruptive, acrimonious bargaining conflicts between teachers and school
management do not contribute to this end.

It follows that anything which can

be done to reduce the potentia 1 for overt conflict or pro.mote
~negotiatory

~well

successful

relationships between these two groups would contribute to the

being of students.
(5) The study may provide direction for universities as they plan
programs for school administrators and teachers in the collective

~training

I bargaining

process. .
LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS

Limitations of the study would be the ones that are inherent in the

j interview method
~method,

Although there are limitations with the interview

it is a desirable method to use when perceptions, opinions, and values

i; are .be1ng
.

!
~ tion,
I

itself.

examined.

The ability to probe vague responses, obtain clarifica- .

and cross-check reactions are advantages of the personal interview.

In

[addition, "~1any people are more willing to communicate orally than in writing,
~
~and therefore, will provide data more readily and fully in an interview than
J
~-----------------

1
~

1c. Wilson Randle and Max S.

Principles and

Practic~

(New York:

~--------------------------------

42,

· c:nnaire."1

I bodily expressions,

I

From=nden:~~ncidental c=~=·

facial andg

and tone of voice, the interviewer was able to acquire

information that could not be conveyed in written replies.
TltlO

instruments were used to collect data.

A fixed-respon_se question-

naire was incorporated because it is more definitive in nature than open-ended
questionnaires, yet the respondents were given the opportunity to express
'their thoughts freely.

An open-ended questionnaire was also used which gave

the respondents complete freedom to communicate their opinions.

Both quest-

ionnaires were administered during personal interviews.
One limitation of the interview method depends on the interviewer's
·insight into the respondent's situation.

Relative to this problem, the inter-

viewer has participated in teacher-school mangement negotiations for several
years and thus has developed insights into the conditions under which the
respondents work.

,
I

He is not alien to the role of the respondents, having

been employed as both a teacher and school administrator.

In brief, .the

respondent's situation was not unfamiliar to the interviewer.
A further limitation of the interview method concerns the employment of

a common vocabulary with the respondents.

Since the interviewer has represent

ed both teachers and management in the collective bargaining process, it
~appears

I

that this qualification was met.

The interviewer in this research is

conversant with the language and had no difficulty relating the conceptual

I

framework of the interview to the operating conditions of the respondents.

I·McGraw1Hill
oeobold B. Van Dalen, Understanding Educational
Book Co., 1966), p. 306.

Research (New York:

i~rM

~-..
- - - - - -. . . . . . .
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The study

was_~elimited

to negotiation representatives of both

teacher groups and school management who participated in collective bargaining situations in which two or more impasse procedures had been used
to resolve the bargaining dispute.

It was further delimited by the fact

that it confined itself to seven school systems in the state of Illinois,
a state which has neither (1) enacted a comprehensive collective bargaining
statute for public school teachers or (2) legalized teacher strikes. Any
inferences, conclusions, or recommendations will be limited to school districts

\~ith

the same characteristics as those under the study.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Conflict Resolution

An academic field developed in recent years by
social scientists; sometimes used interchangeably
with the term "conflict management" but technically different because conflict resolution
carries with it an air of finality. Relevant to
this study, the term will be used to describe
those methods, strategies, or social technolo9ies
which can be employed to resolve or manage (1)
the covert conflict which is inherent in the
collective bargaining process and (2) the overt
conflict which may manifest itself in collective
bargaining impasses.l

Collective Bargaining

In the private sector, collective bargaining is
the legal obligation of the employer and the
representative of his employe~s to negotiate,
administer, interpret, and enforce a written
contract with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.2

1writer s definition.
1

2c. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, op.cit., p. 8.

11

collective Bargaining--cont.

In the public education sector, collective bargaining (alternatively called
"collective negotiations" and "professional negotiations") is a process whereby employees as a group and their em- ·
players make offers and counter-offers
on good faith on the conditions of their
employment relationship for the purpose
of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement, and the execution of a written
document incorporating any such agreement
if requested by either party. Also, a
process whereby a representative of the
employees and their employer jointly
determine their conditions of employment.!
In both the private and public sector,
collective bargaining is a power relationship accommodation. The essence of
bargaining is compromise and concessionmaking on matters where there is conflict
between the parties and the relationship.2

Teacher Negotiation
Representatives

Teachers who represent a teachers' organization by negotiating \"ith administrative
representatives at the bargaining table.3

School Management Negotiation
Representatives

Broadly defined, these are individuals
designated to represent the board of
education in contract negotiations with
teachers. Relevant to this study, such
individuals include school superintendents
principals, business managers, and school
board.members.4

lMyron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective Negotiations for
Teachers, (Chicago: Rand McNally &Co., 1966), p. 418.
2Wesley A. Wildman, "Aspects of Teacher Collective Action,'' Theory
Into Practice, (April, ·1965), -56.
3writer's definition.
4writer's definition.

12
Terms and Cqnditions of
Employment

Synonymous with the te.rm 11 worki ng conditions 11 and refers to such items as school
calendar, the school day, promotion and
transfer procedures, class assignment;
class size, etc.1

Strike

A concerted teacher activity involving
two or more employees for the purpose of
seeking to influence, pressure, or coerce
a school board to make changes in working
conditions or compensation.2

Collective Bargaining
Agreement

Labor contracts or agreements negotiated
in collective bargaining. These agreements
are reduced to writing. That is, they are
signed statements that indicate what each
of the parties can and will do to make the
cooperation of employers and employees
effective. In short, the collective agreement records what the parties have agreed
to in their negotiations and it may deal
with a wide range of subjects, from sick
leave pay to grievance procedures and
wages.3

Iwesley A. Wildman and Fred B. Lifton, Analysis Of Education Association Pro osed Com rehensive, 11 Level IV 11 Teacher Bar aining Agreement,
Illinois Association of School Boards, Preliminary Edition, May 1972) p.66.
2Adapted from Donald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin~ The Law and
Practice of Teacher Negotiations, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National
Affairs, 1970), p.6:81.
3Herbert G. Heneman, Jr. and Dale Yoder, Labor Economics, (Chicago:
South-Western Publishing Co., 1965), p. 175.

13
Mediation

Mediation is the process where a neutr.al
individual, usually with the consent of
the parties, attempts to reconcile or
conciliate the differences between them,
usually in joint or individual sessions
with the parties. It is a direct extension
and part of the collective bargaining process since any settlement reached in mediation must be one mutually agreed upon by
the parties. May be used in both preventive and remedial ways.l

Fact-Finding

Fact-finding is a procedure whereby an
individual or a panel (the latter consisting of at least one neutral person) conducts a formal hearing wherein representatives of the teacher organization and
the school board are given the opportunity
to present evidence material to the impasse and negotiations, to make arguments
with regard thereto, and to file briefs
in support of their positions. The fact
finder or panel thereafter issues a
formal documument, setting forth recommendations for the settlement of the impasse.
These recommendations are advisory in~na
ture and not final and binding upon any of ·
the parties. 2

Compulsory Binding
Arbitration

An impasse mechanism in the ~ublic se~tor
in which unresolved disputes are legally
required to be submitted to a neutral
judicial body which d2ter~ine a final
solution to the conflict.

i~

1Ad2pted from Morris Slavney, "Impasse Procedures
Public Education,.!
Readings On Collective Negotiations In Pt1bl ic Education. Edited by Stanley I
M. Elam, ~1yron Lieberman, and Michael H. ~loskm'l (Chicago: Rand McNally &
I
Company, 1967), p. 426.
2Ibid., p. 428.
3Adapted from Ar.nold t~; Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement in the Public
Sector, 11 Industrial Relations Law Digest,
July, 1969, p.5.

14

Voluntary Binding
Arbitration

Unlike compulsory binding arbitration, this
form of arbitration is not a preordained,
predesigned, or legally required method of
resolving a bargaining dispute. In contrast,
this method of impasse resolution is something that the parties at the particular
time in their negotiations willfully and
voluntarily undertake as a means to culminate their dispute.l

Human Relations
Strategy

Alternatively called the 11 Cooperation 11 or
11
integrative 11 approach to intergroup conflict. It is generally characterized by
such integrative processes as involvement,
continuous dialogue, and joint decisionmaking. Underlying these processes are
attitudes of trust, cooperation, and
gestures of good will. Relative to collective bargaining, this strategy manifests
itself in (1) pre-study committees; (2)postnegotiation committees; and (3) continuing
joint committees.2

Conflict Strategy·

A means of resolving intergroup disagreement which is advanced by game theorists,
diplomatic strategists, students of revolutions, and community organizers. Relative to the bargaining process, the conflict strategy focuses on threat, coercion,
and the collective adversary procedures
such as sanctions, boycotts, picketing,
and strikes. This approach is sometimes
called 11 power politics 11 because it makes
use of ~ower to resolve intergroup disputes. 3

1Writer's definition.

~riter's definition.
3Writer•s definition.

Impasse

Injunction
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When in an effort to reach a collective
bargaining agreement, the parties are either
unable or unwilling to reach agreement. 1 Also,
a disagreement between the parties so serious
that further meetings and conversations seem
fruitless. 2

Court order restraining a strike by employees.3
SUMr~ARY

In summary, the reader is reminded that the general purpose of the
study was to analyze dispute settlement procedures in public education forth
specific aim of identifying an ansv-1er to this critical question:

What im-

passe resolution methods should be employed to resolve school bargainitig disputes? To answer this question the writer has (1) described alternative
methods for resolving disputes as found in professional literature; (2) identified what methods are preferred by forty-two teacher and school management
negotiation practitioners; and (3) investigated three districts with respect
to factors which may have facilitated or impeded the resolution of the bargaining impasses.

lArthur A. Halinowski, private interview held at Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois, September, 1973.
2oonald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin, The Law and Practice of
Teacher Neqotiations, (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., 1970), p. 64. ·
3Writer's definition.

CHAPTER I I
DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRATEGIES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION BARGAINING:
A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
All forms of intergroup conflict--international, racial, or industrial-necessitate a search for methods which facilitate the resolution of that
conflict.

In the industrial setting, it is especially evident that there is

a need for· machinery into which employee unrest and dissatisfaction can be
channelled. As a result, a formal institutionalized device for

managin~

employee-employer conflict has been invented, namely, the mechanism of
collective bargaining.
Since.ninety-five percent of the labor contracts negotiated annually
are terminated without the occurrence of a strike, it can be concluded that
the collective bargaining process, at least in the private sector, is an
effective technique for managing intergroup conflict in the industrial

Ii
•

l
l

environment.

However, in the situations where agreement is not reached and

negotiations conflict escalates into overt labor dispute, it is important
to investigate those methods which can be used to
impasse.

terminat~

the bargaining

This chapter deals with phase one of the study and will describe

some major dispute resolution strategies or social technologies which can
be employed to resolve school bargaining impasses.

l

these include the human

relations strategy, mediation; fact-finding, arbitration, and the strike.

!6
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THE HUMAN RELATIONS APPROACH
The human relations approach to dispute resolution is alternatively
called the "cooperation," "collaboration," "problem solving," or "integrative"
approach.

Professor Richard Wynn of the University of Pittsburgh has also

termed this approach "collective gaining. 111
The Nature of Conflict
To understand this approach to school bargaining conflicts, it is
necessary to define what a conflict is, and to specify its source.

Stagner

defines conflict as ''a situation in which two or more human beings desire
goals which they perceive as being attainable by one or the other but not
both. 112 To clarify this definition, there must be at least two parties; each
party is mobolizing energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation-be it food, territory, power, or economic affluence; and each party perceives
the other as a barrier or a threat to the attainment of this goal.

In other

words, social conflict such as a school bargaining impasse will arise if
Party A really prevents Party B from achieving a goal, or it will evolve if
Party A perceives B as an obstacle even though there is no realistic basis
~

for this view.

Coser defines conflict as 11 a struggle over values and claims

i

I
f

I
~

1Richard Wynn, "Collective Gaining ,11

Phi Delta Kappan, April, 1970,
pp. 415-419.
2Ross Stagner, The Dimensions of Human Conflict (Detroit: University
Press, 1967), pp. 136-138.
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to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents

are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals."l ·
While the sources of conflict were a11 uded to in the above paragraph,
Bennis and associates 2 explain that human conflict may arise from at least

N

two sources.

One kind of conflict stems from different or incompatible goals

held by persons or groups.

These goals may reflect different values and

concerns held'by the conflicting parties, and they may be grounded religiously, politically, economically, or in some other way. During industrial
conflict, for example, a school management may seek the goal of no wage
increase for their employees.

Conversely, the laboring component (teachers)

I desires a definite change in their economic life.
~

II

I

In this illustration,

incompatible goals become a source for conflict.
A second kind of conflict reflects not incompatible outcomes to be

achieved, but rather struggles over the allocation of commonly prized but

scarce goods-- whether money, material goods, political power, or prestige
and status.

To clarify, this kind of conflict grows out of a situation in

which needs and values are similar, but resources required to satisfy these

I values are limited and consequently, undistributable. Stated otherwise,
I conflict will occur when two or more people or groups strive for the same

i
g

?.r,

•
~

1
Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Macmillan,
~ 1956), Lewis
p. 8.
2warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, editors.
f
~ The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 151.
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goal or compete for the same space (space can be either physical or psychological).

To illustrate, teachers and school management both desire

to use a portion of state aid school monies for teachers• salaries.
wage

demands~

Teacher

however, exceed the level which the board of education is

willing to pay.

By definition, the two groups are in conflict because

there is a similarity of values in the presence of scarce resources.
Game Theory
The human relations approach to resolving bargaining disputes considers the. relationship among the nature of conflict, game theory, and
.

the contrasting bargaining strategies known as distributive bargaining
and integrative bargaining.
Game Theory, which is a mathematical technique for analyzing conflict,
advances the idea that collective bargaining is a game which can be played
from at least two viewpoints.1 Bargaining can be approached as a "zerosum game" (\'tin-lose) in which any gains by the teachers• organization
must be recorded as losses for school management and vice-versa;.that
is, what one group wins, the other must lose.

In a zero-sum bargaining

game, the interests of the parties are diametrically opposed and opponents are, therefore, termed "adversaries".2

Zero-sum bargaining can

happen in situations where goals are similar or dissimilar and resources

1Anatol Rapoport, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory," Scientific
American, December, 1962, pp. 108-110
2Thomas C. Schell~ng, The Strategy of Conflict (Mass.: Harvard
University, 1960), p. 84 ·

_______
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such as money, power, time, space, or position are scarce. 1
Collective bargaining can conversely be approached as a "positive
sum game."

From this orientation, the parties have identical rather than

conflicting interests and are concerned with coordinating their actions
toward a common outcome.

Because common interests underlie this approach,

the parties are referred to as "partners."

Popularly, this kind of bar-

gaining can be thought of as a 11 \'lin-win 11 game in contrast to the "win-lose 11
approach.

2

Distributive Bargaining Vs Integrative Bargaining
Collective bargaining conflict can be resolved or accommodated by
using a variety of strategies.

These strategies may be placed on a con-

tinuum bounded by pure distributive bargaining (the zero-sum approach)
3
and pure integrative bargaining (the positive-sum approach). Walton
and McKersie 4 indicate that when teachers and school management are directly
competing for or claiming scarce resources like tax money, such conflicts
are resolved by using a "distributive bargaining" strategy.

This term

1oavid W. Johnson, The Social Psychology of Education (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 159.
2schelling, op.cit., pp. 4, 83.
3Charles R. Perry and Wesl.ey A. Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations
In Public Education: The Evidence From The Schools (Worthington, Ohio:
Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970), p. 61.
4
Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theor of
Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of A Social Interaction System
- McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 11.

I
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re f ers to the. activity of dividing limited resources. When the participants are faced with allocating, dividing, or distributing limited resour ces ' inherent bargaining conflict is accelerated because each party
is trying to win from the other party a favorable division of tbe limited
resources.

S,. nee neither party wants to 1ose and both wish to win, a

stalemate or hegotiations impasse is likely to occur.
Since win-lose bargaining often intensifies bargaining conflict, a
different approach to negotiations is needed.

This is "integrative bar-

gaining" or "problem-solving bargaining" because the parties try to
integrate their resources toward a common task by using the problem
solving approach.

In this bargaining· process, the task of the negotiators

is to discover the high payoff possibilities or the potential benefits
for both parties.

To reach this objective, the adversaries become

"partners•• and proceed deliberately to discover the alternatives which
increase joint gain.

The negotiator behaving integratively is not con-

cerned about the payoff available for him at the expense of his opponent.
Instead, his primary concern is to increase the total sum, and therefore,
this bargaining approach is popularly thought of as a "win:-wi.n" game.

To

achieve a win-win outcome, he chooses matters where there is mutual
interest and high joint gain, and he is always asking the question, "Does
it have potential for integration of interests?" 1

lwalton and McKersie, op.cit., p. 16.

------------------·--------------------~-----
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Characteristices of Ihe Human Relations Approach
The human relations approach to resolving collective bargaining
deadlocks is characterized by the following intergroup behavior: {l)collaborative, ·intergroup problem-solving in which both teams search for
superordinate goals; (2) post-negotiation committees; and (3) continuing
joint committees.

These three features are explained below.

Blake and assoCollaborative, intergroup problem-solving.
ciates 1 list seven steps which characterize this style of decision
making:
1.

Problem definition. An important first step in collaboration is

to define the problem which needs to be solved.

In ordinary \'lin-lose

negotiating, each group defines the problem in isolation, but in this
type of problem-solving, the problem is not defined prior to contact.

It

is developed by and through intergroup contact. "Both groups, or their
representatives, together search out the issues that separate them.

By

joint effort, the problems that demand solution are identified.~ 2 This
bilateral definition is an advantage because both sides agree to the
"facts."

I
I

I
I
~

i

I

This eliminates the individual or autonomous problem-soiving

phenomena in which it frequently happens

that the "facts" seen by one

group are vastly different from the "facts" the other group has in describlng the same set of events.

1Robert R. Blake; Herbert A. Shepard, and Jane S. Mouton, Managing
~tergroup Conflict In Industry (Houston: Gulf, 1964), pp. 90-93.

L

2Blake, Ibid.,
aum

p. 90.
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2.

Full problem review.

At this step, the problem is reviewed

by as many members of the groups as is possible--not by subcommittees
from the two groups.

This review COmmunicates the fundamental facts
11

and issues to all members who eventually will commit themselves to a
final pos1•t•10n. ul
3.

Developing a range of alternatives.

At this level joint

committees or subgroups develop a range of possible alternatives for
dealing with the previously defined and identified problems. This step
is particularly important because the joint investigation of solutions
avoids one or two alternatives that could propel the group into win-lose
deadlock.
4.

Debate of alternatives by the whole intergroup. At this step,

the committees report the reasons and rationale for each alternative to
the larger combined groups.
5.

Searching for solutions.

At this point, the joint groups or

joint subcommittees test those alternatives that seem realistic and
feasible and which the groups agree upon as having some prospect of being
effective.
6.

Exploration and evaluation of solutions by the intergroup.

Following joint subcommittee exploration or the solutions, the combined
intergroup evaluates each of the proposed solutions.

At this point,

"Combinations of solutions or new solutions previously not seen may be

lslake, op.cit., p. 91.

---------------·-·-·---¥---------·--~~------··~-----=---------------~-----------·
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""'

discovered through the rich interchange possible in a large intergroup
•
11 1
discuss1on
7. Weighing alternative solutions.

At this step in intergroup prob-

lem solving the entire intergroup rank the tested solutions in
from best to poorest.
subcommittees ..

~

sequence

However, this ranking may be accomplished in joint

If this step is taken, then the ranked solutions are

returned to the combined intergroup for review, discussion, and selection.
The solution that seems best in the light of all facts and events can then
2
be sifted from the rankings 11 ,
11

To summarize the foregoing outline or sequence of intergroup problem solving, Blake points out the following:
The important feature of this sequence, however, is that the
joint subgroups define the problem, search for alternative
solutions, and evaluate each possible solution for the problems identified. In contrast, the common approach is to retain
group boundaries where each group does its own work privately
and separately form the group with who it eventually must find
agreement.
When the joint group step is taken, conditions produce facts,
not misunderstandings, to serve as the basis for finding a
solution. Omission of such joint effort invariably leads to
the use of power or compromise. Dysfunctional approaches to
intergroup relations are applied when two independent positions
are developed from a full set of different circumstances. The
inevitable result is that the two viewpoints are understood
only partially by both of the groups since neither has the
opportunity to assess fully the thinking or the reasons behind
the other group's analysis. 3

1Blake, 012.cit., p. 92.

2Ibid., p.
92.
3Ibid., p. 93.
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Post-negotiation Committees.

The human relations strategy assumes

that some negotiation issues are not amenable to the style of decision
making just described, and therefore, other mechanisms are available.
One common device is to defer final resolution of some particularly thorny
crisis bargaining issue to a post-negotiation committee.

In brief, it is

a labor-management committee which may shorten or avert a strike by
referral of a controversial issue to a more thorough, reasoned consideration than is possible jn a crisis climate. 1
Continuing Joint Committees.

Another type of joint committee is

one which meets intermittenly or regularly throughout the life of the
contract.

Such a corrmittee may study specific subject matters referred

to it by the negotiators or it may establish its agenda as it goes along.2
Continuing committees of this type can promote intergroup communication
as well as resolve immediate problems which should not be postponed for
regular bargaining sessions.
In final analysis, pure, integrative human relations bargaining is
a limited phenomenon in collective bargaining relationships, and more often
than not, the parties become entangled in the win-lose distributive appraach
to conflict resolution.

The ultimate manifestation of distributive

bargaining is the strike which is discussed next.

lwilliam E. Simkin, Positive Approaches To LaborPeace, Critical
Issues In Labor, ed. Max S. Wortman, Jr. (New York: t1acmil1an Co., 1969),
11

11

p. 342.

2Ibid., pp. 342-243.

..
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THE STRIKE: AN APPROACH TO RESOLVING BARGAINING IMPASSE
The haman relations

appro~ch

to dispute settlement is a strategy

urged by many social psychologists who believe that the exercise of "winwin" group dynamics such as collaboration and trust will serve to resolve
Another group of social scientists offer quite

bargaining impasses.

different advice to the·problem of impasse resolution.

They focus on the

concept of pm·1er-- i •e. , the abi 1i ty of one group to determine or influence
the behavior of another group--and the strategic use of power instruments
such as the strike.l
The Role Of The Strike In The Private Sector
Many experts in the field of labor relations concur on the fundamental idea that resolution of collective bargaining conflict is promoted
in an environment where the bargaining adversaries can exert equal pressure on each other.

In particular, these authorities see the pressures

of the strike as the common denominator that underlies successful groupto-group interaction because such a tactic elicits potential economic
and political "costs which the parties want to avoid; in turn, the dangers
11

and inconveniences prompt concession-making and compromises which culminate in a mutual agreement.

Goulard explains how pressure can prevent

bargaining conflict from escalating into overt conflict:

1

Richard E. Walton, "Two Strategies of Social Change And Their
D1lemmas," The Planning Of Change, edited by Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth.D.
Benne, & Robert Chin (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969), pp. 167-168.
.
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... it is a generally held belief that true collective bargaining
flowers luxuriantly where the contending forces enjoy reasonably
comparable economic power. The reasoning is that where mutual fear
or respect exists, each party is loath to test its economic strength,
and instead explores at length the merits and equities of the opposing party's position. The resultant joint analysis of the issues·
is supposed to bring about just and reasonable solutions, without
resort to economic warfare in the vast majority of cases.l
Bakke and associates also explain that when the dangers of a potential

strike permeate the bargaining atmosphere, settlement behavior is facilitated
The right to bargain collectively ... rests ultimately on the right of
the workers to strike, or that of the employer to "lock out" his
workers. Yet calling a strike, like any declaration of war, involves
a grave risk because there is no quarantee that the union will win.
The employer is, of course, faced with an equal uncertainty. Hence
a strike or even the threat of a strike offers a strong inducement
to the parties to come to an understanding rather than to risk defeat.
Consequently, the right to strike, if used wisely and responsibly,
performs a useful function in the system of collective bargaining. 2
Another who is representative of authorities who look upon the strike
as a means to generate agreement is Jack Stieber, Director of the School
of Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University:
... the threat or actual use of these economic weapons is supposed to
perform a useful function by exerting reciprocal pressures upon the
parties to modify their positions to the extent necessary to bring
about an agreement. Throughout the dispute both parties are subject
to market pressures where the consumer's power of choice is exercised.
Jobs can and have been lost and markets seriously depleted by long
strikes or settlements leading to non-competitive price increases~3

lEverett ~1. Goulard, "The Collective Bargaining Environment In Two
Sectors: The Environment In Industries Regulated by Statute," Collective
Bargaining Today (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970),
p. 281.
2E. Wight Bakke, Clark Kerr, and Charles W. Anrod, Unions, Mana ement,

And The Public, 2nd Edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace an Co., 1960 , p.231.
3
Jack Stieber, "Collective Bargaining In the Public Sector," Challenges
To Collective Bargaining, ed. by Lloyd Ulman {Ne\'1 Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1967), pp. 82-83.
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Strike In Public Education

collective bargaining, whether in the private or the public sector, is
a power relationship beb1een two parties.

As Wesley Wildman of the University

of Chicago has written, collective bargaining in public education is a ''power
relationsh·ip and a process of power accommodation, the essence of which is
compromise ana concession-making on matters over which there is conflict bebtee11

the teacher organization and the board." 1 Accord-ing to this statement,

power, or the capacity to influence the opponent through such means as re't'tards
and punishments, must pervade the school bargaining atmosphere too.

Theoret-

ically, wlien both sides live in fear of being economically or politically
disadvantaged, they are motivated to seek agreement and compromise.

Each

side weighs the costs of agreeing to a proposal or making a concession against
the risks and costs--i.e., loss of salary for teachers and loss of community
support and/or state aid for school employers--of a strike or unilateral
employer action at impasse. As in the private sector, when mutual dangers or
costs exist, "agreement is usually reached prior to impasse without outside
intervention and pressure. 112 David Seldon of the American Federation of
Teachers capsu.lizes the value of the strike in teacher collective bargaining
by stating, "Where the right--and the willingness--to strike exists, most
disputes

~rill

be settled without an actual walkout.

Both sides then have an

1wesley A. VJildman, "What's Negotiable?" The Collective Dilemma:

,

~eg?tiatio!"!~tn

Education, ed. by Patrick W. Carlton and Harold I. Goodwin
Oh1o: Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1969), p. 70. .
2oonald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin, The Law And Practice Of Teacher:
Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1970) '

p. 6:46.

-
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endorses the strike as a force which promotes the resolution of intergroup
. bargaining conflict:
The most serious single obstacle to effective functioning of collective
negotiations in public education is the absence of a bargaining force
which motivates the school board toward bona fide bargaining and a
genuine effort to reach an agreement which the teacher representative
can accept with some degree of enthusiasm ... Most, although not all,
school boards are not •deal-minded.• They are not disposed to accept
the process as one of give-and-take. They have no sense of crisis and
no feeling of urgency. They are content to let •negotiations• drag
toward budget submission deadlines, comfortable in the thought that if
no agreement has been reached by then, they are free to act unilaterally
in accordance with the tradition of managerial sovereignty to which they
are accustomed.z
While the foregoing authorities have indicated that power and the strike
are relevant to the problem of impasse resolution in school bargaining, some
. writers argue that the strike cannot be transplanted into the public education

Inegotiations scene without problems.

The problems focus on (1) the monopolis-

. tic status of public education and (2) the essential services .. argument.
11

The public Education Monopoly.
education is monopolistic in nature.

Like many governmental services, public
That is, there are few substitutes for

such services and virtually no fear on the part of school management that they

I will

11

90

out of business 11 during a strike.

Due to a lack of competition,

·economic and market pressures which operate in the private sector do not
1oavid Seldon,
1965, p. 75.

11

Needed: More Teacher Strikes, .. Saturday Review, May 15,

2wollett and Chanin, op. cit., p. 6:46.
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1

the strike weapon with its concurrent reciprocal pressures are, therefore,
reduced because the strike is not a pure economic weapon.

In contrast, when

private sector unions use the strike and the strike threat, equal economic
costs are imposed on the parties because there is a competitive· market
place.l It should be noted, however, that a teacher strike can be an effective economic weapon in a monopolistic setting when the school employer loses
state aid money during a work stoppage, thus insuring reciprocal dangers.

In

sum, notwithstanding the fact that pure economic distinctions do exist between
private employment and public education, mutual economic pressures or costs
can be generated which motivate the parties to move toward settlement.
Essential Services Argument.

While the strike is the basic component

in private sector dispute machinery, the unique characteristics of public
employment preclude the immediate application of the labor model to all public
sector impasses.2 Specifically, it is frequently maintained that public
services like education, police, and fire protection are essential, and continuity of service must be guaranteed. Succinctly, disruption of such serv·i ces
due to a strike jeopardizes the health and safety of the publ'ic welfare.

Be-

cause of the 11 essential services 11 argument, other impasse resolution procedures--mediation, fact-finding, and in some cases, even arbitration--have been
lHarry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., 11 Structuring Collective
Bargaining In Public Employment," Yale Law Journal, April, 1970, pp. 846-847.
2stieber, op. cit., p. 79.

.
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developed to eliminate reliance upon the strike as a means of resolving
employment di_sputes.

These strike substitutes will be discussed

shortly.
While the essentiality argument is easily applied to such critical
public sector areas as police and fire service, it can be overcome with respect to public education simply because a teachers' strike, though inconvenient, does not create imminent peril or risk to the health and safety of a
community.

Lost school days can be recaptured, and obviously, a health crisis

is not precipitated when schools close for holidays, weekends, or summer
vacation .. Stieber quotes Professor Myron Lieberman, a nationally recognized
expert on teacher-board negotiations, on this point:
... schools are closed for summer, Christmas, Easter and thanksgiving
vacations, for football games, basketball tournaments, harvesting,
teachers' conventions, inclement weather, presidental visits, and for
a host of other reasons without anyone getting excited over the harm
done to the children.1
Furthermore, it should be noted that four states have legislatively
made an essential-services distinction--i.e., they have recognized the difference in public sector work stoppages and have consequently relaxed the prohibition against teacher strikes.

In 1969, Vermont enacted a teacher negotia-

tions statute which evidenced the idea that a blanket ban on all public
employee strikes is unrealistic.

While this statute does

~ot

explicitly

prohibit or permit strikes--it is silent on this matter--the law does contain
the following important language relevant to strike injunctions:
1stieber, op. cit., p. 79.
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No restraining order on temporary or permanent injunction shall be
granted in any case brought with respect to any action taken by a
representative organization or an official thereof or by a school board
or representative thereof in connection with or relating to pending or
future negotiations, except on the basis of findings of fact make by a
court of competent jurisdiction after due hearing prior to the issuance
of the restraining order on injunction that the commencement or continuance of the action poses a clear and present danger to a sound program
of school education which in the light of all relevant circumstances it
is in the best public interest to prevent. Any restraining order of
injunction issued by a court as herein provided shall prohibit only a
specific act or acts expressly determined in the findings of fact to
pose a clear and present danger.1
In 1970, Hawaii and Pennsylvania became the first states to authorize strikes
by public employees.

In these two laws, teachers were granted "conditional 11

strike rights because mediation and fact-finding procedures must be exhausted
first:
The Hav.1aii law provides for mediation and fact-finding first.
Then, if an impasse still exists, employees may strike upon ten-day notice
and after a mandatory 60-day cooling-off period. The state labor relation
board set up under the law may set requirements that the union must comply
with regarding essential services or to avoid imminent or present danger
in strike situations.
The Pennsylvania law permits strikes by all employees except securi
forces--police, fire, and guards in prisons and mental hospitals--and
court personnel. It also mandates mediation and fact-finding first.
Then, if an impasse still exists, the employees may strike unless there is
a "clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or welfare
of the gublic." When such a threat is found by a court, an injunction is
issued.2
The most recent legislative breakthrough relevant to teacher strike
rights occurred in Oregon•s 1973 legislative session when lawmakers amended a

1vermont, Certificated Employees Bargaining Act, § 2010.
2committee On Executive Management And Fiscal Affairs, National
Governors• Conference, 1970 Supplement To Report Of Task Force On State And
Local Government Labor Relations (Chicago: Public Personnel Association,
1971), p. 52 •.
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bargaining statute legalizing the right to strike.
Pennsylvania~

Similar to Hawaii and

teachers may strike only after the exhaustion of mediation

and fact-finding, and then only if a strike would not be harmful to the
community. In addition, if the strike is restrained by a court order because
of public peril, binding arbitration is used to terminate the dispute.
Notwith~tanding

the .argument that (1) collective bargaining based on

the right to strike can move the parties toward more equal bargaining power
and greater labor peace, and (2) that both the monoply and essential services problems can be mitigated in the public education sector, the controversy surrounding the strike will continue to muster strength for alternative impasse-resolving machinery in the form of mediation, fact-finding,
and arbitration.

These structures for dispute resolution, sometimes re-

ferred to as 11 conciliation and appeal strategies, 11 \'lill be examined shortly.
To fully appreciate these strategies, however, it is necessary to discuss
the most desirable format for dispute settlement--that of 11 direct negotiations. 11
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
Arnold Zack, an experienced mediator, fact-finder, and arbitrator
in both public and private sectors, categorically states that voluntary
dispute settlement directly between the parties is the best means for
resolving conflict in an industrial relationship;
Direct negotiation, is, without doubt, the most desirable format for dispute settlement; for if there is to be a workable agreement, it must come directly from the partners to the relationship.
Even if there is outside neutral intervention through recommendations, or an arbitration award, such reports are not
ating·
or self-enforcing and, in the last analysis, must
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the parties themselves before implementation. Thus, since the parties·
must finally accommodate language with which they must live for the
period of the agreement, direct negotiation remains the keystone of
collective bargaining.
Nonetheless, while it is a preferable goal that the disputants work
out their conflict alone, direct negotiations between the parties may fail
to culminate in agreement, and since the legal strike is not usually in
the background as pressure for direct settlement, teachers and school management can avail themselves of a long ladder of procedures to resolve
collective bargaining disputes.

These are the appeal devices or reconcilia-

tion strategies of mediation, followed by fact-finding with nonbinding
recommendations, and binding arbitration.
t1EDIATION

The most common device used to bring disputing parties to agreement
is mediation, in which a neutral third party functions as an extension of
the direct negotiations process. 2 Joseph R. Crowley, of the New York State
Public Employment Relations Board, characterizes the process in this manner:
... Essentially mediation is the interjection of a third party to act
as a catalyst in reaching agreement. Mediation is unstructured. The
process of mediation varies with the parties, the personalities, and
the state of negotiations. A mediator does not dictate; he persuades
and advises. Depending upon the circumstances, he will sometimes meet
with each party separately, other times with both pa~ties, and still

1Arnold M. Zack, Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, Public Workers
And Public Unions, edited by Sam Zagoria (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1972)' p. 106.
2Arnold M. Zack, · Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, .. Industrial
Relations Law Digest, July, 1969, p. 4.
11

11

11
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other times with the chief negotiator for each side.
he will simply be present and silent.

Occasionally,

Mediation does serve one important function: It does result in
the clarification or reduction of the issues in impasse.!
According to Zack, the mediation machinery is perceived to be an
effective means of resolving disputes between labor and management in the
private sector. 2 However, while it has been generally successful as'a way
to produce agreement and salvage a relationship, the mediation procedure
may fail to make a contribution in resolving conflict because of the
following reasons:
(1)

Hostility or the noncommunicativeness of the parties.3

(2)

Unacceptability of the mediator.4

(3) The mediation process may be rejected on political grounds.
While mediators have no legal authority to impose a settlement--they play a
role of suggesting compromises and alternative settlements--their unofficial power can be so great that it becomes politically impossible to reject
their recommendation. This is one reason why management teams tend, more

1Joseph R. Cro\'1ley,

Impasse Procedures In Collective Negotiations, 11
Collective Bargaining Today (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Affairs,
1970), pp. 158-159.
2Arnold M. Zack, 11 Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, 11 op.cit., p. 108.
p. 4.

3Arnold M. Zack,
4Ibid., p.4.

11

11

Dispute Settlement In The.Public Sector, 11 op.cit.,

-------~~~~---------~----------·----·----------·--------~------------------------~
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than teachers, to avoid mediation; they fear that mediation will exert
pressure on the board to modify its position." 1
(4)

Public sector mediation takes place in a different economic

environment than private sector mediation:
... the private sector mediator works in the context of a free labor
market, business competition, profit levels, and the like. These
factors,are not controlling in the public sector where tax structure,
legislative controls on budgets, state aid formulae, and civil
service rules tend to be more pertinent standards. The mediator must
learn to work within a context that forbids the employer from going
out of business or immediately passing on the increased cost of
settlement to the consumer.2
Mediators have little or no prior experience in public sector

(5)

bargaining.

As Zack explains,

different from the traditional
seniority, and the like.

11

the issues in dispute tend to be quite

privat~

sector problems of wages, hours,

The public sector mediator must learn not only a

wholly new vocabulary, he must also learn to deal with questions of classroom size, tenure, curriculum development, police-fire parity, and the
1ike. u3

(6)
context.

Public sector mediation takes place in a different psychological
11

In the private sector the pressures for direct settlement are

perhaps greater with the legal strike lurking in the background. 11 4 In

lt~yron Lieberman,

What To Do When The Talks Break Down,- 11 School
Management, April, 1969, p. 26.
2Arnold M. Zack,
3 I bi d • , p • 108 •

4Ibid . , p. 106.

11

11

Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, op.cit., p. 108.
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contrast, public education bargaining usually occurs without the silent
partner of the strike; and with the absence of such pressure, communication
as well as movement between the parties stagnates.

In brief, the lack of a

strike threat tends to dilute the effectiveness of a public sector mediator.
"If the strike ... were legalized in the public sector as the alternative to
settlement at mediation, this would most certainly tend to increase the
number of settlements in mediation.ul
(7) Another deterrent to effective mediation is that it is too often
imposed on one or both parties rather than being mutually desired.

Zack says:

If a jurisdiction does not provide for a formal impasse procedure,
the parties are free to negotiate one between themselves, provided that
collective bargaining is authorized for the state. Such self-developed
procedures benefit from a positive orientation of the parties toward
settlement, and are likely to be more effective than if one of the
parties is dragged screaming into an appeal procedure that it considers
imposed from on high.
The success of any machinery is related to the extent to which
the parties voluntarily accept it. Thus as direct negotiation is more
desirable than third party intervention, mediation or conciliation
with its emphasis on voluntarism must be deemed to be more desirable
than fact-finding. And fact-finding, since it is advisory· and requires
consent of the parties for implementation of any rec~mmendations, is
considered more acceptable than binding arbitration.
Charles R. Perry, who researched impasse resolution experience in eight
public school systems, concurs that mediation should be used only if both
~

parties agree to seek and accept the services of a mediato~.3

lArnold M. Zack, 11 1mpasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, 11 op.cit.,
pp. 106, 109.
2 Ibid., p. 107. ·
3charles R. Perry,. 11 lmpasse Resolution In Education 11 (unpublished
Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968), p. 246.

--..
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Due to the influence of some of the foregoing factors, mediation may
fail to successfully conclude negotiations.

Other steps such as fact-find-

ing and arbitration may then be invoked in an effort to resolve the bar-·
gaining conflict.
FACT FINDING
Fact-finding is typically the second procedure used to resolve impasses over new contract terms in pub 1i c emp 1oyment, and it is spe 11 ed out
in various forms in at least twenty-four state statutes. 1 Usually, factfinders review the intergroup conflict by conducting hearings where each
party has an opportunity to state its case.

The fact-finders then issue a

report which in.cludes a recommendation for settlement.

In most instances,

these recommendations are not binding on the parties.2 In Nevada, the factfinder can act in either a recommendatory or binding capacity, depending
upon the will of the bargaining parties. 3 Because of its non-binding nature,
the term fact-finding
11

is synonymous with the term advisory arbitration"

11

11

in that the recommendations of the fact-finder or advisory arbitrator are
advisory only and are not binding on either party. 4 If the parties fail to

p. 5.

1Arnold r~. Zack,

11

Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit.,

2
Lieberman, op.cit., p. 28.
3state Labor Laws 38:228.
4wayne F. Anderson, R. Theodore Clark, Jr., and John T. Weise, FactFindin In The Public Sector--A Case Stud (Chicago: Public Personnel----Association, 1970 , p. 2.
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abide by the recommendations, further procedures are sometimes available.
For example, ·under the New York Taylor Act, \'/hen the bargainers refuse the
recommendations, the dispute is given to the local legislature--i.e., board
of education--for final determination.
Zack further explains the basic characteristic of fact-finding:
Fact-finding is procedurally akin to arbitration in terms of
providing a forum for the presentation of diverse views of the parties
as well as providing a neutral individual or board to weigh the claims
of both the employer and the employee organization in the light of
equitable or reasonable standards for the positions involved. But it
lacks the finality of either voluntary or compulsory arbitration and
as a result neither side is bound to do more than receive and hope- 1
fully respect, embrace and agree to the recommendations of the board.
As a substitute for the economic weapon of the strike, fact-finding
is based on the conviction that the political process can be used to resolve
public sector bargaining disputes.

In theory, fact-finders who are empower-

ed to make recommendations or advisory avmrds will be able to provide an
effective political substitute for the strike.

That is, fact-finding is

premised upon the assumption that the recommendations or decisions of neutral
parties will be persuasive to the community, as well as to the teachers'
organization, and the board of education. 2
How effective is the power of political persuasion through the utilization of fact-finding accompanied by public recommendations? With respect
to public employees in general, Professor James Stern has analyzed the first

p. 6.

1Arnold ~1. Zack,

11

Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit.,

2
Arvid Anderson, Strikes And Impasse Resolution In Public Employment, ..
Michigan Law Review, March, 1969, pp. 953-954.
11
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three years of experience with fact-finding in Wisconsin, a state which has
had the most experience with fact-finding in public employee disputes, and
concluded that over seventy percent of the fact-finding awards have served
as a basis for settlement of disputes. 1 With respect to fact-finding in
public education, Perry notes that fact-finding should be available as a
mechanism for resolving teacher-board bargaining disputes.

Moreover,

Perry

maintains that the substitution of a political process of impasse resolution
for the strike weapon would facilitate more stable bargaining relationships
2
in the public education environment.
As just noted, fact-finding has received approval from some experts in
the labor-management field.

Nevertheless, the fact-finding with recommen-

dations route, for one reason or another, does not always bring about the
end of a negotiations dispute.
settlement
(1)

~recess

The problems inherent in this dispute

are discussed as follows:

One condition which impedes fact-finding success is that "Both

parties ... have a convenient dodge, because of their advisory nature, to·
avoid compliance with the recommendations. 113 That is, the fact-finder has
no mandatory power of ordering compliance with his decision as is found in

1
stieber, op.cit., p. 75.
2Perry, op.cit., p. 244-246.
3Arnold M. Zack,

11

0ispute Settlement In The Public Sector," op.cit.,

p. 6.

..
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binding arbitration.

To state the problem in another way, fact-finding

success is measured by "the acceptability of recommendations."1
(2} A second reason for fact-finding failure is related to the

ide~

that the very presence of such appeal machinery may itself interfere with
settlement via the route of either direct negotiations or mediation.

More

precisely, it interferes. with the normal bargaining process:
... Fact-finding has, in fact, come to be accepted as yet another
appeal beyond mediation. It is evident that the parties increasingly
seek to utilize all the available steps of the procedure, to get their
little bit more." The very availability of fact-finding tends to
assure its invocation, and consequently diminishes to some degree
the likelihood of settlement in mediation. Mediation, with fact-finding waiting in the wings, sometimes takes on the appearance of a rite
which must be gone through before the parties get to real crisis
bargaining. The problem is made somewhat worse by the fact-finder's
tendency .to delve enthusiastically into what transpired at mediation
so he can gauge the area of acceptability of his own report. If this
happens in one year's impasse, it assuredly will lead the parties the
next year to hold offers of compromise close to their chest during
mediation, recognizing that they will have to yield even more when they
get to fact-finding, or beyond.
11

Unquestionably the effectiveness of mediati~n would be improved if
fact-finding were not so readily available....
·
In short, fact-finding, as a method of resolving negotiations impasse, can
be criticized because the parties may wait for fact-finding rather than
seriously endeavoring to reach direct agreement by themselves.

3

1Anderson, op.cit., p. 966.
2Arnold M. Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," op.cit., p. 112.
3crm'lley, op.cit., p. 159.
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As indicated above, closure of impasse may not be achieved through
the fact-finding process, thus necessitating the additional step of arbitration.
BINDING ARBITRATION: COMPULSORY AND VOLUNTARY
Because mediation and fact-finding may not be accepted as final,
strikes may still occur.

Another dispute settlement mechanism has, there-

fore, been invented to prevent the strike.

This device is called binding

arbitration and is characterized as follows:
Binding arbitration incorporates many of the virtues attributed
to fact-finding: (1) the expert neutral; (2) taking evidence from
both sides on the merits of their positions in a judicial manner;
(3) issuing a report based on \'/hat the arbitrator determines to be
the appropriate resolution of the dispute. The prime difference
of course is that the arbitrator's award is final and binding. This,
the advocates of arbitration assert, is what is necessary to bring
a finality to employer-employee disputes, to protect the public interest, and to assure that the neutral •s report is accepted. It is at
the same time the device to bring into line the militant employee
groups, as well as the reluctant 11 king can do no '.'Jrong 11 employers.l
To further describe binding arbitration, it is necessary to distinguish between two arbitration techniques used in the area of new contract
dispute settlement.

The first is compulsory binding arbitration, and the

second is called voluntary binding arbitration.
Zack explains compulsory arbitration in this manner:
Compulsory arbitration presupposes a legal requirement that an unresolved dispute be submitted to a judicial body at a certain time in
the process of negotiation, presumably prior to the bud~et deadline.

1Arnold M. Zack,

11

Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions, .. op.cit., p. 118.
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At that point there would be solicitation of the parties• views and·
thereafter a binding determination by a single or group of neutrals,
provided for under the enabling legislation. The details of such compulsory arbitration systems vary. The essentia) element of compulsory
arbitration is that it is? predesigned final solution to the conflict,·
which the parties are required to utiliLe if they are unable to resolve their disputes by direct negotiation.
The effectiveness of compulsory arbitration as a substitute for the
right to strike in the public employment field depends upon the expertise
of neutral decision makers.

The Pennsylvania collective bargaining law,

which utilizes arbitration as a method of resolving disputes involving
police

an~

firemen, provides for a neutral tripartite board, with the

neutral to be agreed upon by the parties, or to be selected from a list
provided by the American Arbitration Association. 2
In the second kind of arbitration--voluntary binding arbitration--we
discover that it is not 11 preordained 11 as in compulsory arbitration. That
is, this means of impasse resolution is 11 Something that the parties at a
particular time in their negotiations willfully and voluntarily undertake
as an alternative to the impasse or economic force (of a strike)· or even· as
an alternative to the labor court.

The essence of voluntary arbitration

is that, although the award is legally binding, it is something the parties
themselves have agreed to utilize and they are thus morally comri1itted to it
as well. 113

p. 5.

2002.
p. 5.

1Arnold M. Zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit.,
2Pennsylvania, P~blic Employee Relations Act, Article XX, Section
3Arnold M. Zack,

11

0ispute Settlement In The Public Sector, op.cit.,

r
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Both arbitration processes have proponents as well as opponents.
ManY who advance the "essential services" argument endorse compulsory
arbitration because it preserves the continuity of necessary public services;
i.e., it assures that any impasse will be resolved without interruption of
.
1
serv1ces.

Compulsory

arbitr~tion

more enemies than proponents.

also has its critics.

Indeed, it seems to have

These people attack this conflict resolution

process for a variety of reasons:
(1) Some authorities claim it has a negative impact on direct negotia-

tions between the parties; that is, this kind of third party determination
can frustrate the negotiating process.

Specifically, Zack argues that when

this device is provided, there is that chance that "the parties with untenable positions would assume and hold to extreme postions in order to force
compulsory arbitrat1on. 2 Furthermore, he says that the parties may adhere
to their extreme positions in hope that "the more extreme their position,
the closer to their real goals will come the split-the-difference award." 3
Lieberman writes, "reliance upon third party arbitration weakens the incentive to agree at the negotiating table." 4

lzack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, 11 op. cit., p-. 7.
2
Ibid . , p. 7 .
3Arnold M. Zack, "Impasses, Strikes, and Resolutions," op.cit., p. 118.
4Lieberman, op.cit., p. 28.

-x
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·f" crowley also regards compulsory arbitration as detrimental to the negoti::
Ii. ting process because if third party determination is at the end of the negotiating road, the "parties will not engage in meaningful negotiations.~!

II

Virgil B. Day concurs by stating that, 11 Any time one party to

n~goti ati ons

sees potential gain in intervention, he will make no serious effort to
settle without it. 112 Perry and Wildman say that compulsory binding arbitration has not proven to be an effective impasse resolution mechanism in
contract negotiations because it tends to undermine collective bargaining
and encourage bargaining impasses.

11

This is a function of the fact that the

imposition of arbitration relieves the parties of the ultimate responsibility for decision-making and the consequences of any failure to reach agreement, thereby eliminating the incentive to seek or accept compromise in the
course of bargaining. 113

In short, authority consensus seems to say that

compulsory arbitration is a deterrent to direct negotiations.
(2) A second objection to compulsory arbitration is that 11 it is a
delegation of legislative power to arbitrators--who are not elected officials and who are not responsible directly to the people--to decide the
cost of government or to determine the methods to be used in carrying out
1crowley, op. cit., p. 161.
2virgil B. Day, 11 The Responsibilities-of Labor and ~1anagement: Will
The Private Sector Serve The Public Needs?" Collective Bargaining Today
(Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970), p. 28.
3charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman, The Impact Of Negotiations In
Public Education: The Evidence From The Schools (Worthington, Ohio: Charles
A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970), p. 91-92.
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the responsibility of elected officials." 1
(3) Thirdly, some discredit the machinery because it can lead to
fully controlled labor management relationship, and, indeed, even to a
fully controlled economy ... 2 While this device might be the answer to re11

solving impasses in such essential services as police and fire, compulsory
arbitration may spread to other less essential services in the public sector,
namely, public education, as well as to services in the private sector, thus
creating a threat to free collective bargaining.
(4) . A fourth argument is psychological in nature.

Experiment£ in

intergroup conflict have clearly revealed that when two groups reach impasse, the solution provided by an outside third-party consultant is not
really a 11 Solution 11 • Harold J. Leavitt 3 says that while the winning group
readily accepts the third-party decision, the losing group, by contrast,
will usually feel disgruntled.

In particular,

11

Strikes by employees dis-

satisfied with an arbitrator's award are likely to occur or, even if there
is no actual strike, there is likelihood of slowdown, blue flu, mass resignation, etc.

The machinery is valuable only to the extent to which the

parties wish to abide by it. 114 Decisions are best implemented when they are
1crowley, op. cit., p. 161.
2Arnold M. Zack, "Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector," Industrial
Relations Law Digest, July, 1969, p. 8.
3Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychologt_ (Chicago.: The University of
Chicago Press, 1964), p. 292.
4zack, "Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector," op. cit., p. 7.

formulated by the two negotiating parties themselves.
(5)
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Another argument, related to the foregoing, is explained by

Zack:
... if compulsory arbitration is not truly desired by either or
both of the parties, how can it be effectively administered? Is
there really any way to compulsorily impose good faith compliance
with detested procedures? A proceeding that goes on v1ithout the
cooperation of.one of the parties can hardly be likely to result
in a tenable settlement.!
(6}

Zack presents a further problem:

the nature of the neutral as a governmental appointee, is such
that he is likely to be instructed to serve as the protector of
the public interest. He is not likely to be committed to the
development of mutuality and rapport between the parties, or to
serving as their agent. Thus, he is likely to be subject to legislative and public pressures. Therefore, the traditional role
of the neutral~ as one both parties have faith in to help them
reach their settlement, is sacrificed to the expedient of keeping
tax rates down. This orientation is likely to further detract
from acceptability of the neutral, and increase the prospects of
non-cooper~tion, or worse, non-compliance with his awards.2

lzack, "Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector," op.cit., p. 8.
2zack, Ibid.,

pp. 8-9.
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{7) A final objection to the umpiring system of compulsory binding
arbitration is advanced by Abel who feels that the resolution of bargaining
disputes via arbitration will only 11 destroy the existing system of communication by causing the parties to communicate with the public, or the
arbitrator, or the governmental intervener, rather than with each other. 111
Indeed, he reminds us that collective bargaining has worked because ''it has
provided workers with an effective means of communicating their complaints 11
to management.

2

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
In at least one way, the voluntary arbitration procedure is similar to
compulsory arbitration:

an expert neutral is essential to both and can be

selected either by a neutral organization such as the American Arbitration
Association or by the parties directly.

However, in either case 11 the par-

ties would be provided with the choice of the individual and with the right
to establish the scope of his authority, 113
In reference to its value, the most pragmatic reason for utilizing
voluntary arbitration is that the bargaining opponents are usually more
committed to adhere to the neutral •s findings than is the case in compulsory
1

r.w.

Abel, 11 The Collective Bargaining Environment in Two Sectors: In
Private Nonregulated Industry, .. Collective Bargaining Today, bp. cit.,
p. 280.
2 Ibid., p. 279.

3zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, .. op. cit., p. 9.
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arbitration.

Paraphrased, since the parties are willing to undertake it,

theY are, therefore, morally obligated to abide by a third-party determination.

1

As a substitute for strikes, voluntary arbitration machinery may seem
more valuable than compulsory arbitration.

Zack, however, reminds us that

this method of conflict resolution is not an absolute answer, and refers .us
to certain limitations:

First, because its nature is voluntaryism, there is

no assurance that this process will be used.

Second, while the parties are

more inclined to abide by third-party intervention, there is still no firm
assurance that the award will be complied with by the parties.

A third

problem has to do with the question of cost consequences of voluntary arbitration.

On one hand, for example, the umpire's award may result in higher

wages than through direct negotiations regardless of the ability of the
employer to pay.

And on the other side, the decision may set wages at a

less than desirable level in spite of the muscle of the particular employee
.
.
.
1ve d .
organ1zat1on
1nvo

2

Despite these dangers, Zack concludes that 11 V01untary arbitration
appears to have fewer obstacles to it than compulsory arbitration, and
greater finality than does fact-finding with recommendations.

Indeed,

voluntary arbitration appears to be the only truly effective way of resolving many of the serious problems that we are increasingly being confronted
with by contracts in the field of public employment. 113
1

zack, 11 Dispute Settlement In The Public Sector, .. op. cit., p. 10.
2Ibid., p. 11.
3
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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SUMMARY
In reviewing the various procedures for resolving bargaining impasses
public education, professional literature suggests the following:
(1)

The most ideal solution is that the parties learn to negotiate

with each other in good faith and mutual respect.

This is called the direct
11

negotiations .. approach to dispute settlement.
(2)

The direct negotiations approach to impasse resolution should be

based on the 11 human relations 11 strategy which emphasizes cooperative efforts,
joint-committee problem solving, post-negotiation committees, and regular
joint study meetings throughout the year.
(3) A strike ban in public education is not essential and limits the
resolution of negotiations conflict because reciprocal pressures are removed from the bargaining atmosphere.

Mutual capacity for injury is the

constant prod to compromise and settlement psychology.

While the strike

seems antithetic to the human relations approach, the two strategies can be
complimentary.

The strike has been and will continue to be an effective

stimulus for both direct negotiations or mediated settlements.
(4)

Notwithstanding the factors wh.ich may impede mediation success,

mediation would seem to make a genuine contribution toward school bargaining
peace primarily because it is an extension of the direct negotiations
approach.
(5)

Fact-finding does not seem to be a proper vehicle for dispute

resolution in public education labor negotiations.

Authority opinion sug-

gests that appeal steps, such as fact-finding and arbitration, tend to

-
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minimize the value of direct negotiations and propel the parties toward
these other dispute settlement procedures.

That is, there is a tendency for

the parties to escalate towards third-party interventions· because they are
Fact-finding, ironically, can encourage bargaining impasses.

available.
(6)

Compulsory binding arbitration has many serious defects.

A major

problem is that the availability of this device may tempt the parties to
use it as a crutch.

The Let-George-Do-It syndrome weakens the possibility
11

11

that the parties will use the direct negotiations route to dispute settlement.

Teachers and school management must look to themselves for solutions

to bargaining problems, not to a third-party arbitrator.
(7)

Voluntary binding arbitration has fewer flaws than compulsory

arbitration.

Nevertheless, it may make the collective bargaining process

less effective because the parties abdicate their responsibilities for conflict resolution to a third party.
(8) According to authority opinion, the best social technology for
resolving teacher-school board bargaining disputes seems to be a combination
of the human relations approach, mediation, and the strike.
To conclude this chapter, the reader will note that TABLE 2 summarizes
the public education collective bargaining laws which have been enacted to
date as they relate to the problem of impasse resolution.
served that most of the laws provide for

m~diation

It can be ob-

and/or fact-finding.
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TABLE 2
A SUMMARY OF STATE BARGAINING LAWS
RELEVANT TO IMPASSE RESOLUTION
IN TEACHER NEGOTIATIONSa
State

Impasse Resolution Procedure

Alaska

11

California

By any procedure mutually acceptable. If no procedure
is agreed upon, a tripartite committee reports its findings at a public meeting of the parties. Non-binding
recommendations.

Connecticut

Mediation by State Board of Education; either party may
request advisory arbitration.

Delaware

Either party may request mediation by any method agreed
upon; either party may request fact-finding with
recommendations.

Florida

Advisory Arbitration.

Hawaii

Public Employee Relations Board appoints mediator or
mediators and fact-finding boards. Parties may agree
to submit unresolved issues to binding arbitration. If
the parties have not mutually agreed to submit the dispute to final and binding arbitration, either party
shall be free to take whatever lawful action it deems
necessary to end the dispute. This means that the
employees could strike but only after mediation and
fact-finding procedures have been exhausted.c

Mediation 11 with recommendations made public.b

asource of this summary, except for others indicated, comes from a summary of state labcw· laws in Government Employee Relations Report (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, December, 1971), pp. 11-31.
bThe term 11 mediation 11 as used in the Alaska teachers statute (amended
in
1971) is the same procedure as most other jurisdictions refer to as
11
fact finding. 11 The mediation board under the Alaska statute hears evidence
and issues findings and recommendations.
estate Labor Laws (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs,
1971), 21: 231-232.

--
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TABLE 2--Continued
State

Impasse Resolution Procedure

Idaho

Mediation followed by fact-finding with recommendations.

Indiana

Mediation and fact-finding supervised by Indiana
Educational Employment Relations Board.

Kansas

None

Maine

Mediation; upon request of parties, Board of Arbitration and Conciliation or Commisioner of Department
of Labor and Industry provides fact-finding with recommendations. If parties fail to reach agreement,
may request arbitration services. Binding determinations except on matters. concerning salaries, pensions,
and insurance. Either party may seek review of any
binding determination in the Superior Court.

Maryland

panel appointed upon request of parties;
if impasse not resolved, panel makes report and
recommendations.a

Massachusetts

Fact-finding with non-binding recommendations.
finder may function as mediator.b

Michigan

Mediation and fact-finding with non-binding recommendations.

Minnesota

Adjustment panel of three persons conducts informal
conference and hearings upon request of parties.
~lakes findings.

11

~1ediation

11

Fact-

aThe term 11 mediation" as used in the ~1aryland Teachers Lav/ (1969) is
the same procedure as most other jurisdictions refer to as 11 fact-finding".
The mediation board under the ~laryland statute hears evidence and issues
findings and recommendations.
bstate Labor Laws, op.cit., 31: 248-249.
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State

Impasse Resolution Procedure

Montana

Senior District Judge submits list to parties for
selection of third member of impasse panel. Panel
makes findings of fact and recommendatio~s which are
made public. Either party may call for the threemember fact-finding panel.

Nebraska

Dispute submitted to ad hoc fact-finding board which
makes non-binding recommendations.

Nevada

Parties can construct their own impasse machinery or
mediation by mutual agreement of parties. Either
party can request fact-finding; the parties may agree
to make fact-finder's recommendations final and .binding. Thus fact-finder can act in either a recommendatory or binding capacity. Voluntary arbitration
can be either advisory or binding.a

New Hampshire

Parties may establish procedures for mediation,
fact-finding.

New Jersey

Voluntary mediation; Public Employment Relations
Commission recommends or invokes fact-finding with
recommendations; voluntary arbitration.

New York

Local determination allowed for resolving disputes
or Public Employment Relations Board provides media~
tors, fact-finding boards upon request of parties or
on its own initiative; recommendations of the factfinding board may be made public; if fact-finding
recommendations are not accepted, the local legislative body--i.e., school board--or committee thereof conducts hearing and makes final determination.

North Dakota

Parties may agree to mediation. On request of either
party, the Education Fact-finding Commission administers fact-finding amd makes recommenda~ions. Such
recommendations are made public.

astate Labor Laws, op.cit., 38: 228.
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State

Impasse Resolution Procedure

Oklahoma

Ad hoc fact-finding committee makes recommendations.

Oregon

Mediation provided by State Mediation and Conciliation Service; fact-finding. Strike is legal unless
there is a violation of health, safety, or welfare.
If strike is enjoined, compulsory binding arbitration is envoked. Voluntary binding arbitration
available at any time during the collective bargaining process.a

Pennsylvania

The parites may submit dispute voluntarily to mediation. If no agreement, the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Mediation shall be called in. Fact-finding panel of
one to three people may be appointed by Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board. Recommendations made public.
Teachers may strike if (1) a danger to public health
is not created, and (2) mediation and fact-finding
procedures have been exhausted. At any time, the
parties may submit impasse issues to voluntary
binding arbitration.b

Rhode Is.land

Either party may request mediation by the state
department of education. A panel of arbitrators
makes findings which are binding on·all matters not
involving the expenditure of money.c

South Dakota

Upon request of either party, Commissioner takes steps
as may be necessary for dispute resolution.

Texas

None.

auH.B. 2263: Fundamental New Bargaining Rights For Teachers, 11 Oregon
Education Association, Vol. 48, No. 3, (October, 1973), 8-9.
bstate Labor Laws, op.cit., 48: 226-228.
estate Negotiation Statutes: Special Memo M-4, (Washington, D.C.:
National Education Association, May, 1972).
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State

Impasse Resolution Procedure

Vermont

Mediation; fact-finding. Fact-finding committee
makes findings which are made public. Strikes are
permitted unless such action poses a clear and
present danger to a sound program of school education.

washington

Ad hoc committee of educators and school directors
for dispute settlement; makes written report with
non-binding recommendations.

Wisconsin

Wisconsin Employment Relations Board functions as
mediator, administers fact-finding cases and appoints
fact-finders upon receipt of petition from parties.
The fact-finding process may precede or follow
mediation.

---~\iia!'-~-a•
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CHAPTER III
A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT RESEA.RCH .

The previous chapter has been a description of at least five major
remedies for preventing or resolving school bargaining impasses.

For

the most part, that discussion was a review of authority opinion.

In

addition to authority viewpoints, a summary of research relevant to the
critical problem of impasse resolution in public education labor negotiations will be presented.

The only pertinent research which has been
accomplished in this area is by Charles R. Perry 1 and has subsequently
been reported in a volume co-authored by Perry and Wesley A. Wildman
entitled The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education: The Evidence
2
From The Schools. This chapter,will be a discussion of this important
work by summarizing both the specific research of Perry and the significant concepts presented in the book.

1charles R. Perry, Impasse Resolution In Education .. (unpublished
Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, 1968).
2charles R. Perry and Wesley A. Wildman, The Impact Of Negotiations
In Public Education: The Evidence From The Schools (Worthington, Ohio:
Charles A. Jones Publishing Co., 1970).
11
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Three Alternate Approaches For Impasse Resolution:

Research Evidence

From The Schools.
Since conflict is inherent in the collective bargaining process,
the ultimate goal of bargaining is a search and discovery for compromise
and concession-making between the adversaries.

In this goal, a wide range

of strategies is open to the parties in their effort to accommodate or
manage the conflict.

These strategies may be placed on a continuum bounded

by pure distributive bargaining and pure integrative bargaining.

Between

these twq polar strategies, the parties to a collective bargaining relationship in public education can choose several alternative bargaining
strategies as vehicles to effect settlement.

In analyzing the various

approaches to dispute settlement, three theoretical power bases have
been defined.

That is, any conflict resolution device must rest on one

.
1.
.
of t hree bases--econom1c,
po 1".
1t1ca 1 , or rat1ona

(1) Economic Approaches.

1

Economic approaches to impasse resolution

are based on a withholding of resources required or desired by the adversary.

The basic mechanism for an economic approach is the strike weapon

in which both the teachers and school management withhold something
essential.

For example, teachers can refuse to provide services on the

terms and conditions offered by management, and they can picket to publicize the existence of a labor dispute as a means to inhibit management
access to alternative sources of labor.

At the same time, school manage-

ment may exercise the power to refuse to grant the changes in those terms
and conditions demanded .bY teachers, and they can exercise the right to
1

Perry and Wildman, op.cit., p. 87.
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hire strike-breaking substitute teachers. 1
As shown more completely in the previous chapter, the strike is
theoretically a highly effective and very efficient mechanism for the
settlement of disputes primarily because it imposes sufficient costs
on both parties which prompt them to accept compromise rather than continued conflict.

These

~osts

include for the employees, the loss of sal-

ary and risk of sacrificing their job rights, and for school management, the costs involve public hostility because of a reduction in the
quantity of education, and a loss of state aid money because schools are
not open the requisite number of school days.
(2) Political Approaches. Political approaches to impasse resolution are based on an explicit appeal to public opinion by the parties to
an impasse, either directly or through a third party.

If political

approaches are to serve as an effective mechanism for impasse resolution in the short run, they require both public interest in the issues
of dispute and disputant sensitivity to public opinion for either econ2
omic or political reasons.
The basic mechanism for a political approach to impasse resolution in the public education sector is fact-finding with advisory public

1

Perry and Wildman, op.cit.,p.87.
2
Ibid., p. 89
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recommendations.

As noted in Chapter II, several theoreticans and prac-

titioners in ·private sector industrial relations claim that fact-finding
is a questionable procedure for resolving bargaining disputes.

In parti-

cular, these experts suggest that the existence and assured availability
of a strike substitute--e.g., fact-finding--promises to mitigate or
eliminate the economic costs associated with a failure to reach agreement,
I

and therefore, reduces the incentive for the parties to compromise and
seek accommodation.

11

The result is settlement avoidance and the appear-

ance of a type of crisis bargaining which the parties prepare for an
impasse rather than attempt to narrow the differences between them. The
primary characteristics of this approach to bargaining are (1) early
commitment to extreme positions; (2) refusal to compromise on even minor
issues; and (3) public debate rather than private negotiation.

This

approach undermines collective bargaining as a decision-making process
and shifts the initial responsibility for decisions to an outside party.ul
Nevertheless, fact-finding leading to public recommendations is currently
the most widely accepted procedural alternative to the strike in the
resolution of public school bargaining impasses. As shown in TABLE 2,
it is authorized or required by law in at least twenty-four states, and

i where bargaining legislation is absent,

it has been adopted on a volun-

i tary basis in many local school district collective bargaining ·agreements.

1
2

Perry, op.cit., pp. 4-5.

Perry and Wildman, op.cit., p. 90.

2
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(3) Rational Approaches. Rational approaches to impasse resolution are based on the-factual determination of the balance of equity in a
dispute and takes place in a context of private decision-making.

Fund-

amentally, a·rational settlement requires both a ruling on the conflict
issues by an impartial third party and a legal or moral sanction for the
1

final decision of that third party.
The basic mechanism for a rational approach to impasse resolution
is binding arbitration.

As explained in the previous chapter, an arbit-

ration process involves adversary pleadings before a third party who is
empowered to make a formal decision on the issues.

Binding arbitration

requires that the parties be bound by the decision of the third party
2
either by mutual agreement or legal compulsion. As was shown, it is generally criticized as an impasse resolution mechanism.
Regarding the actual research completed by Perry, the reader should
be aware that he analyzed the early experience with impasse resolution
mechanisms in eight school systems where impasses occurred prior ·to the
end of the 1964-65 school year.

In studying the problem of impasse rel-

elution in educational bargaining, Perry, among other goals, specifically desired to answer the following question: How effective are the
various strategy approaches to the resolution of bargaining impasses in
establishing the basis for compromise in the final short run settlement
of issues? As indicated, these alternatives include one, the rational

1

Perry and Wildman,·op.cit., p. 90,
2
Ibid., p. 91,
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approach--based ultimately on compulsory binding arbitration; two, public

or political approach--based on fact-finding leading to formal public
recommendations; and three, economic approach--based finally on the
strike.l
From studying the experience with c_onfl i ct management in these
eight school systems, Perry concluded the following; First, when conflict
exists between teachers and school boards over the use of scarce fiscal
resources--e.g., salary issues--private reason in the form of direct
negotiations, mediation, or binding arbitration does not function to
narrow the differences between the bra parties.

Perry explains that

private approaches fail to produce agreement because the constituents of
the two parties are not involved in the decision-making activities.
Stated otherwise, some impasse mechanism must be available which permits
constituents--teacher organization members and community--to influence
their respective ~egotiation representatives.2 Secondly, impasse resolution strategies are effective in forcing compromise by one 6r both
parties only if they have ability to threaten or impose sufficient costs
on constituent groups.

Perry explains that costs can be achieved through

either public or economic methods:
... The required level of such pressure for compromise can be
achieved through either public or economic approaches, but is
not likely to be achieved through such purely rational approaches
as compulsory binding arbitration. The required balance of such
pressure for compromise can be achieved through economic approaches,
but only if the long strike option exists or if the application of
economic sanction against individual strikers is feasible. In

lrerry and Wildman, op.cit., pp. 28, 240.
2rbid., pp. 218-234.

the absence of these conditions, public approachesbased on a
rational appeal to the community as stockholder of the public
school .system constitute the most efficient means of impasse
resolution. 1
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Thirdly, since economic pressures for compromise are absent in most
school bargaining impasses, the public pressures such as those which accompany fact-finding would tend to facilitate the resolution of collective
bargaining imp,asses.

Perry•s study indicates that fact-finding with public

recommendations is effective in forcing a change in the parties• position
only when the dispute is centered on the allocation of existing resources within the school system, and the community is sensitive to the
recommendations exercised by a neutral third party:
Public approaches are highly effective in inducing compromise by
boards of education in conflict over the internal allocation of resources. Taxpayers are likely to be uninterested in changes in the
in the allocation of existing resources within the school system,
despite the fact that such changes may imply accelerated future increases in local support, thus leaving the ultimate community decision to consumers. Consumers are likely to be ambivalent about such
changes in the absence of criteria for assessing the impact of such
short run changes in resource allocation on the long run quality of
education. Thus, the co~sumer group should be willing to accept the
judgment of a neutral third party with respect to such changes and
to exert pressures on the board of education to do the same or to
move in the direction indicated by the judgment.2
Fourth, fact-finding as a public approach has limited productivity in
1

effecting compromise, however, where the dispute centers on the size of the
school system•s budget; i.e., the fact-finding approach does not elicit
1Perry, op.cit., pp. 218-219.
2rbid., pp, 236-237.
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new money benefits for teacher·s.

Once again, its ineffectiveness is re-

lated to the sensitivity of the community to the rational persuasion of
the fact-finder's report:
The.weakness of public approaches in establishing a basis for
the resolution of conflict over the size of the school system budget is a reflection of the fact that the majority of the community
has a strong negative short run economic interest in the outcome of
such conflict. Taxpayers are generally opposed to any immediate
increase in the level of local support of public education. Thus,
where the impasse centers on the level of local support and where
the formal recommendations of the fact-finder call for or imply some
immediate increase in school tax rates, the majority of the community will either not respond or respond negatively to those reccommendations, thereby forcing or permitting the board of education
to reject at least those elements of the recommendations which would
require a short run increase in local support.l
Notwithstanding the limited effectiveness of fact-finding, Perry
finally concludes that the experience in the systems studied indicates
that fact-finding with advisory public recommendations can create a basis
for meaningful collective bargaining in public education primarily because
such a procedure places the final decision on impasse issues directly in
the hands of the community.2 In short, political pressure from·consumers
generates resolution for the bargaining impasse.
Fifth, like the public strategies of fact-finding, the economic mechanism for dispute settlement, namely the strike, also has contrasting
effectiveness.

In the school systems researched, Perry discovered that

the exercise of economic power by teachers failed to force any immediate
1

Perry, op.cit., pp. 235-236.

2 I bi d • , p • 244.

65

increase in local s·upport.

In analyzing this phenomenon, Perry notes:

The inability of economic approaches to provide teachers with a
basis for forcing immediate increases in local support is a reflection of the fact that taxpayers are not directly effected by the
exercise of economic power by the teachers in the short run. Thus,
even in the face of a strike or professional sanctions, the majority
·
of the community-at-large can remain unsympathetic or hostile
toward the demands of teachers.! ·
However, a teachers• strike did increase the extent to which boards
of education agreed to reallocation of existing internal resources, thus
prompting a resolution of the bargaining conflict:
The ability of economic approaches to provide teachers with a
basis for forcing compromise by a board of education in conflict
over internal resource allocation is a reflection of the obvious
sensitivity of consumers to any real or threatened interruption in
the flow of basic public school services. In the absence of any
countervailing pressure from taxpayers, this consumer sensitivity
and the short run political reaction which it fosters are normally
sufficient to force a board of education to capitulate to the demands of teachers. The onl~ alternatives to capitulation open to
boards of education are: 1) to ignore the consumer reaction to the
exercise of economic power by teachers and accept the long strike;
and 2) to insulate consumers from the economic power of teachers by
keeping schools open through the use of teacher replacements. The
former option is generally both personally and politically distasteful to board members; the latter option is generall~ unfeasible
given the labor-intensive character of public education.
In spite of the mixed effectiveness of the strike, Perry leans away
from its use as a means to resolve teacher-school board bargaining conflict:
The experience in the systems studied indicates that reliance on
the strike weapon and economic approaches as the basis for the
resolution of impasses can foster crises bargaining and compromise
avoidance. This is a reflection of the fact that such approaches
tend to involve the community in the impasse resolution process
in its role as consumers of school services. The natural reac~
tion of consumers to an interruption in the flow of educational

lPerry, op.cit., p. 239.
2rbid., p. 239.
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services weakens the incentives for a teacher organization to compromise on its demands short of either acceptance of those demands
or a test of power, particularly since such consumer reaction makes
the long strike unlikely. In this context, boards of education
have a real incentive to withhold any concessions in anticipation
of a strike and the resultant consumer pressure for settlement at
any price.

Economic approaches to impasse resolution are likely to result
in a series of short run decisions based primarily or only on the
desire of consumers for peace in the public schools.l
To compl'ete the summary of Perry's research on what mechanisms
should be used to resolve bargaining impasses, he concludes that public
approaches to impasse resolution have advantages over either rational or
economic approaches.

Specifically, he recommends the following impasse.

resolution policies:
(1)

Provision for fact-finding leading to the issuance of formal
public recommendations well in advance of budget deadlines;

(2)

Provision for mediation prior to fact-finding but only if both
parties agree to seek and accept the services of a mediator.
This is called voluntary mediation;

(3)

Inclusion of a clear statement of the obligation of boards of
education to bargain and of the legal ban on strikes by
teacher organizations. 2

As a brief critique of these three recommendations, the reader will
notice that Perry's viewpoints, especially with respect to fact-finding
and the strike, are in disagreement with the conclusions drawn.in Chapter II.
1Perry, op.cit., p. 24~
2Ibid., p. 246.
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The next chapter will attempt to reconcile some of these discrepancies
by analyzing the effectiveness of impasse resolution mechanisms in seven
Illinois school systems where impasses and strikes occurred in 1972.

-

Jb.- -

CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF
FIXED-RESPONSE QUESTIONNAIRE DATA

This chapter covers the second phase of this study and is aimed
at determining what impasse procedure negotiators prefer to employ in
a school bargaining dispute by testing the following hypotheses:
I.

II.

III.

Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human
relations strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or
resolve collective bargaining disputes.
School management negotiation representatives agree that the
human relations strategy would not function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective bargaining disputes.
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation
strategy is an appropriate mechanism to use in resolving
school bargaining disputes.

IV.

Teacher negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding
strategy is not an effective procedure for resolving public
education bargaining disputes.

V.

Teacher negotiation repres·entatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the arbitration
strategy would not be an appropriate dispute settlement
mechanism in public education bargaining impasses.

VI.

Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike
strategy should be available as a means to resolve collective
bargaining disputes.

VII.

School management negotiation representatives agree that the
strike strategy should not be available as a means to resolve
collective bargaining disputes:
68
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To test the hypotheses, a forty-five minute to one hour interview \'/as
conducted with negotiators representing both teacher organizations and
school management in seven Illinois school districts where strikes occurred
in 1972.

The i ntervi e\'lees tota 1ed forty-two, twenty- one representing

teacher groups and twenty one representing school management.

All of

these negotiators were involved in leadership positions and/or participated

.

in collective bargaining sessions during the 1972 teacher strike situations
and thus were knowledgeable about the impasse procedures used throughout
the conflict.

In each of the strike situations, three negotiation leaders

from each side of the bargaining table were interviewed, thus making a
total of six interviewees from each school system.

Regional Directors for

the Illinois Education Association were asked to help in identifying the
negotiation representatives or major participants from each of the seven
school districts.

The purpose of the interviews \o.Jas to discover what

dispute settlement method (or methods) these negotiators prefer to use in
the event of a public education bargaining impasse.

Responses of the

negotiators and reasons for their particular choices will be presented
along with an analysis of these data.
An interview instrument was el'nployed in this phase of the study to
elicit information.

Specifically, a structured, fixed-response (closed-

ended) questionnaire, designed especially for this study, was used to
complete the data collection for phase two (see APPENDIX A).

During the

administration of this questionhaire, the interviewee was asked certain
questions or propositions, the responses to which were weighted to place
the interviewee in a general category of reactions.
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To further explain the use of the questionnaire, it should be noted
that the responses of the negotiation representatives to the propositions
were categorized by using a modified Likert scale.· The respondents were
asked to expr·ess their feelings about impasse procedures in one of the
five following degrees: Strongly Agree {SA), Agree {A), Undecided {U),
Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SO).

To score the scale, there-

sponses are weighted +2, +1, 0, -1, -2, respectively, from Strongly Agree
to Strongly Disagree {see APPENDIX A for the phase two questionnaire). The
analysis of the forty-two interviews

was

divided into three parts:

{1) an analysis of the teacher negotiation representatives' preference
for what impasse procedure should be used in a dispute;

(2) an analysis

of the school management negotiation representatives' preference for what
impasse procedure should be used in a dispute; and

(3) a combined analysis

of teachers• and school management negotiators' responseswhere appropriate.
In analyzing parts one and two above, if all the school management
negotiators or teacher negotiators Strongly Agree to a proprisition,
proposition would receive +42 points.

th~

If all the management negotiators

or teacher negotiators Strongly Disagree to a proposition, the proposition would receive -42 points.

As the number increases to +42, so does

the representatives' agreement with the proposition.

As ~he number

decreases negatively to -42, so does the representatives' disagreement
with the proposition.
In the combined analysis of responses of representatives of teacher
groups and school management, a division factor of two is used to maintain a
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point base. If all teacher negotiators and school management negotia42
tors strongly Agree to a proposition, the proposition would still receive
+42 points.

If all teacher representatives and school management repre- ·

sentatives Strongly Disagree to a proposition, the proposition would receive -42 points.

Again as the number increases towards +42 so does the

representatives• agreement with the proposition. As the number decreases
negatively to -42, so does the representatives• disagreement with the
proposition.

An example of how to interpret the data for one group is

below:
SA
A
U
.. {14) 66. 6% --r.;;c3"")-.1,..4.,.....,.2~%--~.....-.-:;(1,..)__,4,__.
(Total points received +27)

%~a-,--

=-=7

so

D

(1) 4. 7%

(2} 9.5%

1. SA--Strongly Agree, A--Agree, U--Undecided, 0--Disagree, and
SO--Strongly Disagree.
2. The number in parenthesis represents the number of negotiation
representatives selecting that particular response.
3. The number next to the parenthesis is the number of negotiators
selecting that particular response converted to a percentage.
4. ·The above graphical representation would read, fourteen negotiators
or 66.6% of the respondents selected the alternative Strongly Agree.
Three or 14.2% selected the alternative Agree.
Undecided.

One or 4.7% was

Two or 9.5% selected the response Disagree.

One or

4.7% selected Strongly Disagree.
5. The total

weight o.f the proposition would be calculated as follows:
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Number of Negotiation Representatives
Height
Response
Points
+28 14
+2
SA
+1
3
+3
A

u

1

0
-1

2

D

so

0

..:2

-2
-2
Total Points +27

1

A word should be mentioned about the validity and reliability of
the questiorynaire instrument used in phase two.

The t\'lenty-five propo-

sitions developed to test the hypotheses were formulated by the author
after reviewing professional

literature and related research and were

scattered throughout the questionnaire to minimize the possibility of
influencing the responses.

The questionnaire containing the propositions

was pretested to determine validity of questions and proper phrasing by
initially asking five authorities in the field of labor-management relatidns to judge the appropriateness of the propositions.

The judges

include a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
three university professors in industrial relations, and one managementpersonnel consultant. Additionally, the academic training of the five
experts include two with doctoral degrees, one with a master's degree
in business administration, one with a bachelor's degree in industrial
relations, and one having earned a law degree.

Total years of labor-

management experience is nearly sixty-four years.

After pretesting,

the questionnaire was administered to five educators who had· been involved
in a teacher strike situation.

Following these interviews, the reliability

of the questionnaire was determined by using both the Kuder-Richardson
internal consistency test and Rulon's reliability method.

The relia-

bility coefficients for the questionnaire ranged from .60 as computed
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Kuder-Richard~on

by the
method.

formula 20 test to .88 as computed by the Rulon

Reliability of the questionnaire was determined before it

was formally administered to the forty-two respondents.

A letter of

introduction from the director of the dissertation preceded the actual
interview for the purpose of establishing rapport and credibility with
the interviewee (see APPENDIX C).
Criterion for acceptance or rejection of the hypotheses was determined by using net total points amassed by each group.
algebraic sum of the pluses and minuses was utilized.

That is, an
Hypotheses I, III,

IV, V, and VI must receive positive points to be accepted.
II and VII must receive

negative points to be accepted.

Hypotheses
In addition, when

more than one impasse strategy was preferred, the T-test statistic, which
I

is spmetimes
called the ''Student's" t distribution, was employed to deter/,
.
. mile if significant differences exist between the mean response on one
strategy and the mean response on another strategy.
carried out at the .05 level of significance.

Computations were

This indicates that we are

95% confident that preference differences between strategies are not due
to chance factors.

---------··~*=~--·--------~----·------,~~----------------------------~
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HYPOTHESIS I
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human relations
strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective
bargaining disputes.
Hypothesis I

de a1s with a method for managing· both the covert

intergroup conflict inherent in the bargaining process as ·well as
overt conflict manifested at the point of impasse or bargaining deadlock.

Propositions one, six, eleven, sixteen, and

tv>~enty-one

pertain

to this hypothesis.
fropos iti on 1: To reduce conflict and promote agreement during
actual negotiations, the parties should meet regularly throughout the
year outside the bargaining table to study problems.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A
(13) 61.8%
(Total points received +20)

(5) 23.8%

u
0

D

SD

{3) 14.2%

0

Almost 86% of respondents agreed with this proposition. Nany of
the teacher negotiators felt that regular meetings would improve

II

I

communication betv-;een teachers, administrators, and school board members.
Increased communication could particularly help in .the following ways:
(1) it would provide additional opportunity to understand the viewpoints

of each s·ide; (2) it vwuld be an appropriate time to clarify problems
such as school finance; and (3) regular meetings between the parties could
deal with problems of immediate concern thus preventing issues from
smoldering or festering throughout the year. That

i~,

immediate resolu-

tion of problems might prevent open and outright "civil war" at the
opening of the collective bargaining season; and (4) mutual conflicts

could be explored and resolved easier outside the adversary process of
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formal collective bargaining sessions; formal negotiations may interfere
with issue-solving because both sides tend to become entrenched as they
defend their respective positions.

In sumt regular meetings throughout

the year would increase communication and thus accelerate intergroup
rapport.
One respondent disagreed with this proposition because he felt
\'that agreements do not develop until the "crisis 11 time of school opening
approaches.

Another respondent did not favor the approach because such

meetings had not worked successfully in the district.
Proposition 6: As a mechanism for dispute resolutiont teacher and
school management negotiators should attempt to make decisions which
permit both sides to gain in contrast to decisions where one party gains
at the other party•s expense.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES
SA
A
(2) 9.6%
(13) 61.9%
(Total points received +15)

u

0

( 4) 19%

(2) 9.6%

so
0

Almost 72% of the teacher respondents agreed with this proposition.
Several of those who agreed stated that the Win-win" approach to school
11

bargaining is a psychologically sound principle.

From this viewpoint,

it was indicated that the art of negotiations is to consider the human
factors involved in the negotiations interaction; that is, no one likes
to lose or feel like a loser.

One teacher suggested that school boards

could protect themselves from being losers by negotiating a "board•s
rights 11 clause into the collective agreement.

Others agreed to the

proposition because they felt the win-win approach was theoretically or

philosophically valid.

However, a few respondents admitted that this
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approach is difficu_lt to achieve in practice because some issues are
not amenable to mutual gain.

For example, when teachers gain more in

salary money, school management loses money to purchase school buses,
textbooks, etc.

Those who disagreed with the proposition labeled this

approach impractical because there will always be losers and winners
~hen

scarce resources like money are involved.

·· Proposition 11: To settle differences amicably, the style of
bargaining should resemble mutual problem solving rather than independent decision making in which school management unilaterally sets
salaries and other terms and conditions of employment.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

u

(13) 61.8%

(8) 38%

0

(Total points received +34)

D
0

so
0

As might be expected, all teacher negotiators agreed with the concept of teacher-school management negotiations.

Most of the respondents

justify the school bargaining process because it promotes positive teacher
morale.

More specifically, the collective bargaining process facili-

tates morale for the following reasons:

(1) it is consistent with other

labor-management sectors of the American economy in which employees
have a voice in determining the reward systems under whfch they work.
One teacher argued that the school employer does not have the ethical
right to dictate salaries and terms and conditions of employment because
it is not done that way in other employee-employer re1ationships.
Another teacher maintained that negotiations is a means of increasing
the economic well-being of teachers and economically satisfied teachers
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are an essential requirement for quality teaching; (2) collective
bargaining is a political process that recognizes teacher viewpoints

relative to such school problems as class size and educational programs.
several teacher negotiators expressed the idea that teacher expertise
is needed in shaping educational decisions because school management
lacks knowledge of the real classroom problems.

In sum, teacher nego-

\ tiators believe that unilateral decisions by school management are not
~ally

11

Solutions

11

because such action destroys employee morale.

Proposition 16: A joint sub-committee approach, in which there
are joint study teams composed of an equal number of teachers and school
management representatives, would be a useful means of facilitating
collective bargaining agreements.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES

s

D

SD

(Total points received -3)
Therewas a divergence of thinking among teachers on the statement.
Some of the respondents who agreed admitted that they have not utilized the
joint sub-committee method in negotiations but state that it might be a
positive approach to school bargaining.

Others who agreed claimed that the

negotiation spokesmen for the respective sides jointly worked out an
agreement which eventually settled a teacher strike situation.
Teacher negotiators who have not experienced this approach disagreed
for the following reasons:

(1) such approaches to collective bargaining

may be a waste of time because a ttmini-impasse might occur in the subcommittees; (2) mistrust among team members could develop.

Other

teachers recited previously unsuccessful attempts with similar joint
committee approaches.
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Proposition 21: Post negotiation committees, in v1hich final resolution of some particularly thorny bargaining issue is discussed, would
tend to diminish future bargaining conflict.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES
SA
-a

A
(7) 33.3%

u

0

so

.

(1) 4. 7%

(12) 57.1%

(1) 4. 7%

(Total points received -7)
Teacher negotiators held different viewpoints towards this proposition ..

Some respondents who agreed ·were essentially expressing some ambivalence
toward such committees; that is, while post negotiation committees
successfully resolved extra-duty pay issues during one year, similar.
committees \'mrking on similar issues resulted in mini-impasses
11

subsequent year.

11

in a

Other teachers who agreed with the proposition indi-

cated that post negotiation committees would provide additional time
for communication, and as one teacher articulated, Time and talk help
11

resolve problems."
Approximately 61% of the respondents disagreed with the use of post
negotiation committees.

Some disagreed because they felt that such

committees would carry on the intergroup conflict without a means for
resolving the issues; that is, this procedure would be absent the pressure
which is often needed to prompt agreements.

Others lacked confidence

in these procedures because similar committees had not functioned
successfully in the past.

Several teachers explained that issues like

teacher evaluation procedures and extra duty pay schedules had been
11

discussed in post negotiation committees only to see agreements axed

11

by a board of education thus placing the issues in a situation of quasiimpasse.
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SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS I
The information obtained from the twenty-one teacher negotiation·
representatives and depicted in TABLE 3 suggests that the human relations
approach would be an appropriate social technology for minimizing or resolving school bargaining impasses.

These negotiators showed a particular

value for (1) regular meetings throughout the year, (2) a "win-win'' approach
to collective bargaining; and (3) bilateral rather than unilateral determination of salaries and other terms and conditions of employment.

Since

authority opinion found in professional literature supports these three
elements of the human relations approach, it can be said that teacher
negotiators and the experts are in agreement.

Notwithstanding teachers'

positive opinions of regular meetings and win-win approaches, these two
components seem to be used in only a limited way in actual school bargaining practice.

Training in these two areas, therefore, seems advisable.

Two other elements of the human relations strategy--joint sub-committees and post-negotiation committees--were not as highly respected by
teacher negotiators as the other elements.

The fact that teachers have

historically experienced frustration with such committees would suggest
that school management shoulg strive more earnestly to make joint teacheradministrator committees function successfully.
In spite of some ambivalence toward the human relations strategy,
net total points received were positive and, consequently, permit acceptance
of hypothesis I.
equal +11.5.

Incidentally, the mean points received on this hypothesis

The human relations strategy is a method preferred by

teacher negotiators.

---;ot~:m~z:-.-;~~~~~~~:IIIIIIG~-.,.~~
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS I INDICATING THAT
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES ACCEPT THE
HUMAN RELATIONS STRATEGY AS A MEANS TO MINIMIZE
OR RESOLVE SCHOOL BARGAINING IMPASSES

Propositions And Total
Points Received

Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement

Proposition 1
{+20 points)

Proposition 6
(+15 points)

Propositi on 11
(+34 points)

Proposition 16
(-3 points)

Proposition 21
(-7 points)

+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -42

AGREE

DISAGREE

1
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HYPOTHESIS II
School. management negotiation representatives agree that the human
relations strate~y.woul~ not function to minimize, prevent, or resolve
collective barga1n1ng d1sputes.
Proposition 1: To reduce conflict and promote agreement during
actual negotiations, the parties should meet regularly throughout the
year outside the bargaining table to study problems.
SCHOOL

MANAGEt~ENT

A

SA

-n;}28.9%

{9) 42.8%

REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES

u

D
(3)

0

so

14.2%

(3) 14.2?l

(Total points received +12)
Nearly 72% of the school management negotiators agreed with this
proposition.
sons:

Negotiators agreed with this statement for two basic rea-

First, regular study of problems increases communication between

the parties which subsequently decreases both immediate conflict as
well as future conflict at the bargaining table.

Some . agreed that the

increased communication would alert or acquaint both parties to the
needs felt by each side and such an understanding would facilitate
solutions.

Secondly, some management negotiators expressed the idea

that it would be easier to solve inter-group problems in a less threatening atmosphere than that found at the formal bargaining table.

One

school system has implemented the idea found in this proposition by
negotiating into the contract machinery for regular meetings v-1hich
serve to (1) avoid grievances, (2) eliminate or minimize collective
bargaining issues, and {3} solve problems immediately rather than
allow them to 11 fester 11 throughout the year.

The contractual clause
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is shovm as fallows:

MONTHLY CONTRACT MEETINGS
Representatives of the superintendent and the Association will
meet once a month during the regular school year at a time convenient to both parties for the purpose of discussing the administration of the contract and to resolve problems that may arise.
These meetings are not intended to bypass the negotiations or the
grievance procedure. Further, each party \vi 11 submit to the other,
at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the meeting, an agenda
covering what they wish to d·iscuss. This agreement shall be subject to change or supplement at any time by mutual consent of the
parties hereto. Any such change or supplement agreed upon shall
be reduced to writing, signed by the parties hereto, and submitted
to the Board and the Association for approval, the same as this
Agreement.
School management negotiators who disagreed with the proposition
expressed three problems:

One, there isn•t time to meet outside the

bargaining table; two, regular study meetings would turn into continuous
bargaining sessions; and three, agreement during study meetings would
be

inhibited because such meetings lack the pressure environment which

surrounds the collective bargaining table.
Pro~osition 6:
As a mechanism for dispute resolution, teacher
and schoo management negotiators should attempt to make decisions
VJhich permit both sides to gain in contrast to decisions where one
party gains at the other party•s expense.

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES

t

SA

TIT 4. 7%

A
(16) 76.1%

U
(4) 19%

D

so

0

0

(Total points received +18)

II

As shown, nearly 80% of the management negotiators agreed with the

i

I

,
~
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proposition.

Theoretically, school management representatives agreed

that negotiators should whenever possible aim for a "win-win" decision
in contrast to a ''win-lose" decision.

Decisions of this nature would

tend to diminish the adversary nature of the collective bargaining
process.

In addition, mutual gain, win-win decisions are psycholo-

gically easier to live up to.
While no one disagreed with this proposition, four management
negotiators were undecided.

These respondents claimed that a mutual

gain approach to collective bargaining is idealistic and difficult to
achieve; in practice, school bargaining becomes a win-lose situation
with the organized teacher winning more power while school management
loses power. ·Furthermore, one undecided negotiator stated that there
are few issues in public education bargaining which allow both sides
to gain.

"Usually," he said, "the teacher organization is the asker

and the board of education is the giver.

The teachers can't give

anything to make it a mutual gain situation."
Proposition 11: To settle differences amicably, the style of
bargaining should resemble mutual problem solving rather than independent decision making in which school management unilaterally sets
salaries and other terms and conditions of employment.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A
(18) 85.6%
(Total points received + 22)

(2) 9.6%

u

(1) 4.7%

D

so

0

0

Almost 95% of the individuals who represent the school management
side in public education bargaining agree with the above proposition.
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Most of the agreement centers around the concept that teachers and
school management should bilaterally set salaries and terms and conditions of employment.

According to several respondents, teacher

employees know and understand their needs better than the school employer
does and, therefore, need a mechanism to communicate their problems to
management:

The collective bargaining process then becomes an appropri-

ate system for resolving such problems.

Related to the belief in the

bargaining process, several management negotiators expressed an opinion
that individuals who are affected by a decision should be involved in
the determination of those decisions; collective bargaining, as a decision-making process,

thus provides a way to involve individuals.

Fur-

thermore, some of the respondents stated that job satisfaction and increased teacher morale would result from a bilateral rather than a
unilateral determination of salaries and working conditions.

Notwith-

standing the high level of agreement on this proposition, several negtiators qualified their response by claiming that some school system
issues should not be negotiated between teachers and school management;
for example, such issues as curriculum, teacher evaluation

procedure~,

and class size are non-negotiable and cannot be determined democratically
at the collective bargaining table.

I

!
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Proposition 16: A joint sub-committee approach, in which there.
are joint study teams composed of an equal number of teachers and school
management representatives, would be a useful means of facilitating
collective bargaining agreements.

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

U

{3) 14.2%
(5) 23.8%
(5} 23.8%
(Total points received +2)

so

D

(7) 33.3%

(1} 4.7%

School management negotiators showed a difference of thinking on
this proposition.

Those who agreed indicated that joint sub-committees

would foster intergroup communication during the collective
process.
~

~

I

I

I

I

I

I

barga~ning

Specifically, such committees could facilitate (1) the clari-

fication of issues, and (2) the exchange of facts and attitudes.

One

group of management negotiators acknowledged that the teacher strike in
their district was terminated after a form of the joint sub-committee
approach was utilized; more precisely, the chief spokesmen for the

by the remaining members of the bargaining teams.
11

Side-bar agreement was ratified by the constituencies of both parties
11

bringing settlement to the bargaining dispute.

Those who disagreed

with this proposition felt that the joint sub-committee method \'Jould

't:
~

interfere with, or violate, the integrity of the team approach.

~

is, the joint sub-committee method would fragment their bargaining

~t

i

team thus making them more vulnerable to poor decisions.

i

I'

I

Ultimately, this

~

i

I.

respective parties worked out an agreement which in turn was agreed to

~

~

i

~

That

I
I·

I
t

I

In sum, while

most school management negotiators have not personally experienced this
approach, it is percejved as having both advantages and disadvantages.

i

»

~

f

·---------------------------------------------------------------
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Proposition 21: Post negotiation committees, in which final
resolution of some particularly thorny bargaining issue is discussed,
would tend to diminish future bargaining conflict.

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
U
(2) 9.6%
(7) 33.3%
(2) 9.6%
(Total points received +1)

D

(10) 47.6%

SD

0

As to this proposition, school management negotiators are in
discord.

Among those who agreed, negotiators from two school systems

pointed out the fact that provisions for post negotiation committees
have been incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement.

In

one district, "Monthly Contract Meetings" take place while in a second,
"Joint Discussion Committees" occur.

These contractual clauses exist

for the purpose of (1) resolving ·immediate problems and (2) facilitating
intelligent preparation for the forthcoming bargaining season.

In the

first district, the monthly contract meetings had served to resolve
some ''left-over" bargaining issues but had failed to settle an extraduty pay problem for women coaches.

Respondents who disagreed with

post negotiation committees offered these reasons: (1) such committees
are time consuming; (2) they only protract or drag out bargaining; and

j

(3) post negotiation committees may deal with issues which ultimately
result in

"mini-impasses~ ..

I

II
f

------------w-----------------·----·---------·-·------~~----•-••--·----·---------------1·
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SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS II

The data collected from the twenty-one school management negotiation
representatives, which is depicted in TABLE 4, suggests that the human relations strategy would be an appropriate social technology for minimizing or
resolving school bargaining impasses.

These negotiators showed a particular

value for (1) regular meetings throughout the year to facilitate intergroup
communication; (2) a mutual gain approach to school negotiations; and (3) bi-·
lateral rather than unilateral determination of salaries and other terms and
conditions of employment.

These three areas apparently indicate that school

management perceives the importance of on-going communication, ''win-win" interaction, and sharing power and decision-making with teachers, all of which
would tend to reduce teacher-management conflict as well as increase teacher
morale.
Since the actual net points amassed by the school management negotiation representatives places them on the "agreement'' side of the TABLE 4
graph; hypothesis II is; therefore, rejected.

Rejection of the hypothesis,

however, means acceptance of and preference for the human relations approach.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS I AND HYPOTHESIS II
Hypothesis I and hypothesis II suggest that teachers and school manage
ment assume different viewpoints towards the human relations strategy.

How-

ever, since the two groups responded to the same propositions, it is appropriate to show the combined

responses~

TABLE 5 reveals that the groups resp

ond quite similarly to the propositions and suggests that the human relation·
strategy is preferred as an impasse resolution method.

In particular, TABLE

5 indicated the following:
(1) Both groups perceived regular meetings as a means to improve inter-
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES
ACCEPT THE HUMAN RELATIONS
.
RESOLVE SCHOOL
Propositions And Total
Points Received

II INDICATING THAT SCHOOL MANAGEMENT
REJECT THE HYPOTHESIS AS STATED BUT
STRATEGY AS A MEANS TO MINIMIZE OR
BARGAINING IMPASSES

Amount Of Agreement-Or Disagreement

Proposition 1
1+12 points)

Proposition 6
1+18 points)

Propositi on 11
(+22 points)

Proposition 16
(+2 points)

Proposition 21
(+1 point)

+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 ·20 -30

AGREE

DISAGREE

-40

-42

group communication.

That is, scheduled meetings can reduce the possibilty

89

of crisis bargaining.
(2} The two groups agreed that a Win-win approach to negotiations
11

is appropriate.

11

In particular, group representatives felt that this style

of bargaining has psychological justification because it would tend to reduce the adversary nature of the collective bargaining process.

However,, some

of the teacher respondents maintained that it is impossible to convert all
bargaining issues into mutual gains especially where scarce resources exist.
(3)

Teacher and school management negotiators seemed to believe in the

cortcept of collective·bargaining. Obviously, teachers endorse negotiations,
but it is surprising to note the high percentage of management negotiators
who demonstrated respect for teacher participation in decision-making via
the collective bargaining process.

The two groups agreedprimarily because

they believe in bilateral rather than unilateral determination of teacher
salaries.
(4)

Both groups of negotiators' showed discord with the use
of
.

joint sub-committee approaches in actual bargaining sessions even though some
negotiators from both sides of the table acknowledged that a joint sub-committee of bargaining spokesmen did effect an agreement which resulted in the
termination of a teacher strike.

Negotiators were suspicious of this approach

because it would fragment the team approach to school bargaining thus making
the team vulnerable to mini-'impasses and low quality decisions.
11

(5)

11

With respect to the use of post negotiation committees, teachers

and school management are both in discord.
committees have in the past successfully
pline and extra duty pay schedules.

Some negotiators stated that such

resol~ed

issues like student disci-

Also, post negotiation committee con-
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bargaining agreements in at
cepts have been incorporated into collective
.
least two of the seven school districts involved in this study. Negotiators
disagreed with the concept because (1) it would protract bargaining and .
(2) such committees would lack the pressure needed to effect settlement and
thus terminate in informal impasses.
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TABLE 5
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS I AND HYPOTHESIS II COMPARING TEACHER
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEMENT
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF THE
HUt1AN RELA.TIONS STRATEGY AS A t1EANS TO RESOLVE BARGAINING DISPUTES
Propositions, Respondents
And. Total Points Received

Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement

ProQosition 1
(+20)

Teachers

~···

~·

Management (+12)
Pro2os iti on 6
Teachers

(+15)

Management (+18)
Pro2osition 11

I
I
'

J

I

I
I
J

Teachers

(+34)

Management (+22)
Proposition 16
Teachers

(-3)

r~anagement

(+2)

Proposition 21
Teachers

( -7)

Management (+1)
+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -42

AGREE

DISAGREE

-~-----------------------------------------~"-a~---=-·-----------------~
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HYPOTHESIS II I
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation strategy is an
appropriate mechanism to use in resolving bargaining disputes.
This hypothesis deals with the most common type of impasse machinery,
namely, mediation, and attempts to discover how negotiators perceive
this procedure.

Investigation of this hypothesis will also attempt to

ascertain the most effective form of mediation.

Propositions

two~

seven,

bJelve, seventeen, and twenty-two pertain to this hypothesis.
Proposition 2: In the event of a negotiations impasse, mediation
should be used as a means to resolve the dispute.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

U

D

--13)

--r(~2)r---;:;--9.-r::-5-;; -%---~(r:;-1.,1)r-;::;-;52.-.~3%"o----(r-.4-.-)-.1~9"::%cr-o

SO

14,2% \1.,..)--,4,...-,,7=%,--

(Total points received +10)
The data show: that a majority of the teacher negotiators agreed
with the proposition. This high agreement figure is surprising in view
of the fact that the mediation process failed to resolve the negotiations
dispute in any of the seven school systems investigated.

I
I
I

Notwithstanding

its ineffectiveness, teacher negotiators felt that mediation can be a
therapeutic process for at least two reasons:

First, because of the

accelerated hostility and entrenched postures which often occur during
crisis bargaining, an objective third party such as a mediatm· can promote intergroup communication and subsequent understanding by accurately
advising each party of the other party's intentions and positions.
Secondly, as the mediator "closets" or meets privately with each side,
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the parties may find it psychologically easier to modify their positions
and thus save face.

In contrast, the face-to-face negotiations of the

impasse environment may interfere with a party•s ability to make concessions.

Briefly, it is easier to yield a position to the outsider

than to the opponent.

Those who opposed mediation did so on·the basis

that it simply was not effective in terminating the negotiations deadlock.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES
SA

A

(1) 4.7%

(16) 76.1%
(Total points received +16)

u

0

so

(2) 9.5%

(2) 9.5%

0

A high percentage of management negotiatorssupported this proposition
from several perspectives.

First, mediation is helpful because it

solves some of the group dynamics problems which arise during the bargaining interaction.

For example, because of the competitive nature of

the negotiations process, the parties hold rigidly to their respective
positions.

However, as a mediator works with the parties independently,

the bargaining teams find it psychologically easier to give up their
bargaining positions, thus saving face.

Secondly, the mediation process

can assist the parties to politically pacify certain groups within their
constituency.

Specifically, when negotiation representatives can report

to their membership, "The mediator told us that our position was inappropriate or faulty," constituency sub groups can be persuaded to reduce
political pressure on their representatives, thus giving their negotiators
freedom to concede specific bargaining issues.

Thirdly, a mediator can

facilitate group-to-group communication by (1) translating feelings and

_L_·-·-~-t-t,_·t_u_d_e_s_f_r_o_m_pa_r_t_y-to_p_a_r-~y_,.._,__:_~....~-c-1-a-~-~..f.y_:_·:...g_~_":_.~.,.,.nt_e_r_p....re_t_i-ng... ,_·s_s_u_e_s_'--~

---------~~-·,-----·-#------------

94

and (3) allowing the parties to be candid without anything ••going on
the record.''

Final)y, as to the particular form of mediation, management

negotiators agreed that mediation and fact-finding· should not be used ·as
sequential steps in school bargaining dispute settlement.

The few nego-

tiators who either disagree or are undecided do so on the basis that
mediation did not resolve the 1972 dispute.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

~3)

A
7.1%
(27) 64.3%
(Total points received +12)

u

0

(6) 14.2%

(5) 11.9%

so

(1) 2.3%

Notwithstanding the fact that mediation did not resolve the bargaining disputes in the seven districts investigated, nearly 71% of the
negotiators interviewed agreed that mediation should be an established
cog in school bargaining impasse machinery.

Mediation won enthusiastic

reception because it increased candid communication and decreased some
of the group dynamics problems which arise during

negotiation~.

was also cited as an effective procedure because it can serve to

Mediation
dimini~h

intra-organizational or political pressures which impinge on the bargaining process.
Prooosition 7: Mediation, as an impasse resolution procedure, tends
to promote rather than retard meaningful, sincere negotiations between
the parties.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
0

A
(8) 38%
{Total points received 0)

u

(5) 23.8%

0

(8) 38%

so

0
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Teachers are equally divided on this proposition.
stressed the idea that the mediator aids communication.

Those whoagreed
One teacher pointed

out that as a mediator listens to both sides he can help measure which ·
issues are strongly held and then help the parties work out settlements
over these issues. Another teacher felt that an objective outsider with
"no axe to grind 11 can help the parties see similarities instead of differences.

Other teachers alluded to the idea that a mediator can diminish

the occurrence of ''parallel monologues ... That is, the conflicting parties
themselves often do not listen to one another.
to be understood.

Each is too busy trying

By listening and understanding, a mediator can contri-

bute to the parties' understanding of each other's position.
Teacher·negotiators disagreed with the proposition for a variety
of reasons.
a

cru~ch

Some explained that both sides tend to use the mediator as

instead of doing the negotiations job themselves.

Several ad-

mitted that they felt intimidated by the mediator because he pressured
them to yield crucial issues; these feelings turned to mistrust and antagonism towards the mediator.

Other teacher negotiators felt that

school management used the mediation process as a further means of
"wearing down the teachers' demands. 11

•

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
{I) 4.7%
(10) 47.6%
(Total points received +5)

u
(3)

14.2%

0

so

(7} 33.3%

0

School management negotiators, like teacher negotiators, showed a
divergence of thinking·on this proposition. ·Generally, negotiators.agreed
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that mediation can promote negotiations because it mitigates some of
that political-psychological phenomenon which happen in· the bargaining
process.

One negotiator used the term negotiations syndrome to ex11

11

plain that the parties can get locked into positions from which they
cannot deviate because of the presence of constituency pressur·e.

Ne-

gotiation representatives felt a need to look good to their respective
11

sides.

11

To maintain a political image of truly representing their mem-

bership, the bargaining teams cling stubbornly to positions.

The influ-

ence of an impartial third party upon both the representatives and the
represented, however, can allow the parties to withdraw from previous1y
held bargaining postures and thus promote settlement.
Those who disagreed with the pr.opos iti on 1i sted the fo 11 owing reasons:
(1) a mediator has no authority or power to influence; (2) inexperienced

negotiators rely on the intervention of a third party to conclude negotiations for them thus retarding pre-impasse negotiations; (3) when
school management is convinced that the teachers• organization will proceed either to another step of the impasse procedure such as fact-finding
or to the strike, it is a wise bargaining tactic to avoid mak·ing any
concessions during mediation.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A

(1) 2.3%
(18) 42.9%
(Total points received +3.5)

u

(8) 19%

0

(15) 35.7%

so
0

The data collected indicated there was discord among the negotiators on the concept that mediation can promote sincere negotiations
between the parties.

Teachers especially showed a complete divergence of
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thinking on this matter.

Negotiators_agreed with mediation because it can.

create positive communication channels between the parties in conflict.
Also, mediation can diminish some of the political-psychological
enon which.accompany the bargaining interaction.

phenom~

Negotiators are crit-

ical of mediation because (1) the third party is perceived as showing
preferential treatment; {2) the parties may use him as a crutch; and
(3) subsequent steps like fact-finding dilute the effectiveness of medi-

ation.
Proposition 12: The mediation process, without the additional step
of fact-finding, can exert influence on each party to modify its bargaining position.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES
SA
A
(2) 9.5%
(10) 47.6%
(Total points received +5}

u
(2) 9.5%

D

(5) 23.8%

SD
(2) 9.5%

For the most part, teachers were in agreement with this proposition.
The most important comments made by those who agree with the statement·
focus on the phrase "without the additional step of fact-finding ...
Evidence from the respondents indicated that mediation was of questionable
efficacy if the fact-finding procedure was to follow.

Several teachers

felt that mediation bargaining is retarded because management is holding
back their best concessions for later impasse steps like fact-finding; it
should be noted that this suspicion was substantiated by the responses
of management negotiators.

One teacher expressed the idea that negoti-

ations would be more effective if mediation were both the first and last
step in the impasse machinery.

Furthermore, he confessed that mediation
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bargaining was useless "because we were preparing to go to fact-finding. 11
Those who disagreed with the proposition made the following comments:
(1) "The mediator didn't understand the public education system;"

(2)

"He seemed to be pro-management and consequently, we began to mistrust
him·"
'

(3) "We need other pressure like binding arbitration or the strike

to make mediation effective."
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A
(4} 19%
(13) 61.8%
(Total points received +19)

u

(2) 9.6%

D

(2) 9.6%

so
0

Nearly eighty-one percent of the respondents favored this proposition.
A large group of negotiators agreed _because of the merits they perceived
in mediation:

(1) it is more difficult for the parties to place hostility

on a mediator than on a fact-finder;

(2) in the conflict environment of

crisis bargaining, the parties can build up "blindness" to the other parties' position.

In this setting a mediator can bring insight or perspec-

tive which may promote a climate for agreement.

Moreover, he can trans-

late the positions of each side, thus helping the parties reach agreement.
Another group of management negotiators agreed with the proposition because of the phrase, "without the additional step of fact-finding."

These

respondents endorsed mediation as the final step in the dispute settlement
process saying that additional steps like fact-finding only weaken mediation.

One negotiator, representative of this group, stated, "The more

impasse steps available, the more likely that previous steps will not be
used thoroughly."

In sum, a ritual of reluctant bargaining occurs if

their best offers for later impasse steps.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

1

A

- (6) 14.2%

(23) 54.7%
(Total points received +12)

The data reveal

tha~

most

u
(4) 9.5%

~egotiatorsagreed

D
(7)

16.6%

SO

(2) 4.7%

with the proposition.

There is substantial evidence from the respondents which suggests that
mediation is not a useful impasse invention when followed by the factfinding process.

Some teachers confessed that they were using mediation

only as a stepping stone to fact-finding, which they felt was a more useful tool for prompting concessions from management.

Management negotiators

insightfully perceived this tactic and thus reserved their concessions
for later phases of the impasse procedure.
Proposition 17: The effectiveness of mediation would be improved
if fact-finding were not so readily available to the bargaining parties.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

U

D

SO

~ ~(~1)~4.~7~%--------~(~4}~19~%~----~{~6}~28~.~g%~o--~{~9~)~42~.~8%~o~(~1~)~4~.7~%

~

(Total points received -5)

~

Theresponses show that teachers had a difference of opinion regarding

j

this proposition. Those who agreed explained that both parties would bargain

• more meaningfully during mediation if it were the last step in the imI passe machinery. Hhen teachers believe they can gain more bargaining

i

II

concessions from management during fact-finding, there is a tendency for
teachers to avoid modifying their positions in mediation.

Management
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negotiators, convinced that teachers are heading into fact-finding in an
effort to gain more,·stand pat in the mediation process, thus making mediation an unsatisfactory device for resolving disputes.
Among the respondents opposing this proposition were teachers from
a district who did not have access to fact-finding.

These teachers felt

that mediation would have been improved by subsequent fact-finding because
of their belief that fact-finding can bring more settlement pressure on
school management.

Other teachers, who had experienced both unsuccessful

mediation and fact-finding, still believed that the two procedures should
be maintained as sequential steps in the impasse machinery.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
(8) 38%
(9) 42.8%
(Total points received +25)

u
(4) 19%

D
0

so
0

Almost eighty-one percent of the respondents agreed with the proposition.

Some of the negotiators viewed mediation without fact-finding

as a more mature process because it encourages the parties to do something
for themselves.

Others favored this form of mediation because they be-

lieved that fewer impasse steps expedite dispute settlement.

Conversely,

additional steps beyond mediation only decrease the effec_tiveness of previous steps; that is, as long as there's another step, the parties are
reluctant to compromise in mediation.

Other management negotiators ac-

knowledged complacency or reluctance to bargain seriously in mediation
if they felt that the. teachers' organization was going to use the future
step of fact-finding as· a lever to get more money.

One negotiator con-

----------------------------------------------------~--------------
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fessed, "Since fact-finding was available and forthcoming, we held back

and did not give our best offer in mediation." Another similarly admitted,
"We behave differently in mediation when we know fact-finding isn't going
to follow. We're more honest and serious in mediation if it is the last
step." One other negotiator offered the idea that the mediator can more
11

effectively influence the parties when a fact-finder is not waiting in the
wings. 11
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA
A
U
{9) 21.4%
(13) 30.4%
(10)23.8%
Total points received +10)

so

D

(9) 21.4%

(1} 2.3%

While ·only a small majority of negotiators agreed with the propo-

~

sition it is important to note that management representatives were almost ·
unanimous in desiring mediation without fact-finding.

Teachers, on the

other hand, were divided on this proposition and seemingly did not fully
understand the "holding back tactic which management is forced to engage
11

in when fact-finding follows the mediation process.
P~~position.22~ ~1ediatio n accombpanied byh the t~rea~ or actualitty of 1 ~
.t he str1 e may st1mu ate sett 1 ement etween t e part1es 1n contrast o ·
f·
mediation in and of itself.
f
~

TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
U
(3) 14.2%
(14) 66.6%
(2) 9.6%
(Total points received +18)

D

(2) 9.6%

t

so
0

A significant number of teacher agreed with the proposition. The
respondents were in agreement primarily because they felt that pressure
is needed in the collective bargaining environment to induce settlement

i
I

I
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attitudes~

For example, some felt that the mediator can use the forces

of fear and apprehension which are generated by a strike to facilitate
intergroup agreement.
SCHOOL

MA~AGEMENT

REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES
J

~

11) 4.7%

A

SD

D

U

(5} 23.8%

(12) 57.1%
(2) 9.6%
(Total points received +7)

(1) 4. 7%

A majority of the respondents agreed \'lith the proposition.

Similar

I
i

i

to teacher negotiators, management negotiators felt that a climate of
pressure promotes serious bargaining.

One negotiator stated that the
11

scare of an impending strike helps the parties listen more attentively
to the mediator... Another articulated the idea that a mediator without
a 11 stick 11 is ineffective.

One negotiator summed up management rationale

when he said, 11 We all respond to pressure.

J

II
'

We think and talk more seri-

ously when the strike pressure is imminent ...
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA
A
U
(4) 9.5%
(26) 61.9%
(4) 9.5%
(Total points received +11.5)

D

(7) 16.6%

SD

\,,

(1) 2.3%
t

Nearly seventy-two percent of the respondents agreed with this prop-i
osition.

Two general reasons surfaced:

First, the mediator can be more

I
~

f·

influential in effecting a settlement when a strike threat or its actu-

r

ality hangs over the heads of the negotiators.

I

Secondly, agreement-

i

!·
___,______________________________________________________________I
making attitudes are fostered by the fears associated with the strike.·

f

t

·-

r

,,..,......,..,.,
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SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS III
The information elicited from the forty-two respondents suggests
that mediation should be incorporated into an impasse resolution procedure.

TABLE 6 pictorially shows that the two groups share a preference

for this device.
Both groups agreed with the basic idea that mediation should be
available as a means to resolve disputes.

This is rather surprising in

view of the fact that mediation did not successfully terminate the 1972
impasses.

However, the ineffective aspects of mediation were signaled in

proposition 7 as both groups questioned the ability of mediation to promote sincere negotiations.

With respect to the questions, "Is mediation

more effective by itself" and "Is mediation better without fact-finding
following," school management agreed enthusiastically.

Teachers, however,

were divided with respect to these two important ideas.

With·respect ·to

the thesis that mediation is more effective with concurrent pressures
such as an imminent strike, both groups agreed with management agreeing
to a lesser extent.

In sum:

This hypothesis seems to be confirmed be-

cause the net total points amassed by the independent gr·oups was positive.
Mediation is a preferred strategy to employ in public education bargain-.
ing disputes.
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TABLE 6
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS III COMPARING TEACHER NEGOTIATION
REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATION
REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF MEDIATION AS
A METHOD FOR RESOLVING SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES
Propositions, Respondents
And Total Points Received

Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement

Proposition 2
Teachers

(+10}

Management (+16}
Proposition 7
Teachers

(0}

Management (+5)
Proposition 12
Teachers

(+5)

Management (+19)
Proposition 17
Teachers

(-5)

~1anagement

(+25)

r----- ,·
L-,_........_

Proposition 22
Teachers

(+18)

Management (+7)
+42 + 0 +30 +20 '+10 0 -10

AGREE

-20

-30

DISAGREE
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HYPOTHESIS IV
negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding strategy is not an effective procedure for resolving
public education bargaining disputes.

Teac~er

This hypothesis deals with another procedure commonly employed to
resolve public employment bargaining disputes, namely, fact-finding, and
suggests tHatthis procedure should be eliminated from either state statutes ·
or local collective bargaining agreements.

Propositions three, eight,

thirteen, eighteen, and twenty-three pertain to this hypothesis.
Proposition 3: The assured availability of an impasse procedure
such as fact-finding tends to inhibit the willingness of the parties to
compromise prior to acknowledgement of an impasse and use of the procedure.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES
SA

m 9.6%

A

(1o) 47.6%

u

D

(7) 33.3%

(1) 4.7%

(Total points received +5)

A majority of teachers agreed with the proposition.

so

(1) 4. 7%

The basis for

agreement rests on a teacher belief that if a community has knowledge,
via a fact-finder•s report, about both the working conditions of teachers
and the unreasonableness of the board of education, it will then exert
pressure on the school board to grant concessions to teachers.

This

belief or opinion is ultimately manifested in a bargaining behavior
characterized by delay or reservation.

Teacher negotiators.verbalized

this bargaining tactic in the following ways:

One said, We were afraid
11

to give up too many demands too soon. 11 Another stated,
anything away in direct negotiations or mediation.

11

We can•t give

We must save our

proposals for fact-finding because he will probably split-the-middle. 11
•

ae1-

......
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Teachers who disagreed with the proposition reflected two viewpoints:·
First, as

negotiati~n

representatives they tried earnestly to reach agree-

ment in direct negotiations.

Secondly, since the parties are uncertain

if the fact-finder will favor their position, pressure is generated to
settle prior to impasse to avoid a potentially unfavorable recommendation.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

(6) 28.9%

(13) 61.8%

(Total points received +23)

u

D

(2) 9.6%

0

SD
0

Management negotiators almost unanimously agreed with the idea that
the availability of fact-finding inhibits concession-making in direct
negotiations.

Most of the respondents reported that they were reluctant

to give their last, best offers in either direct negotiations or mediation
when the .fact-finding step was potentially forthcoming.· As one negotiator
said, "As a bargain tactic, if I think the teachers will try to gain an
advantage in fact-finding, I only weaken my bargaining position by
vealing my best offers in earlier phases of bargaining.

re~

So I simply wait

and do not bargain seriously." Another management neogtiator professed,
''If I know I'm going to fact-finding, where the issues are usually compromised by the fact-finder, I hesitate to make concessi.ons early."
Other negotiators agreed with the proposition because they felt that
additional steps in the impasse procedure serve to protract bargaining
conflicts.

It is interesting to note that

negotiator~

in the two districts

which did not use fact-finding in the 1972 bargaining dispute were in
accord with the propositfon.

...-----""'-----·
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The two negotiators who disagreed maintained that fact-finding is

valuable because (1) the process can clarify the issues and facts, and
(2) the report can be instrumental in obtaining community support for

school management.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA
A
U
{8) 19%
(23) 54.7%
(1) 2.3%
(Total points received +14)

0

("9) 21.4%

so

( 1) 2. 3%

Nearly seventy-five percent of the negotiatorsagreed that the availability of fact-finding tends to retard the willingness of the parties to
make compromises in bargaining.

Both groups of negotiators admitted a

reluctance to bargain seriously in the early phases of bargaining if factfinding can be eventually used.

In short, each side becomes complacent

negotiators.
Proposition 8: Fact-finding by itself, that is, without the use of
either prior mediation or a subsequent strike threat is not a positive
vehicle for resolving teacher bargaining disputes.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES
SA
A
U
(2) 9.6%
(11) 52.3%
(1) 4.7%
(Total points received +7)

0

(6) 28.9%

so
(1) 4.7%

While most of the respondents agreed with the proposition, mixed
opinions can be observed.

Some of the teacher negotiators are opposed to

isolated fact-finding because the advisory nature of this process permits.
school management to reject the fact-finder•s recommendations.

Further-

more, since the report can be rejected by either party, the process does
not bring closure or termination to the dispute.
=

As a consequence, the
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parties must choose among three alternatives:

(1) return to the bargaining

table; (2) ca·pitulate to the other side; or (3) prepare to engage in a strike
confrontation.

Other negotiators agreed with the proposition because they

had experienced considerable frustration with the process in the past.

In

particular, it had been a waste of both time and money.
Some who disagreed with the proposition claimed that fact-finding can be
an effective way of communicating teacher welfare problems to·the public, who
in turn, could motivate school management to make concessions to the teachers.
One negotiator disclaimed the proposition because he felt that fact-finding
can help the parties both eliminate the trivial issues and justify the significant issues.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
U
(2) 9.6%
(14) 66.6%
0
(Total points received +13)

D

(5) 23.8%

so
0

A large majority of the respondents agreed with the proposition.

While

the reasons vary, it is readily seen that these negotiators find ·serious defects in the fact-finding process.

Some of the negotiators reiterated the

idea that it is not a useful mechanism for settling impasses because there
exists the danger that serious negotiations may not begin until fact-finding
is complete.

Succinctly, the parties reserve their best proposals for im-

passe bargaining thus interfering with the success of pre-impasse talks.
Another group of negotiators pointed out that since adoption of the factfinder's report is voluntary, that is, the parties are free to reject all or
part of the recommendations, the dispute can easily be turned into a political
war when one side chooses to reject the report.

Moreover, either or both

sides may be angered by an unfavorable fact-finder•s report.
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In either sit-

uation, the fact-finding process is likely to increase hoStilities.

Still

another group of management negotiators found fault with fact-finding because
it was a laborious, time-consuming procedure.
The few respondents who disagreed with the proposition argu·ed that the
process is a useful mechanism for dispute settlement because it can provide
clarification of data and issues, and this understanding can serve as a basis.
for settlement.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A
~~--~U~~~------~0~~~~--~S~D~~~--(25)59.5%
(1). 2.3%
(11) 26.1%
(1) 2.3%
(Total points received +12}

T4) 9.5%

A substantial majority of the negotiators agreed with the proposition.
Agreement generally revolved around the awareness that the fact-finding report
is advisory in nature and therefore the parties can voluntarily choose to
accept or reject the report.

In all districts which used fact-finding, school

management did in fact reject the report and consequently provoked teachers
to strike.

Disagreement came from those who.felt that the fact-finding proc-

ess can (1) generate public pressure for settlement, and (2) facilitate communication between the belligerents.
Proposition_!l: Fact-finding, leading to the issuance of formal public
recommendations, is not likely to reduce the impasse conflict which still
exists between teachers and school management following unsuccessful mediation.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES

1

RESPONSES

~

A

U

D

so

{2) 9.6%

{9) 42.8%

0

(lo) 47.6%

0

(Total points received +3)
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The data show that there is divergence of thinking on this propositi on. · Negotiators who affirmed this statement cited three reasons:
First, the advisory-voluntary nature of fact-finding only functions to·
intensify"the intergroup conflict.

Teachers explained that when school

management rejected all or part of the fact-finder's recommendations
while they accepted the report carte b1anche, the teachers • organization
imnediately felt frustration.

The frustration quickly turned to anger,

organizational solidarity, and ultimately vented itself in a teacher
strike.

Secondly, some teachers believ_ed that even if a public fa_ct-

. finder's report had the effect of generating pro-teacher sentiment from
the community, their board of education wouldn't listen anyhow.
feeling was expressed by another teacher who said,

11

A similar

In a small community

like ours, public recommendations are useless because the community is
already on the board's side. 11 Thirdly, a few teachers professed that
their early bargaining plan was ultimately to go into fact-finding because
they felt that the fact-finder would favor their positions; the community
would then pressure the school board to

g~ant

concessions to the teachers.

These teachers· admitted that while the fact-finder did endorse most of
the teachers• demands, the assumption of community support did not
materialize.
Teachers who disagreed with the proposition did so for two reasons:
First, many expressed a belief that when facts are released to the public,

community pressure will be exerted on both sides to settle.
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Furthermore,

some felt that if school management knows that facts are going to be
released, it may promote serious bargaining prior to the fact-finding
process.

Secondly, some teachers explained that a public fact-finding

report can promote intra-organizational solidarity.

That is, when a fact-

finder favors teacher positions, credibility is enhanced between teacher
negotiation representatives and those they represent.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

U

0

(7) 33.3%

(8) 38%

(1) 4.7%

(5) 23.8%

(Total points received +17)

so
0

The data signify that nearly seventy-five percent of the respondents
agree with the proposition.

Some of the negotiators held fact-finding

in disrespect because the fact-finder generally favors the teachers.

One

respondent typified this feeling when he said, "We always lose in factfinding because the fact-finder is biased." A large number of negotiators
claimed that public fact-finding increases internal or external conflict.
Externally, the report can breed public discontent and this is particularly
unnecessary since the taxpayers usually_ do not understand the report,
school finances, or the issues involved between the parties.

Internally,

the report can (1) solidify or polarize the respective positions of the
parties; some respondents alleged that the teachers tried to use the report to embarrass them into a settlement which further entrenched school
management's positions; and (2) create a win-lose environment which can
provoke further controversy or a strike.

In other words, fact-finding

had an incendiary affect upon negotiations.
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Other respondents pointed

out that fact-finding delays negotiations and is unnecessary because the
teachers know the facts anyhow.
The few negotiators who disagreed with the proposition supported
public fact-finding because the process can (1) foster political credibility -- i.e., it can help the school board obtain community support
especially if the report does not favor teacher positions; (2) generate
public response which in turn may facilitate concession-making by both
sides; and (3) make the parties responsible for the facts or evidence
which they present to the fact-finder.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A
U
(9) 21.4%
(17) 40.5%
(1) 2.3%
(Total points received +10)

D
(15) 35.7%

so
0

The majority of negotiators, especially those from the management
side of the table, agreed with the proposition.

In general, agreement

was based on the idea that the advisory-voluntary nature of fact-finding
only intensifies crisis bargaining.

Disagreement revolved around the

assumption that the fact-finding process can generate public opinion
pressure which prompts dispute settlement behavior.
Proposition 18: Fact-finding with private recommendations is not
likely to serve as an effective form of reconciliation when. teachers and
management are still at impasse following unsuccessful mediation.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
0

A
U
(17) 80.9%
0
(Total points received +13)

D

so

(4) 19%

0
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The respondents, to a large degree, supported the above proposition
for several reasons.

Some teachers, still assuming that the fact-finding

process can eventually coerce management into concessions, felt that private recommendations would preclude community intervention.

More to the

point, these respondents believed that teachers need public support in
order to achieve teacher welfare issues and that private fact-finding
would not be instrumental in bringing community pressure to the bargaining
table.

Other teacher negotiators, while agreeing with the proposition,

took a completely different approach.

These teachers felt that school

employers are impervious to any form of third-party intervention such as
med·iation, fact-finding, or community pressure groups.

Therefore, any

kind of fact-finding, private or public, is ineffective in bringing an
agreement-making atmosphere to the bargaining dispute.

Furthermore, as one

teacher asserted, Since the board can reject the recommendations and did,
11

fuel was added to the fire and a teacher strike was precipitated ...
The minority of teachers \'lho disagreed with the propositi on be 1i eved
that the private form of fact-finding can (1) promote accurate communication between teachers and the board of education, and (2) keep community
unrest and polarization to a minimum.

For example, private recommendations

reduces the possibility that a small community will

11

chouse up sides

during the dispute.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
u
(1) 4.7%
(121 57.1%
(2) 9.6%
(Total points rece.ived +8)

D

SD

(6) 28.9%

0

11
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A majority of the respondents were in agreement with the proposition.
some of the negotiators continued their opposition to fact-finding by
maintaining that neither form of fact-finding, private or public, would
facilitate termination of a school bargaining dispute; instead, third
party intervention such as fact-finding only serves to add coals to the
bargaining conflict because the parties end up quarreling over the veracity of the fact-finder's report.

Some offered the opinion that if fact-

finding is going to be used in the impasse machinery it should take public
form rather than the private because the former can createmore pressure
on the parties to settle.
Those who disagreed did so because (1) they believed that an unbiased,
third party can discover new facts and unrecognized alternatives which
may facilitate impasse settlement, and (2) private fact-finding prevents
the introduction of community forces which may interfere with the resolution of intergroup conflict.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA
(1) 2.3%

A
(29) 69%

U
(2) 4.7%

D

SO

(lo) 23.8%

o

(Total points received +11.5)
A large majority of negotiators agreed that private forms of

fact~

finding would not aid in the resolution of school bargaining conflict.
While several reasons were given, it can be observed that participants
on both sides of the table feel that the fact-finding process is not a
solution to the impasse problem in public education.
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Proposition 23: When the fact-finding process is available in a
local collective bargaining contract, the parties at impasse are likely
to wait for fact-finding rather than seriously endeavor to reach direct
agreement by themselves.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
A
( 11} 52.3%

SA

(Total points received +5)

u

(4} 19%

so

D

(6) 28.9%

0

Only a- slight majority of teachers agreed with the above statement.
Hany of the respondents made allegations that their bargaining adversaries
did not negotiate seriously in the early phases of bargaining.

One

respondent typified the feeling of others in this way: "Our school management has a tendency to wait until the last minute to make realistic
offers.

They were stalling and dragging their heels hoping that we

would give up our demands in the early rounds of bargaining.

11

Other

teacher negotiators admitted that even their team deferred concessionmaking until after impasse was declared.

As one teacher confessed,

"There's no doubt about it, we can always fall back on fact-finding as
a solution to our bargaining problems."

From these comments, one could

conclude that both sides tend to avoid putting their last offers on the
table during direct negotiations.
Among those who disagreed, several reflected the position that since
school boards fear loss of control because of the intervention of a third
party, the threat of possible fact-finding may increase the.willingness
on the part of management to make concessions in early phases of the
bargaining interaction.

It is important to note that this theory was

advanced by teacher negotiators who did not use fact-finding in the 1972
dispute.
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SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES
SA

u

A-

(3) 14.2%

18) 38%
(9) 42.8%
(Total points received +24)
Appro~imately

proposition.

D

SD

(1) 4.7%

0

eighty-one percent of the respondents agreed with the

Many of these individuals reiterated earlier acknowledge-

ments that they tend to withhold or defer concessions on major issues
until the last possible moment.

One respondent, seemingly a spokesman·

for this group said, 11 He don•t bargain hard until deadlines are there,
such as the opening of school. 11 Another respondent explained why manage•~"He

ment must engage in a deferra 1 of early bargaining commitments:

do

not give our best offer in early negotiations because when the fact-finder
comes, he begins at the parties• last offer.

If we made early commitments

in pre-impasse talks, we would be pressured by the fact-finder to give up
more during impasse bargaining.

11

Two negotiators agreed with the propo-

sition because they felt that fact-finding is a crutch which allows the
parties to avoid facing the issues themselves.

That is, the opportunity

to let a third-party solve the problem precludes intensive direct negotiations between the parties.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A

U

D

(8) 19%

(20) 47.6%

{7) 16.6%

(7) 16.6%

SD
0

(Total points received +22.5)
As shown by the above data and TABLE 7, both teachers and management
negotiators agreed with the proposition with teachers showing agreement to
a lesser extent.

Both sides contended that the availability or inevita-

bility of fact-finding engenders the negative bargaining tactic which is
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characterized by a deferral of concession-making in direct negotiations.
SU~1MARY

OF HYPOTHESIS IV

Contrary to the research accomplished by Perry, the information elicited from these forty-two respondents suggests that fact-finding is not
a constructive social technology for resolving school bargaining disputes.
Specifically, the fact-finding process was shown to have two serious defects:

First, the availability of the method can cause both parties to

engage in complacent bargaining tactics characterized by a withholding of
concessions during early bargaining sessions primarily because they hold
an assumption that public dissemination of a fact-finding report will
elicit consumer pressure; such can prompt employer acquiescence to teacher
demands.

While consumer reaction to school bargaining impasses may have

been a facilitating force in resolving teacher-management disputes in the
early and mid 1960s, community participation in the early 1970s is difficult to achieve.

Teachers in this study generally conceded that notwith-

standing substantial efforts to involve the consumer in the dispute, such
efforts failed to generate even minimal public concern. The source of
this apathy may be that communities

a~e

becoming increasingly more

tolerant of teacher disputes and work stoppages and are, therefore, less
likely to react than they did in the last decade.
also, take the form of reluctant bargaining.

Management tactics,

Under the assumption .that

teachers use fact-finding and subsequent community pressures as negotiating
power, school management negotiators defer their concessions for later
phases of bargaining.
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Secondly, fact-finding appears to be a troublesome device because it
intensifies the overt conflict which already exists.

The advisory-volun-

tary nature of fact-finding gives the parties freedom to reject all or
part of the recommendations.

In the school districts where fact-finding

was used, school management did reject the report, thus protracting intergroup confl, i ct.

One teacher summed up the dynamics in this way:

11

The

board's refusal to accept a fact-finder's recommendations created further
disruption and employee unrest.

Opinions polarized, teachers were radi-

calized, and a teacher strike burst forth.

11

Apparently, some public

education negotiators are sensitive to the problems associated with factfinding because in two of the seven districts investigated, fact-finding
has recently been eliminated from the impasse machinery.
Finally, the data which are summarized in TABLE 7 seem to clearly
support the thesis that fact-finding should not be used to resolve school
impasses. Hypothesis IV is accepted.

----·-·--·------~~-~-·---------------------~-~-·--------------------------~
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS IV COMPARING TEACHER NEGOTIATION
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATION
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF FACT-FINDING
AS A METHOD FOR RESOLVING SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES
Propositions, Respondents
And Total Points Received

Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement

Proposition 3
Teachers

(+5)

Management (+23)
Proposition 8
Teachers

(+7)

Management (+13)
Proposition 13
Teachers

(+3)

r~anagement

(f-17)

Proposition 18
Teachers

(+13)

Management (+8)
Proposition 23
Teachers

(+5)

Management (+24)
+4

+40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -

AGREE

DISAGREE
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HYPOTHESIS V
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the arbitration
strategy would not be an appropriate dispute settlement
mechanism in public education bargaining impasses.
This hypothesis deals with the umpiring device called arbitration
in which a third party determines salaries and other terms and conditions
of employment. Arbitration is often advanced as a substitute for the
strike.

While this settlement device was not used in the school systems

studied, it will be investigated to determine how school negotiators feel
about the use of such a strategy.

Propositions four, nine, fourteen,

nineteen, and twenty-four pertain to this hypothesis.
Proposition 4: Contract disputes between teachers and boards of
education should not be resolved by an impartial, outside authority who
makes a final and binding decision.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES

A

SA

(3) 14.2%

0

(Total

poi~ts

u

D

(1) 4.7%

(6) 28.9%

so

(11) 52.3%

received -25)

The scale shows that almost seventy-one percent of the respondents
disagreed with the proposition. Those who disagreed reflected two positions:

First, because of the emotional heat, mistrust, and irrationality

which surrounds a negotiations impasse, an impartial, objective third
party is needed to decide.the issues.

Secondly, the threat of third

party intervention in the form of an arbitrator can promote more serious
bargaining by school management.
The few teachers who agreed with the proposition maintained that an
arbitration-umpire lacks knowledge of the school district which may lead
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him to make inappropriate decisions.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
T14) 66.6%
(4) 19%
(Total points received +29)

D

U

a

(3) 14.2%

so
0

.I
u

The data reveal that nearly all of the respondents agreed with the
statement.· Rationale f6r

agre~ment

focuses on three main themes:

(1) an itinerate arbitrator ''flying in and out of a local school district"
could leave the parties to implement difficult or irresponsible awards;
(2) since an arbitrator is neither familiar with the school district or
with public education, he may make decisions out of ignorance which the
parties have to live with; and (3) ·third-party arbitration is an unlawful
delegation of school boards' rights.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA
A
(14) 33.3%
(7) 16.6%
(Total points received +2)

U
(1} 2.3%

D
(9) 21.4%

There was a divergence of thinking on this proposition.

so

(11) 26.1%

Teachers

generally disagreed with the idea while school management respondents were
in agreement.
Proposition 9: Compulsory binding arbitration, in which a third
party intervenes to determine salaries and other terms and conditions of
work, would tend to weaken the direct negotiations process.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
u
(3) 14.2%
(1) 4.7%
(2) 9.6%
(Total points received -16)

D
(11) 52.3%

so
(4) 19%

~
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As indicated by the scale, a large majority of teachers disagree
with the proposition.

In general, teachers felt that arbitration would

strengthen rather than weaken the bargaining process. Some of the respondents.speculated that the fear of losing an issue via a third-party
conclusion would give impetus to the parties to bargain more seriously.
Teachers especially felt that such fear would prompt good faith negotiations by school management.

Briefly, this dispute resolution device

may encourage settlement before arbitration.

Three teacher negotiators,

all from the same school district, favored arbitration because they had
had a

~ood

experience with it when it was used to resolve an

earli~r

im-

passe in 1970.
Teachers who evidenced dislike for arbitration did so on the grounds
that it would invite a waiting syndrome--i.e., neither side would agree
in advance but would tend to wait for the final step of arbitration.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

(7) 33.3%
(10) 47.6%
(Total points received +20)

u

(1) 4.7%

D

(2) 9.6%

so
(1) 4.7%

The scale shows that more than eighty percent of the respondents
agreed with the proposition.

Management negotiators are critical of ar-

bitration for at least four reasons: (1) this device would interfere with
true negotiations; rather than negotiate between themselves, the parties
would tend to wait for the final step to perform for the arbitrator.
Concurrently, the tendency to wait would interfere with communication-i.e., the parties wouldn't listen to each other because they are preoccupied with arbitration preparation; (2) there is a tendency to ''hold

123

back 11 for arbitration.

If arbitration lay at the end of the impasse pro-

cedure, neither party would give their best offers in direct negotiations;
(3) the availability or possibility of an arbitrated settlement may prompt
a 11 let-George·-do-it 11 syndrome; and (4) an elected public body like a
school board cannot give away its rights and responsibilities to an arbitrator.

In addition to these perceived arbitration defects, several

management negotiators displayed mistrust in the arbitration procedure
because they had had a bitter experience with it in a previous impasse in
which the arbitrator's awards favored the teachers' organization.
Among the few negotiators ltJho disagreed, one stated,

11

If I knew an

umpire was coming in to resolve the issue, I might negotiate differently
in an effort to avoid an unfavorable

a~tJard.

11

COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A

(8) 19%
(12) 28.6%
(Total points received +2.5)

u

( 4) 9. 5%

0

so

(13) 30.4%

(5) 11.9%

The combined response scale shows that there is considerable dis~greement

among the respondents with respect to the proposition.

Teacher

negotiators generally desired the use of arbitration primarily because
they felt it would promote serious bargaining on the part of school
management.

Conversely, school management negotiators disapproved of

compulsory binding arbitration; their lack of faith in this device was
founded on several rationale.
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froposition 14: As a means of impasse resolution, the parties should
not have access to voluntarily submit the conflict issues to an impartial
third party for a final and binding decision.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

a---

A

(3) 14.2%
(Total points received -17)

U

(2}

9.6%

D

---,...0,.....,.2IT7-:1%

SO
·-r(4.n-)__,l:;-;;9=%--

'

More than seventy percent of the respondents disagreed \vi th the
proposition.

Some of the respondents disagreed with the idea because of

the word "voluntarily." These teachers felt that arbitration must be
compulsory or mandatory, otherwise school management would not agree to
utilize this dispute settlement technique; that is, voluntaryism would
promote another impasse.
11

11

Other teachers remarked that the potential

loss of control by school management via any form of arbitration would
motivate management negotiators to make better negotiation efforts in
earlier stages of bargaining.
As to the few negotiators who agreed with the statement, one teacher
thought that any form of arbitration would function to retard the negotiations process--i.e., the parties wouldn't negotiate meaningfully until
the arbitration step was reached •.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

(9)

42.8~~

A

- - - - - (7) 33.3%

(Total points received +22)

U

(2) 9.6%

D

'13Tl4.2%

so
0

Approximately seventy-five percent of the respondents agreed with this
proposition.

Management negotiators found some similar faults with

val~

untary binding arbitration as they did with compulsory binding arbitration.
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For example, they perceive vo1untary arbitration as having the following

defects:

(1) it engenders a ''let-the-arbitrator-solve-the-problem" syn-

drome; (2) arbitrators may not be knowledgeable about the specific school
system or public education bargaining problems; and (3) a school board
cannot abdicate its responsibilities to outsiders.

In sum, these nego-

tiatol'S expressed the idea that bargaining is best without a third party.
One respondent favored the concept of voluntary binding arbitration
but only if the arbitrator deals with salary issues and not curriculum
issues.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A

(9) 21.4%
(10) 23.8%
(Total points received +4.5)

u

(4) 9.5%

D

(15) 35.7%

so

(4) 9.5%

The combined response scale reveals that the respondentswere in discord with respect to the use of voluntary binding arbitration.

While

teacher negotiators favored this impasse resolution device, school management negotiators categorically rejected it.
Proposition 19: As a means to resolve bargaining disputes, compulsory
binding arbitration would deter the parties from reaching direct agreement by themselves.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
A
(1) 4.7%
0
(Total points received -19)

U
(3} 14.2%

D
(13) 61.8%

SO
(4) 19%

More than eighty percent of the teacher respondents disagreed with
the proposition.

Rather than deter a direct agreement, teachers expressed

a general feeling that the possibility of compulsory binding arbitration
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would encourage early settlements. That is, the parties--especially school

management--would negotiate earnestly to avoid an arbitrated settlement.
SCHOOL
SA

t~1ANAGH~ENT

REPRESENTATIVES RESPONSES

u

A

f4) 19%

1

(10) 47.6%

(Total points received +14)

(3) 14.2%

D

so

(4) 19%

0

The scale shows that most management negotiators agreed with the proposition.

Several respondents voiced the idea that the arbitration process

would force them to hold back offers in direct negotiations.

As one nego-

tiator said, We couldn•t expose our best offers until the third party comes.
11

Other management negotiators were convinced that the teachers• organization
would indiscriminately throw many demands into the arbitrator's kettle
11

11

in hopes that the umpire would split the differences.
Among the negotiators VJho disagreed, several claimed that they would
rather reach an early agreement than risk a dictated settlement by an
arbitrator.
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

A

(5) 11.9%
(10)"23.8%
(Total points received -2.5)

u

(6) 14.2%

D
(17) 40.5%

so

(4) 9.5%

Respondents showed dissimilar opinion over this proposition. Teacher
negotiators strongly endorsed compulsory arbitration while management negotiators were equally opposed to the mechanism.

The former group felt that

such a device would motivate their opponents towards serious, good faith
bargaining in direct negotiations.

The latter group felt that an arbitrator

"waiting in the wings would slo\'J down the settlement process.
11

Specifically,

teachers would hold out to the very end in hopes of gaining more while

11
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management would hold out in hopes of saving more.
Proposition 24: Reliance upon third party arbitration, either compulsory or voluntary, would weaken the incentive for the parties to agree
at the bargaining table.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

0

A

(Total points received -19)

so
(4) 19%

0

U

(2) 9.6%

(13) 61.8%

(2) 9.6%

Almost eighty percent of the teachers disagreed with the proposition.
The general feeling expressed was that the threat of arbitration can
function to promote concession-making and settlement behavior in the
earlier phases of bargaining.

One teacher remarked, ''To avoid the pos-

sibility that an arbitrator would rule against the association on any
demand, I would bargain more seriously in pre-impasse talks. 11 Other
teachers speculated that school management would similarly bargain differently in order to avoid a possible negative arbitration award.

In

sum, deferment of compromises would be diminished by the potentiality
of an arbitrator entering the scene.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
(3)

14.2%

A

(10) 47.6%

(Total points received·+11)

U
(3)

0

(5) 23.8%

14.2%

so
0

A majority of management negotiators agreed with the cbncept that
arbitration would interfere with the process of direct negotiations.

In

particular, some felt that both parties would postpone compromises for the
arbitration step. As one negotiator said, The parties would give up and
11

not negotiate if arbitration were available in the impasse steps."
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Another negotiator suspected that teachers would be especially inclined
to wait for arbitratiqn: "Why should the teachers• organization give in
during mediation or fact-finding if binding arbitratipn is there to
give them

more.~~

Those in disagreement commented that arbitration would give incentive to settle.

One negotiator said, "The possibility of arbitration

might make us move faster to avoid a third party from telling us what
to do. 11 Another remarked,

11

If both sides know arbitration is there at

the end of the tunnel, the uncertainty of his decision may stimulate
earlier negotiations. 11
COMBINED RESPONSES
SA

u

A

(3) 7.1%

(12} 28.6%

(Total points received -2)

This ·scale

sho~t/s

(5) 11.9%

0
(18)

42.9%

so

( 4) 9. 5%

a diversity of viewpoints ·among negotiators.

As

is true in all of the propositions relevant to hypothesis V, teachers
endorsed arbitration while management objected to its use.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS V
The summary graph in TABLE 8 evidences the fact that the two groups
of negotiators took opposite viewpoints with respect to the use of arbitration.

Teachers, seemingly frustrated with the stalling tactics used

by school management, believed that arbitration would (1) speed up the
bargaining process; (2) encourage concession-making by their adversaries;
and (3) motivate the management team to take the bargaining process
seriously.

School management negotiators criticized arbitration because

it (1) encourages the parties to defer their best offers until later
phases of bargaining; (2) promotes a 11 let-the-arbitrator-solve-the-
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problem-for-us11 attitude; (3) raises the problem of whether or not a
board of education can delegate its rights and responsibilities to a
third party; and (4) permits decision-making by an umpire who may neither
be knowledgeable of the school district or the peculiar problems of public
education.

In brief, management negotiators in this study were convinced

that school bargaining is best vlithout a third-party arbitrator.

In many

respects, these negotiators offered the same criticisms as those advanced
by authorities in labor-management relations.
A necessary fact to point out is that arbitration was neither available or utilized in the school systems investigated, but one district had
emoloyed this settlement device in a previous impasse. Therefore, it
should be said that most of the respondents' rationale was based on
speculation rather than direct experience.
Coincidentally, TABLE 8 shows that the disagreement points perfectly counter-balance the agreement points.
neither acceoted nor rejected.

Hypothesis V is, therefore,
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TABLE 8
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS V COMPARING TEACHER NEGOTIATION
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL MANAGEt1ENT NEGOTIATION
REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF ARBITRATION
AS A METHOD FOR RESOLVING SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES
Propositions, Respondents
And Total Points Received

Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement

Proposition 4
Teachers

(-25}

~1anagement

(+29}

Proposition 9
Teachers

(-16}

11anagement (+20)
Proposition 14
Teachers

. ( -17)

Management (+22)
Proposition 19
Teachers

( -19)

Management (+14)
Proposition 24
Teachers

( -19)

Management (+11}
+ 2 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 - 0 -42

AGREE

DISAGREE
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HYPOTHESIS VI
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining
disputes.
Hypothesis VI, as well as hypothesis VII, focused on the most controversial strategy for terminating bargaining impasses in public education,'
namely, the strike.

This hypothesis suggests that teachers endorse the

use of the strike; conversely, hypothesis VII estimates that school management negotiators are opposed to this device.

Propositions five, ten,

fifteen, twenty, and twenty-five relate to hypothesis VI and Hypothesis VII.
Proposition 5: State legislatures should authorize strikes by teachers
at least where public health or safety is not thereby endangered.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES RESPONSES
1

SA
A
U
(13) 61.8%
{8) 38%
(0)
(Total points received +34)

D

(0)

SD
(0)
1-

Teacher negotiators unanimously agreed with this statement.

In

general, agreement came from three viewpoints: First, since mediation
and fact-finding failed to resolve the impasses and with binding arbitration not available, some device is needed to bring closure to the
dispute.

The strike can serve this function.

Secondly, many teachers

expressed the concern that school management will abuse its power position--i.e., they are reluctant to make compromises and concessions--when
teachers are denied the right to strike.
the negotiations

proc~ss

In other words, the strike makes

function more efficiently because the parties

have full equality at the bargaining table.

Thirdly, teacher strikes do

not imperil the health and safety of a community.

..
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Proposition 10: The threat or actuality of a strike can function
to promote an agreement making atmosphere.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES
SA

161

D
(3) 14.2%

A
U
28.9%
(12) 57.1%
0
(Total points received +21)

so
0

Teacher respondents were in almost total accord with this proposition.

Agreement centered around the concept that collective bargain-

ing is a power relationship in which the parties must be able to exercise
power tactics--such as the strike-pfor the purpose of facilitating agreement.

More specifically, strike threats and actual work stoppages bring

pressures to both sides to settle. As one teacher said, "The strike was
an instrument to get the school board•s attention, and when they began to
listen to us, bargaining was easier.

The strike also forced us to examine

our demands more carefully." Another teacher emphasized the importance
of the power relationship by saying, "with the absence of binding arbitration and the choice of the school board to refuse the fact-finder•s
recommendations, the only power tool we had remaining was the strike ...
Regarding the three

te~chers

who disagreed with the statement, it

is essential to note that·all three represented the same school district.
In this school system the board of education threatened to fire 414
teachers who engaged in the strike.

--------------------------...
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Proposition 15: Concession-making, compromises, or modification of
bargaining positions by school management are likely to be generated when
a teacller.s • organization threatens to strike.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES
SA

u
A
(2) 9.6%
(9) 42.8%
(Total points received +16)

D
(3}

\6) 28.9%

so

14.2%

(1) 4.7%

Approxima-tely seventy percent of the respondents agreed with this statement.

Fundamentally, agreement centered on the belief that negotiations is

essentially a compromise and balancing of opposing pressures of two social
groups.

Furthermore, as a means to

achiev~

compromise, teachers must process

specific forms of bargaining power--e.g., the strike threat or the actuality
of the strike.

Several teachers, h6wever, qualified their affirmative re-

sponses to this proposition by pointing out that strike threats are less
effective when the other party is experienced in the bargaining process.

In

other words, a highly sophisticated school management can mitigate the effectiveness of a teachers• strike.
Among the teachers who disagreed with the statement, several offered the
idea that threats by themselves do not
one teacher reported,

11

influ~nce

the opponent. Accordingly,

The school board thought we were only bluffing and

were not serious about a teacher walk-out ...
Proposition 20: Teachers should be allowed the 11 modified.right to
strike. 11 That is, they could legally strike but only after either mediation
or fact-finding procedures have failed to resolve the bargaining dispute.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES

SA

A

U

(1) 4.7%
(20) 95.2%
0
(Total points received +22)

D
0

so
0

The scale reveals that teachers unamiously agreed with the statement.

Agreement

gen~rally
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came from two directions: First, the respon-

dents clearly reiterated their belief that teachers should be granted the
legal right to strike.

In particular, teachers should be entitled to

strike because (1) a work stoppage by teachers does not endanger community health or safety, and (2) the strike right has been granted to other
employees in both the public and private sector.

Secondly, the respondents

maintained that all available alternatives or possibilities for impasse
resolution--such as mediation--should be exhausted prior to a teachers•
strike. ·
Proposition 25: The threat or actuality of a strike during or
following the mediation process would tend to increase the number of
settlements in mediation.
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES
SA

A

(4) 19%
(13) 61.8%
(Total points received +20)

u
(3) 14.2%

D

(1) 4.7%

so
0

Nearly all of the respondents agreed with this statement. Agreement focused on the belief that pressure is a prerequisite to good faith
bargaining on the part of school management, One teacher typified the
assumption in this manner:

11

0ur school board took a stubbprn, unyielding

position in both pre-impasse and impasse talks and began to compromise
only when we withheld our services.•• The need for a pressure environment
was explained by another teacher in this way:

11

The strike threat or actual

work stoppage gives the mediator pressure tools to use on both parties
and this pressure encourages compromises.•• Another teacher argued that

if strikes were legal and injunctions were not available, mediated
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settlements would be increased.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS VI
TABLE 9 graphically demonstrates that hypothesis VI is accepted.
It is not surprising that teacher negotiators who engaged in a work
stoppage would rationalize such behavior.

However, it is noteworthy that

the rationale expressed by teachers is nearly identical to the rationale
articulated by experts in the field of collective bargaining who are
proponents of the right to strike. As examples, teacher negotiators and
authorities agree on the following principles:
(1)

Teacher strikes must be differentiated from other public

employee strikes because they do not usually precipitate a health or
safety crisis.

Consequently, teacher strikes should be legalized. A

legislative ban on strikes, accompanied by penalties, would interfere
with the effective development of teacher collective bargaining and
specifically would not facilitate resolution of bargaining impasses.
(2) Teacher strikes facilitate impasse resolution because they
exert reciprocal pressures upon the parties which can produce a settlement. Because strikes provide a proper balance of strength and risk on
each side of the bargaining table, neither party can afford to act
irrationally or irresponsibly.

11

The fruits of peace are generally far

greater than the spoils of war. 1 Moreover, in some instances there is
11

lr.w.

Abel, The Collective Bargaining. Environment In Two Sectors:
In Private Nonregul a ted Industry, Co 11 ecti ve Bargaining Today (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1970), p. 279.
11

11
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evidence that school management negotiators, consciously or not, rely
upon the ban on strikes as a license for the arbitrary exercise of prerogatives and as immunity against their failure to negotiate in good faith
with employees. 1
(3)
ship which
power.

Collective bargaining in public education is a power relationi~

stablized when the contending parties have equal bargaining

Specifically, the threat or actuality of a power source such as

the strike promotes the necessary power balance which underpins the
successful resolution of school negotiation impasses.

1M. Sami Kassem and Marcia L. Mutterer, A Critique Of Public Policy
Toward Teacher Strikes And Some Alternatives, Public Personnel Review,
April, 1971, p. 83.
11

11

I
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HYPOTHESIS VII

;
'

School management negotiation representatives agree that the strike
strategy should not be available as a means to resolve collective
bargaining disputes.
·

~

In contrast to hypothesis VI, this hypothesis suggests that school

~

',,,,

'

~

l

!
~

I management negotiators disagree with teacher negotiation representatives

with respect to the use of the strike.

Propositions used to test this

hypothesis are the same as those used for hypothesis VI.
Proposition 5: State legislatures should authorize strikes by
teachers, at least where public health or safety is not thereby endangered. ·
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA
0

A

U
(2) 9.5%
(Total points received -19)
(4) 19%

D

(7) 33.3%

so
(8) 38%

The.response scale reveals that a large majority of management
negotiators disagreed with the above proposition.

The respondents believed

I'

that strike prohibitions should continue in the school bargaining context
primarily because teachers provide an essential service which should not
be disrupted.

J

Other management negotiators would continue strike re-

strictions because teachers could utilize authorized work stoppages as a
means to further erode the power of local boards of education.

Several

respondents would continue no-strike laws simply because alternate impasse
resolution devices can be used.
Among the few negotiators who agreed with the proposition, two did
not object to dejure strikes because they were happening defacto anyhow.

I
~

.I

I
·I

Another respondent expressed the idea that teacher strikes do not endanger ~
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Proposition 10: The threat or actuality of a strike can function to
promote an agreement-making atmosphere.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVEs• RESPONSES
SA

A

13) 14.2%

0

U

(7) 33.3%
(3) 14.2%
(Total points received +2)

(5) 23.8%

so

(3) 14.2%

There is a diversity of thinking among the res-po'ndents witH:
respect to the above statement.

The negotiators in agreement commented

that the inconveniences of the strike motivated them to negotiate more
seriously towards an agreement.

The "inconveniences" included complaints

from parents, extra bargaining sessions, and the disruption of the educational program.
Those in disagreement offered the following viewpoints: (1) Most
importantly,

teach~r

strikes do not frighten school boards as they used

to in the decade of the 1960s when the strike phenomenon was surrounded
with mystery and fear;

(2) threats and work stoppages polarize and

solidify the sides even more and thus make agreement more difficult.

As

one negotiator reported, "Because the strike threat raised the temperature
of the school board, barriers were

bui1~

which interferred with agreement;"

(3) when school management is supported by a majority of the community,
the strike does not promote agreement; and (4) since a teacher strike can
save the school board money, there is no hurry to reach agreement on the
contract dispute.
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Proposition 15: Concession-making, compromises or modification of
bargaining positions by school management are likely to be generated when
a teachers• organization threatens to strike.

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

U

D

(10) 47.6%
(2) 9.6%
(Total points received -2)

(6} 28.9%

so

(3) 14.2%

The response scale indicates that there is a considerable lack of
agreement on this proposition.

Negotiators who supported the statement

alluded to the concept which is sometimes referred to as either the "cost
of withholding consent" or the ''cost of disagreement." Specifically, these
"costs" included the political embarrassment of allowing the disruption
of the educational program.

In other words, these respondents suggested

that the costs, punishments, and embarrassments attendant a strike foster
concession-making by school management.
Negotiators who disagreed with the statement, reiterated their
beliefs about the strike:

(1) strike threats early in the bargaining

season tend to solidify school management; (2) absence of public sentiment
during a strike or strike threat reinforces a school board's adamant
bargaining position; and (3) annual strike threats by a teachers' organization eventually lose their effectiveness, credibility, and mystique to
the point where school management is no longer afraid of a strike actuality.
In sum, the existence of these three

strike~threat

factors impede rather

than generate settlement behavior by the school management team.
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ProQQ_~_Q_:

Teachers should be allowed the "modified right to · ·
could legally strike but only after either mediation or
fact-finding procedures have failed to resolve the bargaining dispute.
strike~lfTS~they

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT
SA

-riJ

A
(6) 28.9%

REPRESENTATIVES~

U

0

4.7%
0
(Total points received -11)

(9)

RESPONSES

42.8%

so
(5)

23.8%

About 67% of the respondents disagreed with the proposition. Among
these respondents, the general feeling was that teachers should not be allowed
to strike under any circumstance.

One particular reason was given for this

generalization, namely, that education is an "essential service" which should
not be disrupted by a teachers' strike.
Those in agreement accepted the concept of the limited or modified
11

right to strike basically because strike rights ·are enjoyed by other
11

employee groups.
Proposition 25: The threat or actuality of a strike during or following
the mediation process would tend to increase the number of settlements in
mediation.
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES' RESPONSES
SA

A

U

(2) 9.6%
(9) 42.8%
(5) 23.8%
(Total points received +6)

0

(3) 14.2%

so

(2) 9.6%

While management negotiators had mixed feelings about this idea, the
scale reveals that a majority agreed with the statement. Agreement essentially
centered on the idea that mediation under pressure leads more quickly to resolution than mediation without pressure.
this way:

11

One negotiator summed up the idea in

To be honest, I respond to the strike to get rid of it; therefore,

the strike pressure would probably help the mediation process. 11
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Most of the negotiators disagreed because they felt that the strike
tends to polarize the parties into a

~win-lose''

situation. As one responden

said, "A strike converts an economic dispute into a raw power struggle to
find out who's stronger."
Among the undecided, some argued that better ways than the strike must
be invented to resolve bargaining impasses.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS VII
While the total net points amassed by the respondents and shown in
TABLE 9 would confirm hypothesis VII, it is compulsory to point out that
school management negotiators show some ambivalence toward the use of the
strike .. For example, these negotiators agreed that (1) the

~costs"

con-

comitant to a .strike facilitate more serious bargaining on their part,, and
(2) the pressures of a strike may prompt more settlements in mediation.
Management negotiators maintained that strikes should not be legalized
in any form.

Furthermore, with respect to the question, "should state leg-

islatures authorize teacher strikes at least where public health or safety
is not endangered, 11 more than seventy perceilt answered in the negative notwithstanding the fact that none of the management respondents claimed that
the teacher strike which occurred in their district imperiled community
health or safety.
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS VI AND HYPOTHESIS VII
In comparing responses of teacher negotiators and school management
negotiators to the same propositions, TABLE 9 indicates the following
trends:

(1) the two groups disagreed with respect to legalizing teacher

strikes; (2) both groups agreed that the threat or actuality of a strike
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can function to promote an agreement-making atmosphere; (3) the two groups
took opposiie viewpoints relative to the thesis that strikes can prompt
school management to make bargaining concessions.

However, it is note-·

worthy that management negotiators exhibited a divergence of opinion on
this idea; (4) the two groups of negotiators assumed contrasting positions
on the

''modi~ied

right to strikeu concept; and (5) the two groups agreed

that the pressures of a strike threat or actual work stoppage would increase the number of settlements in mediation.
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TABLE 9
SUMMARY GRAPH FOR HYPOTHESIS VI AND HYPOTHESIS VII CONTRASTING
TEACHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES RESPONSES WITH SCHOOL
MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES• RESPONSES RELATIVE TO THE USE OF
THE STRIKE AS A MEANS TO RESOLVE SCHOOL BARGAINING DISPUTES
1

Propositions, Respondents
And Total Points Received

Amount Of Agreement Or Disagreement

ProQosition 5
Teachers

(+34)

Management (-19)
Propositi on 10
Teachers

(+21)

r:~·

-

fltanagement (+2}
Pro12osition 15
Teachers

{+16)

Management (-2}
Proposition 20
Teachers

(+22)

Management { -11)
Proposition 25
Teachers

(+20)

Management (+6)
+42 +40 +30 +20 +10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -42
AGREE

DISAGREE

~-------

.1

I
I
~

f

144
SUMMARY

The presentation and analysis of data in this chapter has shown what
impasse resolution strategies teachers and school management negotiation
representatives prefer to employ in the event of a negotiations impasse,
and consequently, has provided a clue to this important question: What are
the most effeitive methods of

I

imp~sse

resolution in public education labor

disputes?
With respect to the five methods investigated, teacher negotiation

f representatives preferred to use the following four methods: (1) the strike;

I (2)

I

arbitration; (3) the human relations method; and (4) mediation.

The

T-test statistical tool was used to refine this preference. TABLE 10 shows

i

a pair-wise comparison which allows us to rank or prioritize the four pre-

~

ferences.

~

(1)

In reading this TABLE, the following conclusions can be drawn:
In comparing the strike strategy to arbitration, the T-test shows

no significant difference between the means of the two methods.
~

Interpreted,

it appears that teachers• preference between the two methods is evenly

1 divided; that is, while they prefer both methods, they have exhibited no

I

significant preference for either method.

J

the T-test shows a significant difference between the two means.

(2)

:1
q

li

In comparing the strike strategy to the human relations method,
Inter-

preted, it seems that the difference of this magnitude is not due to chance

~ variations in preference, but it is probably due to the fact that a real

'
l

difference exists in teachers• preference.

That is, we have no reason to

, think that teachers like the two methods equally well.

r!

The evidence seems

to indicate a tendency to prefer the use of the strike to the use of the

~•I
l~~...-
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{3)

In comparing the strike strategy to mediation, the T-test shows

a significant difference between the two means.

Interpreted, it seems that

the difference of this magnitude is not due to chance variations in preference, but it is probably due to the fact that a real difference exists
in teachers' preference.

To state the conclusion differently, we have no

reason to think that teachers like the two methods equally well.
(4)

In comparing arbitration to the human relations strategy, the

T-test shows no significant difference between the two methods.

Interpre-

ted, it appears that teachers' preference betvJeen the two methods is equally
divided; that is, whi1e they prffer both methods, it appears that teachers
are undecided about which resolution device should be used during an impasse
because they have exhibited no significant preference for either method.
(5)

In comparing arbitration to mediation, the T-test shows a signi-

ficant difference between the two means.

Interpreted, it seems that a

difference of this magnitude is not due to chance variations in preference,
but rather, it is probably due to the fact that a real difference exists
in teachers' preference.

That is, the statistical evidence seems to in-

dicate a tendency for teachers to prefer the use of arbitration to the use
of mediation when resolving school bargaining impasses.
(6)

In comparing the human relations method to mediation, the T-test

shows no significant difference between the means of the two methods.
Interpreted, it appears that teachers • preference betwee-n the

tv1o

methods

is evenly divided; thaf is, while teachers prefer both methods, it appears
that they are undecided about which resolution device to use in the event
impasse because they have exhibited no significant preference for
______

__,.
_ _....__........,_,..."'illi..,_,.a;__._,.,_.,..,_ _..,.,.,__,........,_______
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either method.
With respect to school management negotiation representatives• preference, this chapter revealed that these negotiators preferred to use only
two of the five strategies investigated:
(2) mediation.

(1) the human relations method and

While TABLE 11 shows the means as 2.57 and 3.38 respectively,

the T-test used in the pair-wise comparison indicates that the difference
in preference is not significant.

Restated, while there is a difference

in means, the difference is not significant to warrant a conclusion that
these negotiators prefer one method over the other.

In brief, in the event

of a bargaining impasse, either method would be desirable.
Other important conclusions can be drawn from the data in this
chapter:
(1) While teachers accepted the strike strategy, school management
negotiators rejected the strike.
(2) While teachers accepted arbitration, school management negotiators rejected this method.
(3)

Both groups rejected fact-finding as a means to resolve public

school bargaining disputes.
(4)

Both groups endorsed the mediation and human relations method

as strategies to resolve bargaining impasses.

8
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TABL E 10
THIS TABLE SHOWS A PAIR-WISE CO MPARISON OF FOUR IMPASSE RESOLUTION
METHODS AS PREFERRED BY TEA CHER NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES
Impasse Resolution
Method

~1ean

a

Strike Arbitration Human Relations
Method
Method
11ethod

t'ledi ati on
t·1ethod

Strike

5.38

.81

3.35*

4.59*

Arbitration

4.52

-

1.66

2.86*

Human Relations

2.85

-

-

1.36

Mediation

1.38

-

-

-

*Significant difference of prefere nee in the two methods at the .05 level
of confidence.

TABL E 11
THIS TABLE SHOWS A PAIR- WISE COMPARISON OF TWO IMPASSE
RESOLUTION METHODS AS PREFERRED BY SCHOOL MANAGEMENT
NEGOTIATION REPRESENTATIVES

Impasse Resolution
Human Rel ations
Method
Meana
Method

Mediation
~1ethod

Human Relations

2.57

.93

Mediation

3.38

-

a
Means were computed by (1) determ 1n1ng the algebraic sum of the pluses and
minuses and (2) dividi.ng these sum s or total values by the number of
respondents, which is twenty-one. The total values possibly attained by
each respondent ranges from +10 t 0 -10.

.-
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDIES:

BACKGROU~ID

DATA--POLITICAL FACTORS, BARGAINING

RELATIONSHIPS, AND IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN THREE SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Chapters V and VI incorporate the third phase of the study which
is a case study analysis of three of the seven school systems for the purpose of clarifying or identifying any salient factors which may have influenced the impasse resolution process in those school systems.

The in-

formation for the case studies was collected in personal interviews by
using an open•ended questionnaire (see APPENDIX B). This guide was administered to eighteen negotiation representatives who also participated in
the phase two interview.

The data are placed in a modified case study form.

These three districts were selected for case study analysis on the basis
of (1) the quantity of information obtained about the district; (2) the
number of impasse steps used to resolve the bargaining dispute; and (3) the
representative nature of the districts.
The purpose of this chapter is to present basic background information of the three districts.

!. ·

The presentation will focus on three specific ~

(1) the political factors affecting each of the parties at the time

I

of the impasse;

f

(2) the history of the collective bargaining relationship between

~

conditions operating at the time of the impasse occurrence:

~

f

the teacher organization and school management; and
148

f

I
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(3) the impasse procedures called for in the formal collective bargaining agreement under which the parties operated at the time of the
dispute.
Political Factors
Power, which is broadly defined as the ability of one group to control, influence, or determine the behavior of another group, 1 is an integral
part of the political structure and status of the parties and should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of any impasse procedure.

In par-

ticular, the ''political structure of the parties will determine the weight
assigned to the demands of various constitutent groups in decisions as to
bargaining positions and final commitments.

The political status of the

parties will determine the strength of commitments to positions and influence decisions regarding the use of power in support of those commitments."2
The Collective Bargaining Relationship
In the state of Illinois, notwithstanding the absence of a school
bargaining statute, a formal teacher-board relationship can be established
in a local school system as a result of negotiations between the two par-.
ties.

For example a local collective bargaining contract may force the

board of education to recognize and negotiate an agreement with teacher
representatives.

In addition to such formal relationships, a number of

informal relationships can be established; a summary of some·of the different systems of informal bargaining relationships is shown in Figure 1.
1Edwin B. Flippo, Management:
and Bacon, 1966), p. 190.
2Perry, op.cit., pp. 35-36.

A Behavioral Approach (Boston: Allyn
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FIGURE 1
COMPARISON OF THEORETICAL MODELS OF COLL~CTIVE
BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPSa

Conflict

Containment

Accommodation ·

Cooperation·

Model 1

Militant
Opposition

Armed
Truce

Working
Harmony

Union-management
Cooperation

Model 2

Aggression
and
Resistance

Repressed
Hostility

~1oderate

Joint
Participation

Model 3

a

Wortman and Randle, op.cit., p. 29.

Quiescence

Cooperation

--

~,....,.;;it'

~

~

~

a

I
I
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Impasse Procedures In The Collective Bargaining Agreement
The National Labor Relations Act, a 1935 law which made the collective

i.

bargaining process famous in the private sector, eventually became a model

!

to follow by public sector employment.

~

the Wagner Act, includes the following important elements: (1) the right to

!
~

This act, more commonly known as

I

organize and bargain; (2) representation procedures; (3) appropriate bar-

f

gaining units; (4) unfair practices; (5) the scope of bargaining; and (6)

I

the resolution of bargaining impasse.

As has been indicated, this latter

element is the most critical issue in public education collective bargaining.
Indeed, the heart of a teacher negotiations law or agreement is its pro1
vision for resolving disputes over wages and other contract issues.
DISTRICT 1
District 1 is a unified school district with a school population of
10,600 students.

The school system employs 675 teachers, who at the time

of the impasse, were represented in negotiations by the local teachers•
association, an affiliate of the Illinois Education Association.

Since a

major university is found in the community, education can be seen as the
main industry.
11

11

The community population totals 59,000.
The Political Considerations

Regarding political factors of the teachers• association, several
administrative negotiators were aware that the parent association, the
1Robert E. Doherty and Walter E. Oberer, Teachers, School Boards, And
Collective Bargaining: A Changing of the Guard (Cornell University, Ithaca,
New York: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1968),
p. 96.
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Illinois Education Association, was experiencing two significant internal
problems, namely, fiscal problems of high debt and a

in

dec~ease

and that such problems had an impact on the 1972 negotiations.

membershi~

It was .

apparent to these administrators that to surmount these two related problems,
the Illinois Education Association, via its local affiliate, wo.uld need to
demonstrate highly visible, militant, and productive negotiation services
to its teachers.

As one administrator stated, "We anticipated that the lEA

local would try to build membership by asserting itself militantly and thus,
we braced for its eventual display ...
Regarding political factors affecting school management, the most significant aspect revolved around community unconcern.

Throughout the entire

impasse proceedings of mediation, fact-finding, and the strike, the community in general, did not intervene to voice a demand for resolution of
the bargaining conflict.

All management negotiators interpreted the

silence of the citizenry as support for their bargaining positions during
the impasse, and thus, school management found it easy to take uncompromising positions.

One administrative negotiator judged that the community

apathy partially resulted from the acquiescence shown by the university
faculty relative to their own salaries and working conditions.
his analysis was as follows:

In brief,

a militant and vociferous university staff

can serve to inform and energize a community, which in turn,

~reates

a com-

munity climate conducive to community activity in public education bargaining disputes.
quietness.

University quietness, conversely, facilitates community

While the community as a whole was not drawn into the impasse,

one civic group did respond, namely, the Chamber of Commerce, who opposed
any tax rates which may have resulted by increases in teacher salaries.
Lr-u....,,_,.,
lllll<.,..-..r.,.et!=e&M~~~•==s'......,...~:n>~<~~-----'

Their response was one of hostility toward the teachers' association and·
their denunciation of teacher viewpoints further promoted school management to be intransigent or immovable during the impasse procedures.
The History Of The Collective Bargaining Relationship
While the teachers• organization and school management have been ne196~

gotiating since 1963, the period between 1963 and

was perceived by one

teacher negotiator as a time characterized as a mutual admiration society
11

in which neither party negotiated from strong, demanding positions.

The

years between 1965 and 1972, however, were viewed by all

as a

respondent~

11

period of stress and escalation of intergroup bargaining conflict. At
least one formal impasse was reached during this time--in 1971--in which
mediation was used to resolve the dispute.
The iDterviewees suggested several factors which may have contributed
to the growth of employee-employer conflict: (1) teacher organization leaders were being trained by the state teachers• association (Illir:wis Education Association) to be teacher union organizers
11

11

such training in how

;

to effectively mobilize teacher collective power tended to radicalize
teacher leaders and prompted teachers to aggressively seek more power;
(2) the board of education resented the collective bargaining relationship
because the process diluted the board•s "power

pie~

11

According to one

teacher negotiator, the contractual obligations created by the formal collective bargaining process cut into the power pie.

As the board of education.

realized that their power and decision-making autonomy were declining, there
was a subsequent attempt· to protect their power position by assuming increasingly inflexible positions during bargaining.
"""VIWI......'O""'*C'WC!

Overt, intergroup con-
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1 flict began to evolve as the board and the teachers organization engaged

I
t

I

in a restructuring of power relations resembling a power ••tug-of-war;" that
is, conflict was evidenced as the teacher organization sought more decis_ionmaking power via collective bargaining while the board fought to maintain
its traditional power differential situation.
Impasse Procedures Of The Collective
Bargaining Agreement
The collective bargaining agreement which was in effect at the time
of the teacher-board impasse called for both mediation and fact-finding in
the event of an impasse. As to mediation, the contract stated that if
agreement was not reached on all items by May 1, 1972, either party could
request the mediation services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service.

Furthermore, such a request must be honored by the other party.

Regarding the mediation request, it should be noted that the teachers' organization initiated the request.

The agreement further delineated how

the mediator was to function; that is, he would have the authority to confer separately or jointly with the parties and could take any other steps
appropriate in order to persuade the parties to resolve their differences
and effect an agreement; however, the mediator could not, without the consent of both parties, act as a fact-finder or recommend terms of settlement.
The agreement then indicated that if mediation was unsuccessful in
resolving the bargaining dispute, each party could invoke the fact-finding
procedure by June 1, 1972; once again, it was the teachers• organization
which called for fact-finding.

Like mediation, the impasse provisions of
1
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i

~

I
f:

the contract spelled out several specific responsibilities of the factfinding process: (1) the fact-finder must be selected from the American
Arbitration Association; (2) he would hold necessary hearings and thus provide adequate opportunity for both parties to testify fully and present
evidence regarding their respective positions; (3) the fact-finder was then
required to i,ssue a written report recommending a basis for the settlement
of the disagreement within thirty days after his appointment; (4) within
ten days from the receipt of the fact-finder's written report, both parties
were required to notify the fact-finder of their acceptance or rejection of
his recommendations and reasons for non-acceptance; (5) if no agreement was
reached within ten days from receipt of the fact-finder's report, the responses of the parties would then be added to the fact-finder's initial report and then released to the public.
Regarding these two impasse resolution procedures, several salient
observations are necessary: (1) the teachers' organization initiated both
mediation and fact-finding; (2} the fact-finder's report covered fifty-five
issues; (3) while the teachers accepted the report in total, the school
board rejected most of the recommendations and accepted others.

However,

since the board did not accept the recommendations intoto, the report was
essentially rejected; (4) total time involving the two impasse steps covered
about seventy days; (5) impasse provisions in the contract did not provide
for a third step in the event of unsuccessful fact-finding.

I

I

In reality,

however, the strike terminated the impasse; (6) the new contract, which is
a two-year agreement, now provides for one rather than two distinct impasse
steps.

Specifically, a mediator shall attempt to persuade the parties to

reach agreement, and if unsuccessful, he shall have the option of making a
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written public report recommending a basis for the settlement of the
disagreement.

In essence, the new impasse provision makes the individual

mediating both a mediator and a fact-finder.

This quasi one-step impasse

procedure reflects the viewpoint that both parties perceived the 1972 factfinding as a nuisance procedure rather than a valuable asset in resolving
bargaining disputes.

In view of the fact that fact-finding was a time con-

suming process which exacerbated rather than reduced the 1972 impasse conflict, this is a favorable decision.
DISTRICT 2
District 2 is a unified school district with a school population of
12,600 students.

The school system employs 699 teachers, who at the time

of the impasse were represented in negotiations by a local affiliate of the
Illinois Education Association.

The community population numbers 55,000.

The Political Considerations
Several political considerations need to be mentioned about this di·strict.

One of the most important political factors in this school district

is the diversity of the community.

The community is considered to be a

"bedroom district" with most of the residents employed outside the district
boundaries.

Two-thirds of the land is farmed and manufacturing takes place

along a river which runs through the district.

In general, the community

can be characterized as conservative, low middle-class, and blue collar.
In addition, the community did not become involved in the teacher-board
negotiations dispute. ·
Another significant political factor had to do with the president of
the board of education.

This individual had been board president for six

------------------------------------------------~--------------------·

r . ._._____ . __,. _.____. __
. ·--·--·
~

yearsJ and according to several teachers, was a dominant personality who

~I

held an anti-union attitude. This alleged attitude seemed to be accurate

~

because he (1) refused adamantly to hire union employees in his own place
of employment, and (2) encouraged the board of education to fire the 414
teachers who engaged in the six-day strike.
Another political factor was a reflection of the personality of the
teachers' organization.
11

One teacher respondent explained it in this way:

0ur organization v1as once strictly a tea and cookie soci a1 group, but in

the mid-1960's, we developed into a militant pushy organization." This
change in teacher organization ·behavior

was resented by school manage-

ment who condemned not only the local teachers• organization but the Illinois
Education Association, who as one management negotiator argued, "influenced
and agitated the local teachers to be militant, aggressive, and irresponsib1e. 11
The History Of The Collective Bargaining Relationship
Prior to the six-day strike in 1972, collective bargaining conflict
had been in evidence.

Formal impasses had been declared in 1971 and 1970

with the mediation procedure used in both years to resolve the dispute. It
is important to note that while a contract was agreed upon at the end of the
1972 strike, the school board refused to bargain a 1973-74 contract with
the teachers' organization, thus determining salaries and working conditions
unilaterally.
Impasse Procedures Of The Collective Bargaining Agreement
The collective bargaining agreement which was in effect at the time of
the teacher-school management bargaining dispute, called for both mediation

,. .,

COM ..... _..._ • •

158

and fact-finding in the event of a bargaining impasse. As to mediation,
the contract stated that if agreement. was not reached on all items prior to
May 1, either party could declare an impasse and call for a mediator.

The

mediator, who was not restricted to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, was required to meet with the parties either jointly o·r separately
for the purpose of persuading the parties to resolve their differences.
The mediator was prohibited from making public findings of fact or recommended terms of settlement.
If mediation was unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, the parties
were required to utilize fact-finding.

Fact-finding in this instance in-

volved a three man committee with one member selected by the Board of Education, one member selected by the teachers' organization, and one neutral
member, chosen by the other two members, served as chairman. This committee
held hearings to provide opportunity for the parties to testify on and present evidence regarding their respective positions.

At the conclusion of

the hearings, the fact-finding chairman--who was chosen from the American
Arbitration Association--made a written report recommending a settlement.
These recommendations were required to be made public by either party but
were advisory only and could not be· binding on either party.
issues were dealt with in the fact-finding report.

Twenty-five

Regarding endorsement

of the report, neither party accepted the fact-finder's recommendations intoto; each side accepted what they liked and rejected what they did not like.
While the teachers' organization desired to continue negotiations on the
fact-finder's report, the school board instead, unilaterally adopted items
in the report.

This action, according to the teacher respondents, precip-

itated the six-day strike.
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DISTRICT 3
District 3 is a unified school district with a school population of
The district employs 250 teachers, who at the time of impasse, were.represented in negotiations by a local affiliate of the Illinois
Education Association.
The Political Considerations
The community, which has a population of 11,190, is labeled as a
"bedroom district" with most of the working class employed outside of the
community.

Other members of the community are farmers and about 1000 people ,

are employed at the county court house.

A state supported university is

located within this school system which includes six townships.
interviewees described the community as

conservative~

Most of the

In general, the com-

munity did not become visibly involved in the three-day teachers• strike.
The History Of The Collective Bargaining Relationship
The bargaining relationship from 1968 to 1972 was characterized as·
conflictful.

During this five-year period, impasses were reached each year

with mediation and/or fact-finding used to resolve the disputes.

Fact-

finding was employed in the 1970 and 1971 impasses, but each time, the
school board rejected the recommendations or failed to act· on the report.
"Eleventh-hour settlements" occurred during these two years.
According to several management negotiators, the last five years has
evidenced growing teacher militancy within the

district~

These respondents

were convinced that the new aggressiveness was prompted by the state teach-
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expressed by one negotiator in this way:

"He felt we were negotiating

with the state education association rather than with our local teachers ...
Impasse Procedures In The Collective Bargaining Agreement
The impasse procedures available at the time of the 1972 dispute
called for both mediation and fact-finding.

Regarding mediation, the con-

tract stated that a mediator from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service would be jointly requested if agreement was not reached on all items
before June 1. The mediator was required to meet with the parties either
jointly or separately in an effort to persuade the disputants to resolve
their differences.
or

recommendin~

~ess

The mediator was prohibited from making findings of fact

terms of settlement.

A unique element of the mediation·pro-

required the parties to give their last offers on unsettled.items"· if
11

mediation had failed to resolve the dispute prior to June 25.

The federal

mediator ultimately transmitted the last offer of both parties to the factfinder.

It is interesting to note that this mediation tactic was eliminated

in subsequent impasse procedures.
If mediation failed to resolve the impasse, a fact-finder from the
American Arbitration Association was to be selected.

The fact-finder held

hearings to determine facts and subsequently recommended terms of settlement
in writing to both parties.

This report, which was advisory only, was re-

quired to be released to the public py the. fact-finder if agreement was not
reached.
In contrast to the number of issues submitted to the fact-finding
process in the other two districts, this fact-finder deliberated on only
Lfive issues: class size, si~e, b~nd:..:bitra:~~~he grievance

~

~

I

I!
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procedure, severance pay, and salary.

Regarding endorsement of the fact-

finder's recommendations, the teachers' association accepted the report but
the board of education rejected it.

The board's refusal to accept the

r~-

I

I

port angered the teachers into a three-day work stoppage.
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
This chapter has presented a background of three school systems with
respect to political factors, the collective bargaining relationship, and
the impasse procedures available to the parties during the dispute.
summary of some of the data is shown in TABLE 12.

A

Several speculations

or conclusions could be expressed as a result of investigating these districts.
Political Considerations:
(1) Anti-teacher organization attitudes held by school management mem-

bers will clash with militant teacher collective action, thus continuing
the struggle for power in public education.

Furthermore, such power strug-

gles will diminish the effectiveness of those impasse resolution devices
which are political in nature--e.g., fact-finding.
(2) A conservative, indifferent, or apathetic attitude by the consumers
of education--i.e., the community--during a bargaining crisis will tend to

dilute the effectiveness of a political impasse procedure such as

.

fact-find-~.~

i ng.

J

The Collective Bargaining Relationship:
(1) All three districts show a bargaining relationship characterized

by intergroup conflict.

Indeed,

~1hen

they are matched with Figure 1, the

formal relationship resembles "conflict," "militant opposition,'.'

and

"aggression and resistance."
(2) During a pet1od when the collective bargaining process is decreasing the board's power while at the same time increasing teachers• power,.
any impasse.procedure which involves the aspect of voluntaryism--such as
fact-finding--will probably be rejected by the party in pmver.
The Impasse Procedures:
(1) The impasse procedures used in the three districts are represent-

ative of dispute settlement procedures called for by either state legislation or local collective bargaining agreements.
(2) Fact-finding was not a solution to the impasse because the factfinder in most instances was burdened with an overwhelming number of issues
to resolve.

Furthermore,

fact~finding

seemed to be unsuccessful because

its advisory nature permitted one or both parties to reject the report.
In all three cases, the recommendations were unacceptable,and closure of.the dispute was not achieved until a teacher strike occurred.

I
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TABLE 12
A SUMMARY CHART SHOWING PROMINENT BACKGROUND FACTS OF THE THREE DISTRICTS
I

Dist-1 Community
rict Population

59,000

1
I

2

Student
Number Of Political Factors
Population Teachers
And Community
Characteristics

I 55,000

10,600

I
12,600

699
i

'

I
'

3

111,190

University town;
conservative community; militant
posture taken by
teachers

675

I

I

!
I
II

!
I

I
I
I

·I

i

250

I

I
I

University town; school
board resentful of bar1 gaining process; growing
I militancy by teachers;
j bedroom district; farm1 ing; conservative.
i

'

Contractual Provisions
for Resolving Impasse

Conflictful

Anti-teacher union
Conflictattitude by schoo 1 board ful
president; board resentful of collective bargaining process; growing
mi
,
1 1i tancy by teachers;
1 bedroom district; farmi ng; some manufacturing. I

I
5,300

Collective
Bargaining
History

I

r

I
I'

l

I

Mediation followed by
voluntary fact-finding'
with advisory recommendations.
followed by :
required fact-finding
with advisory recommendations.
~1ediation

I

Il

l
!

Conflictful

'

j
t

Mediation followed by

required fact-finding
with advisory recommendat:ions.
,

i

I!
'
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TABLE 12--Continued
Teachers' Response School Managements'
Number of Issues Community
Taken Into
Response To To Fact-finding
Response To FactReport
Finding Report
Fact-finding
Fact-finding

District

Teacher
Reaction

Length
of
Strike
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CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDIES: THE INTERACTION OF POHER AND GROUP DYf'W1ICS REU\TIVE
TO IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN THREE SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS
The purpose of this chapter is to analjze the interaction between the
exercise of power and group dynamics as they pertain to the resolution of
bargaining conflict in the three districts.

The ultimate goal of this anal-

ysis is to (1) achieve further insight into the effectiveness of the various
impasse resolution strategies used in public education bargaining disputes,
and (2) to identify any relevant forces which impede or facilitate the resolution of bargaining disputes.
The Exercise of Power
The issue of power in labor-management relations is the cardinal factor
in every contract negotiations.

It determines, in the final analysis, how

much school management will give and what the teachers' organization will
yield, if anything.

Its form or source may vary:

it may be social, politi-

cal, economic, or psychological but the relative power of the contestants is
nearly always the decisive factor. 1 Moreover, the exercise of power for the
purpose of resolving bargaining disputes is often termed 11 coercive power 11 in
which one party attempts to punish the other. 2 For example, in order to
1

Robert N. McMurry, 11 War And Peace In Labor Relations,.' Unions,
Management, And The Public, 3rd edition, ed. by E. Wight Bakke, Clark Kerr,
and Charles W. Anrod (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Publishers, 1967),
pp. 225-226.
2

Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organization (New York:
pp. 167-168.
165

McGraw-Hill, 1966),

. I
I
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command attention, or propose and achieve bargaining demands, a teachers•
organization may threaten school management with harm, loss, inconvenience,
or embarrassment via such tactics as sanctions, strikes, and unfavorable
publicity campaigns.

1

School management, on the other hand, may seek to in-

fluence teachers via an exercise of power·which includes threat of dismissal
or securing an injunction forcing the teachers back to work.

These

t~ctics

create a bases for negotiations and are attempts to resolve bargaining disputes in the short run.
Group Dynamics
Impasse resolution in labor-management contract disputes can be improved
understanding the nature of groups or the dynamics of intergroup behavior.
2
This assumption can be enlarged by considering Dunnette and Kirchner•s viewby

point that collective bargaining is never a one man affair.

Rather, groups

of people and personalities are entwined in the negotiation process.

Con-

sequently, it is important to briefly discuss some of the social and psychological characteristics of groups and then to determine if any of these
characteristics affected the success or failure of the impasse resolution
strategies used in the three districts under study.
Blake and associates 3 point out that fundamentally, a group consists
of a number of individuals bound to each other in some stage or degree of
1
Richard E. Walton, Two Strategies Of Social Change And Their ·
Dilemmas, .. The Planning Of Change, edited by Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D.
Benne, and Robert Chin (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart, &Winston, 1969), pp. 167168.
2
Marvin D. Dunnette and Wayne K. Kirchner, Psychology Applied To
Industry (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965}, p. 186.
11

3

Blake, op.

cit.~

pp. 1-18.

interdependence or shared "stake.''

167
In this sharing, the group will develop

norms, goals, and values which have pm,terful influence o·ver the members.
Specifically, the problem of the group is to guarantee its survival in order
to attain some purpose or goal. As a means to this end, the interdependence
among individuals must then be "regulated to insure partial or ·entire
achievement of these goals."

1

It logically follows that the behavior of an individual is frequently
determined by his group.

In negotiation, for example, when the bargaining

spokesman speaks as a group representative, "his behavior is to some extent
dictated by the fact that he is a member of that group." 2 Moreover, he is
not free to act independently.

Instead, the purposes and laws of his
11

11

group control or handcuff his behavior.
Additional factors come into play in situtations where an individual
is interacting with another and both are representatives of groups.

Cole

3

states that one important motivation of the negotiation leader is the great
desire to win the approval or respect of one's peers. This ambition is
subtle but potent and helps to explain why the forces of conflict seem to
be stronger than those of peacefulness.

Blake describes some of the complex

forces in leadership interaction as follows:

1Blake, op. cit., p. 6.
2

Ibid., p. 2.

3oavid L. Cole, The Quest For Industrial Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill,

1963), pp. 8-9.
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Acting as an individual, a man is free to change his mind on the
basis of new evidence. But as a group representative, if he changes
his thinking or position from that of his group•s and capitulates
to an outside point of view, he is likely to be perceived by them as
a traitor. On the other hand, if as a representative, he is able
to persuade a representative of the other group to capitulate to
his point of view, his group receives him as a hero. In other words,
when a man is acting as a representative of one group in disagreement
vJi th another, the prob 1em is no 1anger a personal affair. It is an
intergroup problem. And as sulh it can become a significant factor
in accounting for his actions.
.
Regarding group norms and values, Leavitt2 observes that groups generally value or demand in-group conformity.

That is, since a group can best

survive:intact or solid, the group pressures or emotionally seduces its
members to conform.

The norm, therefore, is against deviancy.

Furthermore, Leavitt analyzes conformity as essentially a problem
of loneliness.

The individual needs the group--its support and affiliation.

The threat is so painfully strong that it permits a group to press the

indiv~

idual to conform, even if that individual has authority or other kinds of
power.

11

Even the president seems to want and need some sources of support,

some assurance of psychological backing from his people. 113 . Likewise, i.f
the bargaining leader is to keep his position and membership secure, he too
must support his group•s standards.

Thus, it is this fear of amputation

and excommunication by the group that forces each negotiating representative

1B1a ke , op •c i t . , pp • 3-4 •

2Leavitt, op.cit., pp. 268-282.
3rbid. p. 280 . .
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into battle on a win-lose basis.

Indeed, it is the presence of

incompatible group norms, objectives, values and the "we-they" orientation
which generates a state of intergroup conflict at the bargaining table.·
Experimental Approaches To Studying Intergroup Conflict
The win-lose orientation to intergroup interaction just
discussed has been experimentally verified with both children and adults.
The prototype intergroup experiment was designed by Sherif.
two groups of boys were brought into competition.

In his studies,

Phenomena generated by

the competitive circumstances were then studied from both an ingroup and
intergroup perspective.

Following the competitive confrontation, effective

and ineffective conditions for reducing competitive tensions and conflict
between groups were identified and evaluated.

Similar experiments have

been conducted with adults and is explained below.
Experimental Design, Setting, And Phenomena
The intergroup competition exercise or experiment was pioneered and
developed by Robert Blake and his collegues, and has for a number of
years been a standard exercise in human relations laboratory training.
Although the exercises are conducted under artificially constructed conditions, the situations are, nevertheless, psychologically real for the
participants.

Regarding the exercise, Harrison says that "Basically, this

design involves the assignment to each of two groups the task of producing
a product.

Each of the groups knows that it is in competition with the

other to produce the better product.

Repres~ntatives

of the groups come

f------------N--•-a•-u-•---------------------~---·------------------~------------
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together--usually in front of the groups which they represent--to
negotiate a decision as to the better product.

Typically, the represent-

atives fail to reach a decision and the products are turned over to a panel

I.

of judges for a final evaluation."l
The setting of this experiment is obviously in the direction of a
win-lose ortentation and is,

therefore~

quite realistic and similar to

teacher-school management conflict situations.

In collective bargaining for

example, both employee and employer frequently approach negotiation sessions
that is, "the intention of each side is
not to compromise, but to win." 2

with fixed win-lose positions:

Under the competitive circumstances of the exercise just described,
certain predictable and measureable phenomena and consequences emerge.
These win-lo?e dynamics of intergroup conflict, researched by Blake, are
now summarized and paraphrased.
1.

Closing ranks and increasing cohesion.

A rise in group cohesion

is one of the first phenomenon to occur when groups begin to compete.
Blake notes "The rule is, v1hen an adversary approaches, members close ranks,
either to defend or to attack.
the group tend to be put aside.

Spirits go up!

Former disagreements within

Members pitch in.

They pull together for

the common goal of victory. 11 3
1 Roger Harrison, "Training Designs For Intergroup Collaboration)"

Human Relations Training News, edited by Cyril R. ~1111 (Washington, O.C.:NTL
Institute For Applied Behavioral Science, 1969), p. 51
2slake, op.cit, p. 20.
3Ibi d, p. 21.
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This basic urge to win is so intense that disputes and discord

i
Ifi

among members tends to be snuffed out.

&

'

member who fails to go along with the group is pressured towards conformity.

'

Likewise, an individual group

Indeed, group unison and in-group cooperation are

important that devia-

~o

tion may lead to psychological or physical expulsion from the group.
2.

Leadership consolidation.

Prior to intergroup competition,

the power relations in a group are rather loose and poorly developed.
However, when sharp competitive forces are exerted. the 11 pecking order 11
becomes·more explicit.

That is, some members begin to exercise more weight

in defining group direction and character.
3.

Positions Contrasted:

Downgraded.

Own Position Enhanced:

Adversary•s

It should be remembered that in the intergroup exercise, each

group•s decision, solution, or position is referred to as its product.
After the groups have created their respective products and compared them
with that of the contending group, Blake notes that the 11 membe.rs quickly
reassay their attitudes toward their own solution and toward that of the
other group as well.

But judgements concerning the quality of competing

products are colored by membershipconsiderations." 1 Thus, one•s own group•s
product is judged superior to the other•s.

In other words, group members

strongly identify with their own product.

Shortcomings in their own prod:-

ucts are rationalized and the competitor's product is downgraded.

1alake, op.cit., p. 23

~

l_____________________________

-----mmm=

. . __. .,____,_________

~

r----·----------------·------·-------------------------------·-----Jj2 1

!
""'

~
r
~

~

i

I
I

It is worthwhile to point out at this time that objectivity is a
primary condition of intergroup problem-solving.

Unfortunately, during

these experimental inter-group relations, the win-lose attitudes and conflict distort realistic judgement.

Indeed, the escalated disagreement

obliterates objectivity to such a degree that the possibilities of future
cooperation are reduced or eliminated.
4.
Bul'lets.

Attack and Counterattack:

Paper Bombs as Substitutes for

After the two positions or products are studied, the groups

interact through representatives who will determine a winner and a loser.
Before this final decision is made, however, a phase of public debate
between representatives is provided for clarifying similarities and
differences between the two products.

During this stage, questions put to

each group are answered through their representatives.
Concerning the questions representatives ask each other, it
typically happens that the content of the questions which group members
write and hand to their representatives are not for the purpose of
clarification.
11

Instead, the motivation underlying such questions is to

belittle the competitor•s position, to cast doubt on its validity, and to

demonstrate its inferiority to one•s own group•s position. 11 1

As a

consequence, . intergroup contact for purposes of clarification only serves
to intensify the conflict' promote subjectivity, and increase suspicion.
To state it differently, negotiation and debate neither reduces the conflict or increases objectivity.

lslake, op.cit·., p. 24.
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Negative Stereotypes Concerning One's Adversary.

When intergroup contact is competitive and mutually frustrating, "the

I
I

interactions of groups through their representatives lead to strong
stereotype formations. Members of each group develop negative attitudes.
They express hostility toward members of the other group ... The end
result is the erosion of mutual respect and confidence in the constructiveness of the other's intentions."l
6.

The Perception of Representative Personality.

Before they begin

to interact, representatives, as persons, are usually viewed objectively.
That is, they are seen as reasonably mature, intelligent, well-intended
human beings.

But as interaction proceeds, the process of provocation

and reaction characterized by negative stereotypes and attitudes and
expressed hostility soon destroys the initial perceptions.

While one's

own representative is seen as heroically defending his group against hostile attack, the opponent's representative is perceived to be less and less
mature, less well-intentioned, less intelligent, etc.

His behavior is

governed by despicable personality traits; their own representatives
behavior as governed by praiseworthy personality traits.

Blake observes

I
that the "Group members are blind to the fact that representative behavior~
is largely determined by the forces of group membership and win-lose
conflict."2

lslake, op.cit., pp. 24-25.
2Ibid., p. 26.
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7.

Commonalities minimized, differences highlighted.

During

I

intergroup competition, "similarities in group products are virtually

r1

ignored, but areas of difference are highlighted ... ·Blake describes thi-s

~

I•

phenomena as follows:
The most common error is to misidentify items in both products as
having been in only one. In other words, many items are seen as
uniquely one's own product, even when they are present in both
products. While group members correctly recogrii ze that such items
belong to their own group's position, they fail to see that the same
items are contained in the adversary's position. As a result
commonalities tend to be overlooked and disparities increased when
groups are in competition. Consequently needless barriers to
understanding and agreement are created. 1
8.

Loyalty of Representatives.

When the representatives meet to

determine a winner and loser, the group deliberations are characterized by
loyalty, subjectivity, and defensiveness of the representative.
represent~tive

If a

were to take an objective point of view and admit that a

competitor's product was superior to his own, he might be in danger of
losing for his group.

Since loyalty pressures often over\1/helm his logic,

he fails to exercise impartiality.

Moreover, rather than pursuing

negotiation interaction objectively and 1ogi ca lly,

11

the representatives

soon fall to parrying, jabbing, feinting, and probing for weaknesses in
the other's position.

The motive to win and remain loyal becomes
ately paramount and intellectual objectivity disappears." 2
9.

Hero-Traitor Dynamics.

immedi~

The emotional pressures of loyalty--

1 Blake, op.cit.," p. 26.
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the representative's personal satisfaction with his own group's product,
and his derogation of the other, or identification with one group at the
expense of the other is explained by Blake as the hero-traitor dynamic·:
A traitor is a group member in good standing who, on contacting
the adversary, capitulates to the enemy's position. He loses for
his group. A hero, on the other hand, is a person who wins for his
group by vanquishing his adversary. Being tagged a traitor means
loss of face or prestige, being ridiculed and, in the extreme, being
expelled from one's group. On the other hand, being a hero brings
rewards of applause, warmth, increased status and heightened
presitge. Yet, the behavior required to be heroic can vary from the
actions requiring objectivity and problem-solving. Equally unfortunate, behavior based on objective problem-solving may be withheld
deliberately to avoid the traitor trap. Deadlock, though it does
not carry with it the elevat1on 1n status accorded a hero, at least
is one way to avoid the traitor trap.l

I

The deadlock or negotiations impasse, which frequently results from
intergroup competition experiments, provides study of additional intergroup
problems including resolution through third party arrangements.

Since it

is difficult to determine a winner through representatives, an impartial
judge is used to produce a verdict.

Simply, he examines and evaluates each

group's product and presents his decision.

His judgement generates further

phenomena.
10.

Impact of Victory and Defeat. on Group Leadership: Consolidation

Vs Reelacement.

In winning groups, those who led the fight to victory are

congratulated, and their positions in the pecking order" are strengthened
11

and enhanced.
In defeated groups, on the other hand, in-group fighting and
splintering occurs.

A shift in the pecking order commonly results in which

1Blake, oo.cit., p. 28.
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leaders lose status.

That is, former leaders are occasionally replaced

because their ability and integrity are in question.

The replaced leaders

feel unfairly attacked by their own group and consequently fight back to
justify their actions and to remain influential.
11.

Post Victory-Defeat Reactions And Group Mentality.

.

Blake also

notes that group mentality is dramatically different in winning and losing
groups.

For example, the victorious group members react to the

arbitrator's decision with complacency.

Ther-e is a "fat and happy"

atmosphere as members rest on their laurels and enjoy the fruits of their
success.
In contrast, the defeated group tends to become "lean and hungry."
The atmosphere is tense as the members critique their operations and
efforts which led to failure and assign responsibility for them.
12.

Win-Lose Reactions to Resolution by Third-Party Judgement.

As

stated previously, when negotiations by representatives failed in the experiment, arbitrators were brought in to break deadlock and to decide the
winner.

The decision which is rendered by the third-party is received

differently by the groups in conflict, and as we shall see, does not
truly solve the impasse.
When the arbitrator's verdict favors one group's position, several
phenomena occur.

Blake describes these as follows:

The arbitrator is experienced as being fair and unbiased because the
judgment he proclaims "only proves that v1e were right in the first
place." He is experienced as being a good arbitrator because he sees
the situation as members see it. "If there were any doubt in our· minds·,

--------------------·-----~·-·~-----------··--=-------------,---·:--------~----------·-----'
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By comparison, those defeated by the arbitrator•s decision evidence two
negative reactions in the experimental situation.

First, in their initial
reaction, the arbitrator is wrong , as shown by the fo 11 owing remarks: 11 The
arbitrator is biased, unfair and incompetent.

He has no grasp of the pro-

blem ... he does not possess the intelligence prerequisite to be fair and
unbiased ... he doesn•t seem to know too much about the subject ... he didn•t
take enough time. 11 2 Secondly, a delayed in-group reaction to third-party
defeat is that the group is at fault. 11 Rather than venting their frustrations from defeat on the arbitrator, they discharge it by attacking the other
members.

A consequence is that the group tends to splinter, to lose its
former cohesion, and to disrupt. 113
Finally, the phenomena which results when the resolution of conflict
is placed in the hands of a neutral arbitrator under experimental conditions
is similar to phenomena generated in real life arbitration.

The third-party

judge is applauded by the winners and conversely chastised by the defeated
group who feel cheated and resentful.

Also, while the winning team leans

' toward self-congratulatory behavior, the losers experience in-group fighting.
Furthermore, while the winning group feels highly committed to live by the
third party•s judgment, the defeated frequently are not moved to alter
their stand and comply only because the ground rules require· it.

In

the final analysis, the third-party judgment usually does. not diminish

lslake, op.cit., · p. 52.
2rbid.,

p. 52.

3Ibid.,

p. 53.
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the win-lose nature of the disagreement.

Rather, the decision
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provides fertile soil for producing a further intensification of interpersonal and intergroup conflict. As a result, further win-lose barriers to
operative group efforts are erected. 1
13. The Win-lose Trap.

co-

While the victorious and defeated groups

react differently to the win-lose experience, one similar phenomenon does
occur. When the groups are asked to move almost immediately into situations
requiring intergroup cooperation in the solution of a second problem on the
heels of the intergroup competition experiment, the groups soon find themselves working as antagonists rather than as collaborators.

Regarding this

phenomenon, Blake notes as follows:
Feelings of competitiveness and mutually disparaging attitudes have
become so deeply ingrained that members of one group cannot perceive
the offerings of the other group as well-intended.
Only when the groups review the entire competition episode in detail,
and together examine subjective attitudes of antagonism and how they
were produced, as well as the objective data collected in the course
of the experiment, are they able to regain perspective of themselves,
their reactions, and the interrelationship. By analyzing and gaining insight into the background of their past behavior, it is possible
for them to start working collaboratively across group lines. 2
In summary, the social and psychological phenomena of intergroup competition which are generated under experimental laboratory conditions closely
resemble many of the win-lose union-management contests found in the annals
of American industry.

Blake.remarks that a study of these conflicts demon-

lslake, op.cit., pp. 54-57.
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As Blake says, "The actions and reactions of the protagonists in such dis-

!

putes often deepen antagonism and destroy all avenues of resolution rather

i

I~

~

~

stand the

dyn~mics

failure of collective bargaining negotiators to und::r:

and consequences of intergroup win-lose power struggles.

than contribute to intergroup problem-solving.••

1

Thus, it is apparent that

every negotiator should have an understanding of the dynamic aspects of intergroup conflict in order to constrtictively deal with them.

In brief, there

are obvious parallels between the experimental and actual intergroup winlose conflicts which occur in public education collective bargaining.

Some

of these parallels will be identified in this chapter.
EXPERIENCE IN THE DISTRICTS
DISTRICT I
The Exercise of Power
To induce school management to accept the teachers• demands, the
teachers• organization exercised power in several ways.

The teachers assumed

that the community would be sensitive to a reduction in service due to a
teacher strike and would consequently focus political pressure on the board
of education to accept the demands of the teacher organization. Acting on
this assumption, the teachers• organization invented a ••telephone bank" to
communicate to parents what the issues were in the disoute and to solicit
parental support.

According to the teacher respondents, however, this de-

vice did not generate either an immediate or latent parent interest in the

1Blake, op.cit.,

p. 18.
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~ dispute. Unfavorable publicity campaigns were also attempted by the
~

~~ teachers through picketing, press releases, and the distribution of door-tos"

~~ door 1eafl ets. Still, the community was not motivated to take an active,
i.

~

1 visible part in resolving the bargaining dispute. School management, it
•

should be noted, interpreted community silence as support. The most dramatic
exercise of power employed by the teachers' organization was the strike in
\vhich the teachers lost four days' pay.
Regarding school management's exercise of power, the board of education
reacted to the teacher strike by securing an injunction.

The judge who gran-

ted the injunction, however, first ordered both parties to return to negotiations and settlement was reached.

According to the teacher interviewees,

the injunction was an effective school management tactic.
acknowledged,

11

As one teacher

We did not want to violate the injunction for fear of in-

curring fjnes and felt that the injunction was a hammer which we wanted to
avoid.

11

Another teacher said,

11

We were intimidated and helpless by the

injunction threat, and since there was no collective bargaining law
permit.
.
.

ting strikes without punishments, we resumed bargaining to reach an agreement.

11

Group Dynamics
Several group dynamics operated within the teachers' organization during the bargaining dispute.

Because the teachers accepted the fact-finding

report totally while school management rejected or modified it, teacher
leaders felt that organizational solidarity resulted.

in particular,

teachers felt insulted and angered by management's action and initiated a
strike.

Also, throughout the impasse, the teachers' association used paper
11

1
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n

'i

bombs 11 in an effort to downgrade school management's positions.
Several group dynamics also operated within the school management team.

I

( For example, at the very outset of bargaining, management had formed a negative stereotype concerning the teachers' organization.

In particular, they

perceived that the teachers would (1) utilize all of the impasse procedures
available and (2) ultimately engage in strike activity.

i

These perceptions

encouraged school management to assume immovable bargaining positions through-

~

out the entire bargaining interaction.

~

planned to take their positions into fact-finding and not give in before or

i
I

during mediation.

As one respondent stated, 11 Teachers

And they were pre-destined to strike and were committed

early to such action. 11 These perceptions, incidentally, seemed to be accuii

rate.

A second· dynamic had to do with the ''attack and counterattack 11 factor.

I As a result of the strike attack, school management counterattacked by seekj

ing an injunction.

While this furm of counterattack intensified the inter-

i group conflict, it did motivate the teachers towards a settlement.

One group dynamic was shared by members of both parties, namely, the
1 reactions to third-party judgement.

Notwithstanding acceptance of the fact-

~ finder's report by the teachers, some hostility was directed at the report

~

'I
i!

~

because the recommendations did not completely favor the teachers• organiza-·
tion.

School management also was angered by the verdict of the fact-finder.

It would appear, therefore,that intergroup conflict is reduced when the
bargaining parties create solutions themselves instead of leaving it to a
third-party.

As a consequence to the feeling that fact-finding had outlived

its usefulness, the parties agr,eed to eliminate the fact-finding step in
future negotiations.

1
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DISTRICT 2

I

The Exercise of Power
Two basic 11 power politics 11 were used by the teachers' organization in
this contract dispute for the purpose of coercing management towards concession making.

First, teachers used a variety of informational devices aimed

at gaining immediate community involvement in the dispute. These included
newspaper articles, telephone trees,
11

ting.

11

house-to-house leafleting, and picke-

All of the teacher interviewees were convinced that such tactics were

ineffective in securing public support for their positions.
'

It should be

noted, i nci dentally, that schoo 1 management perceived the community silence

~

1 as a mandate to hold firmly to their bargaining positions.
j

I"

I
'l

I

ercise of teacher power was the six-day work stoppage.
The primary exercise of school management power was the threat of dismissing all teachers who engaged in the strike.

l preceded by a letter of remedial warning. All

ll

1

The second ex-

This dismissal threat was
of.

the teacher negotiators

admitted that this exercise of power--i.e., the actual dismissal threat,
ultimately prompted settlement psychology on the part of the teachers' organization.
Group Dynamics
The presence of at least three group dynamics were reported by the
teacher negotiators.

First, intra-organizational cohesion occurred when

school management (1) vetoed the fact-finder's report, {2) subsequently impos-·
ed salaries unilaterally, and (3) threatened to fire the striking teachers.
These three actions on tha part of school management seemed to solidify the

~
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r teachers either in defense or to attack. The threat of dismissal partif,
I'

cularly gave rise to teacher cohesiveness.
position:

11

together on

One teacher reflected this

The teachers were vehement due to the firing threat.

It bound us

a win-or-else basis and we only returned to class when both the

IEA and a mediator from the state superintendent•s office influenced us to
return. 11
Secondly, there was the appearance of the 11 attack" dynamic which came
on the heels of the board•s rejection of the fact-finding report and subsequent

ref~sal

to resume negotiations.

The attack took the form of the strike

One teacher explained, 11 We struck out of principle--the board didn•t show

I''

respect for us; we had a right to be heard in further negotiations after the ·
fact-finder•s report failed to resolve the dispute." Another teacher said,
11

The board president•s refusal to meet with us after the fact-finding pro-

cess radicalized the teachers, and out of anger and provocation, we struck. 11
Thirdly, most of the teacher negotiators admitted that they felt
strong loyalty to their constituents.

One teacher reflected the position

that she supported or defended demands which were not hers but which were
wanted by other teachers.
School management alluded to the existence of three group dynamics.
First, harrassing phone calls, original unreasonable demands by teachers,
the influence of the state teacher•s organization, and the strike vote all
acted to polarize school management into a cohesive group and intensify the
adversary nature of the bargaining process.
Secondly,

followin~

the teachers• strike vote and initiation of the

strike, school management reacted in counterattack by (1) sending letters
of remedial warning to the striking teachers, and (2) threatening to fire

I

I

..
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all teachers who engaged in the work stoppage.

I
!,,f

angered the teachers to continue the strike but ultimately facilitated ter-

~

1

This latter action initially

mination and resolution of the teacher-school management dispute.
Thirdly, school management had some negative reactions to third-party
resolution because (1) the fact-finding process was too lengthy and was not
available until just before school opened, and (2) the report recommended
that the board adopt binding arbitration as the last step in the grievance
procedure.
DISTRICT 3
The Exercise of Power
To influence school management to make bargaining concessions, the

I

teachers• organization exercised its power in t\'JO ways:

First, they engaged

Ii in unfavorable publicity campaigns by using such tactics as picketing,

I leaflets, and discussion w·ith civic groups. Regarding their effectiveness
'

I

in bringing public pressure on school management, the teacher negotiators

I generally agreed that these devices failed.

While some PTA leaders privately

I gave support to the teachers• organization, they did not become a visible,

i
I
i)
~

~

I

j
I

lobbying force demanding that the school board concede to the teachers• demands.

Even if there had been community sensitivity to the bargaining

crisis, it is doubtful that management would have modified its bargaining
positions.

One school management negotiator reported this attitude:

11

We

didn•t feel any pressure by the community and even if they had taken the
teachers• side, it wouldn't have disturbed us because our minds were made
up." The second form of power exercised by the teachers was the strike.

l------------------------·~-·-----------&~-------------------------1
School management's singular exercise of power was to request an

.
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injunction forcing the teachers back to work.

G

issued by a j.udge who based his decree on the idea that the strike did have

~

.

A restraining order was

- · · - - ·
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serious, adverse effects and could cause irreparable damage to the community
and school system.

Even though teachers' attorneys did argue against a

temporary restraining order on the grounds that a delay in starting school
wasn't that serious, the order did have a significant impact on the teachers •
organization.

Two of the teacher interviewees confessed that they wanted to

avoid any fines or penalties associated with an injunction violation, and
were, therefore eager to end the strike.
Group Dynamics
w

i
J

As indicated in the previous chapter, one step of the impasse proce~:
dure required that the parties issue their 11 last offer 11 to the other side.

f As a result of this process, the two sides agreed that the fact-finder would
I,

recommend either the teachers' or the board's last offer.

However, when the

fact-finder's report recommended that the board accept the teachers' last
offer, the board, by a vote of 6 to 0 rejected the report on the contract.
As a result, several group dynamics were set in motion.

For example, school

management's repudiation of the report incensed the teachers to the point of
increasing cohesion and group solidarity.

As one teacher said, 11 We felt

slapped down by the board's action and this pulled us together. 11 Another
teacher explained, 11 When the board disregarded the report, it ·motivated us
to strike. 11
Another dynamic which was evidenced had to do with the loyalty of the
representatives.

One teacher recited his loyalty by saying,

11

During the

bargaining sessions, I argued for things I personally opposed." A third

J
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dynamic, namely, the hero-traitor synarome affected another teacher who .

admitted the urgency to represent his constituency even though some of their
views were contrary to his.
A final dynamic related to resolution by third-party judgement. As
previously mentioned, the fact-finder was obligated to award his decision
in favor of one side or the other.

In finality, however, he chose to Split11

the middle 11 and this deviation from the impasse procedure angered the teachers.
School management likewise displayed some group dynamics.

Especially

I~ evident was the fact that they rejected resolution by a third-party fact-

I

These negotiators

negatively reacted to the third-party recommen-

~

finder.

I

dations because they felt (1) the fact-finder didn't understand the true

'

~

li

l
II
!

~

facts of the district; (2) he was biased in favor of the employee side; and
(3) his decisions would erode or dilute the board's power to operate the

district.
Another significant dynamic related to the concept of attack and
counterattack.

As a result of the teachers • propaganda device , which anta-

gonized the board, and the strike, school management counterattacked by
successfully securing a back to work order.

Moreover, such teacher behavior

! united school management to protect their position .
.<

';

I
ij

Dynamics relative to the loyalty of representatives as well as the
hero-traitor responses also seem to be a part of this contract dispute.

management negotiator reported that the group decision-making ''locked me into
supporting the board on every issue. 11 Another stated,

I
I

One

I had to win for our

sid~ ...

11

No one wants to lose-
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SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
This chapter has focused on the interaction of (1) the exercise of
power; (2) the dynamics of intergroup and intragroup behavior; and (3) the
resolution of school bargaining conflict.
in TABLE 13.

A summary of the data is shown

Several conclusions could be expressed as a result of examin-

ing the three factors in this interaction.
(1)

In the three districts studied, both groups engaged in an exer-

cise of power.

For·the teachers, such power tactics primarily included un-

favorable publicity campaigns, which were designed to gain community allies,
and the strike, which was intended to coerce school management into making
concessions at the bargaining table .. Both tactics seemed to be ineffective:
publicity campaigns did not motivate consumers of education--i.e., the parents--to become involved in the bargaining dispute.

Regarding the effect-

iveness of the strike, while it did function to end the dispute, its usefulness as a conflict resolution procedure was mitigated because it was not a
pure economic weapon bringing reciprocal pressures on the disputants.

School

management was not deprived of state aid money and thus were content to allow
the strike to continue with impunity.

Teachers, on the other hand, lost pay

for days not worked; thus the economic pressures were lop-sided or unbalanced.

The strike could have functioned similar to a traditional private sec-

tor work stoppage if the teachers• organization would have postponed their

~

strike activity into the school year when the costs of withholding consent--

~

e.g., loss of state aid revenue because schools did not operate there-

~

quisite number of days--would have mounted on ·school management.

L

(2)

For school management, the exercise of power was primarily a

,_,_ _ _..,_ _ _ _ _ _
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legal remedy, namely, the securing of an injunction forcing the teachers to

§

~ return to work; in addition, dismissal threats were communicated to the

I'
I

I

striking teachers.

Both tactics by school management appeared successful:

teachers, fearing court fines from injunction violations and fearing loss

!

! of job via dismissal, were motivated to settle.

On the

surface~

it seems

i

!

that the three teachers' strikes did not generate net economic gains because
the salary money lost while on strike was not compensated by the new salary
schedule negotiated.
(3) All of the districts investigated exhibited some of the negative and

I detrimental

intergroup behavior which is a function of a competitive bar-

i

gaining interaction.

I

attack and counterattack, hostility towards third-party judgements, and

I

i~

These group dynamics included:

group cohesiveness,

loyalty of negotiation representatives to those they represented.
( 4) The appearance. of severa 1 of the group dynamics would tend to va 1idate the elimination of fact-finding from impasse resolution machinery.
Relative to group dynamics, school management's refusal to completely endorse a fact-finder's report prompted teacher's to (1) solidify their ranks
and (2) attack the 11 enemy. 11 Both dynamics may have been prevented or diminished if fact-finding had not have been used in the dispute settlement
process.

Ironically, rather than serve to resolve the conflict, fact-·

finding became an inflammatory process which intensified the intergroup
bargaining conflict.
11

One teacher seemed to agree with this conclusion:

The problems with fact-finding served to convince us to eliminate this

impasse step in future negotiations.''

l
,_

In short, fact-finding is beset with

both political and psychological problems.

--

(5)

Community insensitivity to the bargaining dispute would also
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tend to confirm the conclusion that fact-finding is not a solution to the
impasse problem. As noted, fact-finding is a political process made effective when

th~

public places pressure on school management to concede to the

demands of the teachers• organization.

But as demonstrated in this chapter,

community indifference only solidified school management•s bargaining positions.

While the citizenry may have become immediate.ly involved in teacher-

school management bargaining conflicts in the decade of the 1960s when such
conflicts were new and clothed in an aura of fear, publics will probably
choose not to participate in bargaining conflicts in the 1970s.

If this

thesis is true, fact-finding success, which is based on the assumed involvement of a community, 'r'ri 11 not be forthcoming.
(6)

Since there is a need for alleviating or preventing some of the

undesirable.consequences of public education

bargaining~

such as negative

intergroup behaviors, the human relations method--with its emphasis on
cooperation, systematic communication, and joint

problem-solving~-would

seem to be validated by this case study chapter.
In sum:

the interaction or relationship between power, group dynamics,

and conflict resolution would suggest the elimination of fact-finding and the
deliberate attempts to assure the workability of the human relations approach
to impasse resolution.

TABLE 13
A SUMMARY CHART SHOWING THE EXERCISE OF POWERt THE EXISTENCE OF INTERGROUP DYNAMICS,
AND GROUP RESPONSES AND REACTIONS
Community Response
To Teachers•
Exercise of Power

Exercise Of Power
By Teachers

Disttrict

1

Unfavorable publicity campaigns:
picketing, pres·s
releases, leafleting. Strike.

Indifference
and non-involvement.

2

Informational
devices and un. favorable publicity campaigns:
newspaper articles, telephone
trees leaf1eting, picketing.
Strike.

· Indifference
and non-involvement.

11

Exercise Of Power By
School Management

Teacher Reaction To Management•s
Exercise Of Power

Legal remedy: sought
and secured an
injunction.

Intimidation and movement
to settle dispute.

Letter of remedial
warning; threat of
dismissal .

Initial anger and subsequent
motivation
to settle.
..
I

I
I

I

11

,

3

I

l
Legal remedy: sought
and secured an
injunction.

Some private
endorsement,
but no mass
visible support.

Unfavorable publicity campaigns:
picketing & leaf1eti ng; i nformational devices
1ike ta 1ks with
civic groups.

Motivation to settle.
I

I
1-'

\0

l

I

-

'
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TABLE 13--Continued
----

I Group Dynamics Occurring In Teachers' Organization

District

I

l'

•

i
i

!

~

I (1)

1

I

Group Dynamics Occuring With
School Ma~agement
(1) negative stereotype toward
teachers' organization;
(2) counterattacked strike by seeking
injunction;
(3) hostility toward third-party
judgments of fact-finder.

group cohesion due to school management
rejecti6n of fact-finding report;
(2) attack in the form of the strike;
paper bombs to downgrade opponent's
positions;
(3) hostility -toward third-party judgments
of fact-finder.

!
i

i (1) cohesion due to board's rejection of
I
fact-finder's report, threat of dismissal,
!
I

2

I
i
I
I

!

and unilateral determination of salaries;
(2) attack via the strike;
(3) loyalty to constituents.

i

i

group cohesion due to board's refusal
I (1)
to accept fact-finder's report;
(2) loyalty of negotiation representatives;

3

I

!
!
i

t

(3) hostility toward third-party judgment.

I

I

i
l

I
!

I

I

(1) group cohesion;
(2) counterattack teachers• strike
with dismissal threat;
(3) hostility toward third-party
judgment.
(1) hostility toward fact-finder;
(2) counterattacked teachers' strike
by securing injunction;
(3) combination of loyalty &herotraitor dynamics.

.....
1.0
.....
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CHAPTER VII
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE HYPOTHESES
Af'ID THE CASE STUDIES
The reader is reminded that the two major sections of this paper,
namely the fixed-response questionnaire data and the case study data, had
distinct purposes:

the former was aimed at determining what impasse machine-

ry public school negotiators preferred to employ in a bargaining dispute.
As a means to this end, seven hypotheses were tested via a fixed-response
questionnaire.

The purpose of the case studies was to clarify or identify

any

factors or relevant forces which may have influenced the

signifi~ant

success or failure of the impasse resolution process. To facilitate this
purpose, three school systems were investigated
with respect to .five factors.
political fact~rs, the history of the collective bargaining relationship,
the impasse procedures called for in the collective bargaining agreement,
the exercise of power, and the emergence of group dynamics.
Notvlithstanding the differences in purpose, relatiot:Jships exist
between the

t\'10

major sections of the paper.

These relationships focus on

the five methods for resolving public education bargaining disputes, all
of which were placed in hypothesis form.
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Hypothesis I
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human relations
strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective
bargaining disputes.
In one important respect, the case study data related to teachers
and their use of the human relations strategy.

In order to diminish inter-

group conflict and reduce negative group dynamics, the human relations
strategy advocates that the parties approach the bargaining table from a
11

win-win 11 or mutual gain orientation.

The case studies revealed that

teachers engaged in a competitive 11 Win-lose 11 orientation rather than a
11

Wi n-vri n" approach, and as a consequence, severa 1 group dynamics emerged

which interfered with impasse reso"lution:

teachers solidified their ranks

and attacked school management with a strike.

In short, the impasse

conflict was intensified in part because teacher negotiators did not utilize
the human relations strategy.

In other words, the case studies did support

the above hypothesis.
Hypothesis II
School management negotiation representatives agree that the human
relations strategy would not function to minimize, prevent, or
resolve collective bargaining disputes.
From several viewpoints, the case study data related to school
management negotiators and their use of the human relations strategy.

Among

other components, the human relations strategy is characterized by (1) a
mutual gain or 11 Win-win 11 orientation, and (2) mutual problem-solving or
bilateral determination of issues.

Relative to the first characteristic,

the case studies disclosed that when school management engaged in a

.

"win-lose 11 rather than "win-win" orientation, some group dynamics

?-
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emerged which inflamed the impasse conflict; specifically, school management
solidified their ranks and counterattacked teachers with dismissal threats
and court injunctions.

Regarding the second characteristic, the case studies

showed that a unilateral rather than

a bilateral

determination of contract

issues by one school management did provoke a teacher strike.

In sum, the

conflict surrounding the bargaining dispute could have been reduced if
school management had utilized the human relations strategy. The hypothesis
is, therefore, not supported by the case studies.
~pothes is

II I

Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation
representatives both agree that the mediation strategy is an appropriate mechanism to use in resolving school bargaining disputes.
Evidence was found from the fixed-response questionnaire data which
indicated that mediation

w~uld

be improved if fact-finding were not so

readily available to the bargaining parties. That is, when mediation is
followed by fact-finding in a sequential arrangement, "holding back" bargaining tactics are engaged in by the parties.

With respect to the relationship

of mediation to fact-finding, the case studies revealed that the

contra~tual

provisions for resolving impasse in the three districts studied did, in
fact, encourage complacent, reluctant, or holding back bargaining tactics on
the part of the negoiiators, especially school management.

Specifically, the

contract provisions called for mediation followed by either voluntary or
required fact-finding.

In short, while the case studies did not lend

support for the hypothesis, they did indicate what fot'm mediation should
not take.

~5

Hypothesis IV
Teacher negotiation representatives and school- management negotiation
representatives both agree that the fact-finding strategy is not an
effe~tive procedure for resolving public education bargaining disputes.
In a number of ways, the case studies confirmed the idea that factfinding should not be utilized to resolve school bargaining impasses.

First,

with respect to "holding back•• tactics, it should be reiterated that the
contractual provisions for resolving impasse in the districts studied called
for mediation followed by either voluntary or required fact-finding.

Relative

to this arrangement, a mandatory fact-finding procedure set into action a
cycle of tactical operations by both parties which cancelled each other out
and delayed'serious efforts to arrive at prompt resolution of their differences.

Second, because of the voluntary nature of

fact-finding--i~e.,

the

recommendations of the fact-finder can be rejected by either party--it is
significant to note that when school management refused to accept the factfinders• reports intoto, teachers were provoked to counterattack in the
form of a strike.

Third, the effectiveness of political-public approaches

to impasse resolution, such as fact-finding, are dependent upon the sensitivity of the community and/or the teaching staff to rational persuasion as
exercised by a neutral third party.

However, while the teacher organizations

were sensitive to the fact-finding reports, community sensitivity to the
same reports was absent.

Briefly, the case studies supported the hypothesis.
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Hypothesis V
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation
representatives both agree that the arbitration strategy would not
be an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism in public education
bargaining impasses.
In relating the case studies to the hypothesis, only a theoretical
relationship was observed.

That is, while third-party arbitrators were

not utilized to resolve the bargaining impasses, third-party fact-finders
were used.

Since hostility was directed toward the fact-finders by both

parties in nearly all the school systems studied, thus intensifying the
impasse conflict, it is reasonable to speculate that had arbitrators been
called in to award a decision, they too would have reaped a harvest of
hostility.

From this speculation, the case studies supported the hypothesis.
Hypothes·is VI

Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining
disputes.
From two perspectives, the case study data supported the hypothesis.
First, teacher negotiators reported that strikes did not imperil the health
or safety of the school district community.

Second, teachers acknowledged

that the economic "costs" concomitant to the strike--i.e., the loss of
salary while on strike--did motivate them toward settlement.

In this

matter, the strikes did function to bring closure or termination to t.he
impasse conflict.
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Hypothesis VII
School management negotiation representatives agree that the strike
strategy should not be available as a means to resolve collective
bargaining disputes.
Evidence from the case studies was not supportive of the hypothesis.

.

In particular, all of the management negotiators interviewed acknowledged
.

that the teacher strikes did not endanger the health or safety of the
school district corrmunity.

Furthermore, it should be reiterated that the

work stoppages did serve to bring the bargaining impasses to an end.

That

is, the presence of pain, inconvenience, or costs due to a strike did
11

11

motivate the parties--especially teachers--to\'tard settlement.

CHAPTER VIII
SUM\'V\RY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECQMvlENDATIONS
SUf~MARY

The purpose of this study was to analyze the various impasse resolution strategies which are available to public education negotiation representatives for the purpose of providing a clue or answer to the following
critical question:

11

What impasse resolution methods should be employed to

resolve public school labor disputes? 11 To answer this question, primary information was collected from two sources:

First, the experience of forty-

two public education negotiators who had utilized several alternatives to
resolve school bargaining disputes.

These negotiators represented both

teacher organizations and school management in seven Illinois school districts
where strikes had occurred in 1972. Seven hypotheses were tested via a fixed-response questionnaire for the purpose of determining what impasse machinery these negotiators preferred to employ in a dispute.

Second, three of

the seven districts were investigated for the purpose of clarifying or identifying any significant factors which may have influenced the success or
failure of the impasse resolution process in those school systems. This information was derived from an open-ended questionnaire and placed in case
study form.

The case studies also helped to validate some of the hypotheses.

Both questionnaires were administered during personal interviews. A sum-.
mary of the data derived from the two questionnaires follows:
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Hypothesis I
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the human
relations strategy would function to minimize, prevent, or
resolve collective bargaining disputes.
Based on all the accumulated data--i.e., data from both the fixedresponse questionnaire and the case studies--this hypothesis is accepted.
This hypothesis assumes that teacher negotiators have positive viewpoints
tm'/ard increased intergroup communication, a win-win" approach to bargain11

ing, bilateral determination of salaries and other terms and conditions
of employment, intergroup problem solving styles and joint sub-committees,
and post-negotiation committees as useful social technologies for managing the conflict inherent in the collective bargaining relationship.
While teachers did voice some objections to joint sub-committees and
post-negotiation committees primarily because they had experienced frustration with such committees in the past, the results of the fixedresponse questionnaire showed that teacher negotiators, for the most
part, agreed that the human relations approach should be included in
.the process of managing school bargaining conflict. The case studies
revealed the existence of two negative group dynamics on the part of
teachers--group cohesiveness and attacking behaviors--both of which
could have been reduced had teachers utilized the human relations ·
strategy.

~-A~..---------------------------------------~----------·----------~
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Hypothesis II
School management negotiation representatives agree that the
human relations strategy would not function to minimize, prevent, or resolve collective bargaining disputes.
In light of the accumulated information, this hypothesis is
rejected.

Data from the fixed-response questionnaire showed that school

management

~alued

the human relations approach.

In addition, the case

studies disclosed the emergence of two negative group dynamics on the
part of school management--group cohesiveness or psychological "fences••
and counterattacking behaviors; both of these dynamics could have been
minimized had school management negotiators employed the human relations
strategy.
This hypothesis assumes that management negotiators would take a
different posture towards the human relations approach than do teacher
negotiators.

However, both groups of negotiators are generally in

agreement with the human relations strategy.

In fact, the data indicated

that school management negotiators have a higher regard for this approach
than do teacher negotiators.

It is encouraging to note that both groups

value regular meetings as a means. to improve communication, mutual gain
or 11 Win-win 11 decisions, and the collective bargaining process itself.
Both groups showed some reservation for the use of joint sub-committee
approaches during actual bargaining sessions. This reservation is probably due to the fact that neither group is trained in the use of such
a bargaining style.
tion committees.

Also, both groups were suspicious about post-negotia-

In brief, both groups of negotiators endorsed the

human relations strategy.

t"Jlll'·.............- - - - - - - - - -..- - .. - - - - ·_ _ _...._ _ _ _
1~....- - _ . , . . . . . . , ._
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Hypothesis II I
.~

Teacher negotiation representatives and school management
negotiation representatives both agree that the mediation
strategy is an ~ppropriate mechanism to use in resolving
school bargaining disputes.
On the basis of the fixed-response questionnaire results, this
hypothesis is accepted.

Most of the negotiators supported mediation be-

cause it can increase inter-group communication.

Also, negotiators stress-

ed the point that mediation can function to diminish intra-organizational
political pressures which often "lock" negotiation representatives into
untenable positions.

Regarding the relationship of mediation to fact-

finding, school management negotiators strongly affirmed the idea that
the effectiveness of mediation is eroded if fact-finding is to follow.
This opinion is consistent with the professional thinking of labor relations authorities.

While some teachers perceived that fact-finding can

handicap the mediation process, the information elicited in the fixedresponse questionnaire data seemed to indicate that teacher organizatipns
are not fully cognizant of the ••holding back" tactic which school management is forced to engage in when fact-finding follows the mediation
process.
While the case study data did not help in accepting or rejecting
the hypothesis, the data did indicate what form mediation should not take.
In particular, the case study data revealed that the contractual provisions for resolving impasses called for mediation followed by either
voluntary or required fact-finding, an arrangement which interfered with
the impasse resolutiori process.

te•cu•"'

-----------~----------~
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Hypothesis IV
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management nego~
tiation representatives both agree that the fact-finding strategy
is not an effective procedure for resolving public education
bargaining disputes.
All of the available data converged to accept this hypothesis.
An analysis of the accumulated data pointed out two major defects in
fact-finding:

First, both sides of the bargaining table are tempted to

engage in reluctant bargaining behavior during pre-impasse dialogue.
Teachers• reluctance was generally based on the assumption that a factfinding report, when issued to a community, will prompt the consumers
of education to pressure school management to make bargaining concessions.
However, community sensitivity to school bargaining problems and the
fact-finders• reports was absent.
from a different source:

Management•s reluctance to bargain came

If a management team committed its best offers

early in the bargaining talks, they may be pressured into making further
concessions during fact-finding.

With this possibility facing manage-

ment, it is, therefore, wise to be complacent in pre-impasse talks.

To

·sum up the "reluctancy dynamics," teachers fail to bargain early in
order to get more later, while management fails to bargain early in
order to save more later. As a consequence, these bargaining tactics
by the parties cancel each other out and delay serious efforts to arrive
at a prompt resolution of their differences.

.

"
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Secondly, since fact-finding is advisory and acceptance voluntary, the rejection of the recommendations by one party may alienate
the other party to the point of retaliation and counterattack.
five districts using fact-finding, this is essentially what

In the

h~ppened.

In brief, the teacher• strikes in these districts can be blamed in
large part because school management refused to accept the third-party
judgment.
In summarizing these difficulties, it can generally be said
that the fact-finding process inhibited the resolution of collective
bargaining conflict. More specifically, it intensified the adversary
relationship of the collective bargaining process, was inflammatory,
and led to a quasi- 11 civil war ... Moreover, it diminished the effectiveness of the collective bargaining process in the school systems which
were studied.
Hypothesis V
Teacher negotiation representatives and school management negotiation representatives both agree that the arbitration strategy
would not be an appropriate dispute settlement mechanism in
public education bargaining impasses.
Taking into consideration all of the accumulated data, a definitive
conclusion cannot be reached relative to accepting or
thesis.

rejec~ing

this hypo-

On one hand, the fixed-response questionnaire data neither con-

firmed nor disproved this hypothesis.

Indeed, strong antipathy between

teachers and school management was manifested.

While teacher negotiators
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held the opinion that arbitration should be available in the impasse
resolution machinery, school management negotiators rejected this device.
Teachers,. often frustrated by their opponent's intransigence, found it
easy to lean toward the use of a third-party umpire because they felt his
potential presence may make the bargaining process more effective as
well as extract additional concessions from management. Management negotiators, conversely, were convinced that an arbitrator has no right to
dictate salaries and other terms and conditions of employment during a
dispute.

On the other hand, case study information would only mildly

support acceptance of the hypothesis. Specifically, the case studies
suggested that third-party arbitrators, especially in the compulsory form,
would not be an appropriate dispute settlement process in school bargaining impasses.
A necessary point should be noted with respect to the fixedresponse questionnaire data:

Arbitration was neither available nor util-

ized in the school systems studied, but one district had used this device
in a previous impasse.

Therefore, it can be stated that most of the

respondents' rationale was based on speculation rather than direct experience.

The use of arbitration in resolving school bargaining disputes

will continue to be a matter of conjecture until more data is gathered
from school systems experiencing this settlement tool.
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Hypothesis VI
Teacher negotiation representatives agree that the strike strategy
should be available as a means to resolve collective bargaining
disputes.
Based on the accumulated data, this hypothesis is accepted.

In

particular, the hypothesis was amply confirmed by the fixed-response
questionnaire data.

reachers based their approval on three factors:

(1) teacher strikes do not impose a threat to the health and safety of the
community; (2) work stoppages exert mutual pressures on the parties which
can be productive of a settlement; and (3) strike possibilities encourage
a balance of power which subsequently makes the collective bargaining
process more effective, more efficient, and less conflictful.

Labor

relations experts tend to agree with all three rationale.
The case study data additionally supported the hypothesis.

For

example, information collected from both parties indicated that a teacher
strike did not endanger the health or safety of the community.

Further-

more, the strikes did function to bring closure to the bargaining impasses
because pressures or costs were exerted on the disputants.

As stated in

an earlier chapter, the motivation to agree in collective bargaining is
conditioned by the presence of potentfal pain or pressure--e.g., the loss
of salary for teachers and the loss of state aid for school management
because of a strike.

The case studies, however, indicated that the pres-

sure and costs of the strike weighed more upon striking teachers than
management simply because (1) the latter did not lose state aid money during the strike, and (2) the injunction was _available to coerce teachers
back to work.

Hypothesis VII
School management negotiation representatives agree that the
strike strategy should not be available as a means to resolve
collective bargaining disputes.
Because the accumulated data are contradictory, this hypothesis
is neither accepted nor rejected.

With respect to the fixed-response

questionnaire data, this hypothesis was supported.

It is significant

to report,however, that school management negotiators were not in
complete accord with respect to the use of the strike.

For examplef

some respondents emphasized that state legislatures should not legalize teacher strikes even though (1) community health is not thereby
endangered, and (2) all previous impasse steps--e.g., mediation and/or
fact~finding--have

been exhausted. On the other hand, some management

negotiators agreed that (1) mediated settlements could be advanced
by strikes or strike threats, and (2) the inconveniences or "costs"
of a strike can strengthen "settlement psychology." Since the case
study data supported the viewpoints of the latter group of school management negotiators, the hypothesis was not supported.
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While some of the case study data were referred to in the previous
section, it is appropriate to directly summarize the relevant factors
which influenced the process of impasse resolution in the three districts
studied. These factors included political factors, the history of the
collective bargaining relationship, the impasse procedures called for in
the collective bargaining agreement, the exercise of power, and the emergence of group dynamics:
(1)

Certain political factors can weaken the effectiveness of

the fact-finding process.

For example, the confrontation between collec-

tive teacher·militancy and school board resistance to the collective
bargaining process can function to increase the struggle for power in
public education.and consequently retard any impasse resolution device
which is political or advisory in nature. Also community indifference
or insensitivity to a teacher-board contract dispute can dimihish the
effectiveness of fact-finding.
(2) The informal collective bargaining relationship in all three
4istricts could be alternatively characterized by ••conflict," "militant
opposition," and "aggression and resistance.•• When collective bargaining
takes place in such a climate, any impasse procedure which involves the
aspect of voluntaryism--such as fact-finding--will probably be ineffective in resolving the labor dispute.
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(3) The contractual provisions for resolving impasses in the
three districts called for sequential steps of mediation and factfinding.

This arrangement prompted both parties to be complacent during

pre-impasse negotiations thus delaying serious efforts to conclude negotiations. 'Furthermore, since this arrangement provided for fact-finding
with advisory recommendations, one or both parties could reject the
report.

In all three cases, the recommendations were rejected, and

closure of the bargaining dispute was not achieved until a teacher strike
occurred.
(4)

In the three districts studied, both groups

exercise of power.

engag~d

in an

Teachers used unfavorable publicity campaigns such

as picketing, newspaper articles, and leafleting, plus the strike.
School management exercised power by seeking court injunctions and by
threatening to dismiss striking teachers. Management power tactics were
more effective than teacher power tactics primarily because the strike
weapon did not bring reciprocal economic pressures on the disputants.
That is, while teachers lost pay during the strike, school management
did not lose state aid money and could, therefore, allow the strike to
continue with impunity.
(5)

In the districts investigated, several examples of group

dynamics were manifested:

group cohesiveness, attack and counterattack,
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hostility towards third· party judgments, and loyalty of negotiation
representatives to ·'those they represented. The appearance of some of
these dynamics were attributable partly to fact-finding.

For example;

when school management negotiators refused to endorse the fact-finders'
reports intoto, teachers were prompted to solidify their ranks and attack
the "enemy" with a work stoppage.

Ironically, rather than serve to

resolve the impasse, fact-finding became an inflammatory process which
intensified the intergroup bargaining conflict.

These dynamics could

also be attributed to the fact that the human relations method--with its
emphasis on cooperation, regular

communication~

and joint problem-solving--

was not systematically employed during pre-impasse and/or impasse negotiations.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the critical problem of impasse resolution
in public education bargaining disputes.

Data for the

analys~s

came

~rom

a fixed-response questionnaire and a case study tnvesttgati:on from which
a number of conclusions can be drawn:
(1) Teacher negotiators preferred to use the strike, arbitration, the
human relations method, and mediation to resolve school bargaining impasses.
(2) School management negotiators preferred to use only the human
relations and mediation method to resolve contract disputes.
(3) Both groups. of negotiators rejected the use of fact-finding as
a dispute settlement method.

(4) Political factors and an informal collective bargaining

r
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relationship characterized by excessive intergroup conflict can hinder·
the effectiveness of fact-finding.
(5)

Fact-finding is not as effective as the strike in bringing

closure to a school bargaining dispute.
(6) The absence of reciprocal economic pressures on the disputants
can reduce the effectiveness of the strike in resolving public education
bargaining disputes.
(7) The inclusion of the human relations method and the exclusion
of the fact-finding method can diminish the potentiality for the appearance of negative group dynamics.
Reco~nendations

An analysis of the results of the fixed-response questionnaire
and the case study data would justify the following recommendations:
(1) Since both groups of negotiators responded positively toward
the human relations strategy on the fixed-response questionnaire, it seems
wise to incorporate the elements of this strategy into the collective barg
aining relationship between teachers and school management .. It is.
questionable if the human relations approach can be legislated into
law, but some components, .especially those which enhance intergroup
communication, can be negotiated into local contracts. An example of
a regular communication device is as follows:

r
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MONTHLY CONTRACT MEETINGS

I

Representatives of the superintendent and the Association will
meet once a month during the regular school year at a time con-·
venient to both parties for the purpose of discussing the administration of the contract and to resolve problems that may arise.
These meetings are not intended to bypass the negotiations or the
grievance procedure. Further, each party will submit to the other,
at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to the n1eeting, an agenda
covering what they wish to discuss. This agreement shall be subject to change or supplement at any time by mutual consent of the
parties hereto. Any such change or supplement agreed upon shall
be reduced to writing, signed by the parties hereto, and submitted
to the Board and the Association for approval, the same as this
Agreement.

I

I

Such contractual clauses may be advantageous because they resolve immediate problems, function to settle problems before contracts expire, and
serve to keep the

communi~ation

lines open.

Other elements of the human relations approach are not so easily
implemented because they deal with attitudes as well as bargaining tactics.

For example, the integrative ••win-win" element involves an atti-

tude of trust, openness, good will, and a search for mutual gain. Also,
joint sub-committee approaches and the intergroup problem-solving technique, which can be employed during actual bargaining sessions, will be
difficult to achieve in the near future.

These two elements, as well.

as other elements of the human relations approach can be learned by the
bargaining participants. Specifically, negotiators could take advantage
of laboratory workshops in which the participants learn the human relations approach by engaging in conflict management laboratories, roleplaying, and intergroup problem-solving exercises.

Such workshops are

available and are instructed by behavioral scientists knowledgeable in
the dynamics of the human relations approach.

l

·+
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(2) Mediatipn should be employed as the first step in the machinery for resolving school bargaining disputes. Since both groups generally
agreed that fact-finding inhibits the mediation process, state laws or
local collective bargaining agreements should not require fact-finding to
follow on the heels of mediation.

Furthermore, mediation should be accom-

panied by the threat or actuality of a legalized teacher strike simply·
because it provides pressure which induces settlement attitudes. While
this recommendation may be unwelcomed and distasteful to the reader, the
evidence from both the fixed-response questionnaire and the case studies
makes this recommendation appropriate.
{3) Fact-finding with advisory recommendations should not be used
in the machinery for resolving disputes.
for

dire~t

Since it can become a substitute

negotiations, it makes the collective bargaining process less

effective. Furthermore, it can become a vehicle which intensifies impasse
conflict.

In other words, state legislation or local

agreeme~ts

could

help to avert some of the conditions which lead to increased intergroup
conflict, such as the strike, by eliminating fact-finding from the impasse
resolution procedures.

Fixed-response questionnaire data and case study

analysis validate this recommendation.
(4) On the basis of the accumulated information, it is difficult
to pronounce a firm recommendation regarding the use of arbitration.
one set of data, teachers and school management

nego~iators

ing viewpoints towar.ds this dispute settlement device.

From

took contrast-

Furthermore, since

none of the districts·used arbitration to resolve their 1972 impasse,
many questions remain unanswered about this resolution device. Neverthe-

1
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less, a recommendation is 'made that voluntary binding arbitration be
available to the parties at any time during the dispute.
dation is based on the following rationale:

This recommen-

The very fact that school

management negotiators rejected the strike necessitates a search for the
most effective 11 strike substitute 11 --that is, some device which will bring
finality and closure to the bargaining deadlock.

As noted, since fact-

finding does not seem to be the best strike substitute, some form of
arbitration would seem advisable. Moreover, voluntary binding arbitration
would not be an unreasonable recommendation since several states now per~
~

J
1
~

It

I
i

I
I
I

II
'I

:!

mit its use to resolve teacher-school management disputes. These states
include Oregon, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey.
(5}

Categorical recommendations relevant to the use of the strike

are also difficult to make because the accumulated data was mixed. That
is, while the fixed-response questionnaire results showed a pronounced
contrast between the two groups of respondents, the case studies supported
the use of the strike strategy.

Nevertheless, recommendation is made that

the strike strategy be authorized by state and/or national legislation.
This, recommendation is based on the following rationale:

First, school

management negotiators did not denounce the strike in every respect.

On

!l

~;

j
1
:,

~

'

I

Ii

k.
y

I

the contrary, they agreed to some extent with professional literature
that the costs, inconveniences, and pressures concomitant to the strike
can serve to (1) facilitate meaningful, good faith bargaining, and (2) increase the likelihood of mediated settlements.

Secondly, the strike did

not create imminent peril or risk to the health and safety of the community in any of the seven school districts investigated.

Thirdly, strikes

r
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did terminate the impasses.
(6)

Due to the above recommendations, the most functional impasse

resolution procedure to be legislated into either state law or the local
collective barga·ining agreements would incorporate a combinatjon of
mediation, the legal right to strike, and voluntary binding arbitration
available at any time during the collective bargaining dispute.

In

addition, the entire collective bargaining process would be generously
sprinkled with elements of the human relations approach.
Implications For Further Study
(1)

Similar research should be conducted in states having teacher

bargaining laws to determine if impasse resolution procedures within the
context of state legislation are more effective than impasse resolution
procedures outside the confines of a state law.

Oregon, Pennsylvania,

and Hawaii would be appropriate states to study.
(2)

Research might be conducted in school systems which have

utilized forms of binding arbitration for the purpose of determining
the effectiveness of such a method.
l
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APPENDIX A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING QUESTIONNAIRE*
Following are some statements with which you may agree or disagree.
Please select one of the five alternatives which best represents
your position on each statement and briefly state your reason for
your particular choice.
SA--Strongly Agree
A--Agree
U--Undecided
0--0isagree
SO--Strongly Disagree
· SA A U 0 SO

1.

To reduce conflict and promote agreement during
actual negotiations, the parties should meet regularly
throughout the year outside the bargaining table to
study problems.

SA A U D SO

2.

In the event of a negotiations impasse, mediation
should be used as a means to resolve the dispute.

SA A U 0 SO

3.

The assured availability of an impasse procedure such
as fact-finding tends to inhibit the willingness of the
parties to compromise prior to acknowledgement of an
impasse and use of the procedure.

SA A U D SD

4.

Contract disputes between teachers and boards "Of
education should not be resolved by an impartial,
outside authority who makes a final and binding ·
decision.

SA A U D SO

5.

State legislatures should authorize strikes by teachers,
at least where public health or safety is not thereby
endangered.

*This questionnaire includes propositions designed to test the
r_ hypotheses.
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~ SA A U D SD

6.

As a mechanism for dispute resolution, teacher and
school management negotiators should attempt to make
decisions which permit both sides to gain in contrast .
to decisions where one party gains at the other
party•s expense.

SA A U D SD

7.

Mediation, as an impasse resolution procedure, tends
to promote rather than retard meaningful, sincere
negotiations between the parties.

SA A U D SD

8.

Fact-finding by itself, that is, without the use of
either prior mediation or a subsequent strike threat,
is not a positive vehicle for resolving teacher bargaining disputes.

SA A U D SD

9.

Compulsory binding arbitration, in which a third
pal~ty intervenes to deternli ne sa 1aries and other
terms and conditions of work, would tend to weaken
the direct negotiations process.

SA A U D SD

10.

The threat or actuality of a strike can function to
promote an agreement-making atmosphere.

SA A U D SD

11. To settle differences amicably, the style of bargaining should resemble mutual problem solving
rather than independent decision making in which
school management unilaterally sets salaries and
other terms and conditions of employment.

SA A U D SD.

12.

The mediation process, without the additional step
of fact-finding, can exert influence on each party
to modify its bargaining position.

SA A U D SD

13.

Fact-finding, leading to the issuance of formal
public recommendations, is not likely to reduce the
impasse conflict which still exists between teachers
and school management following unsuccessful mediation.

~

~
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I~ SA
A

14. As a means of impasse resolution, the parties should
not have access to voluntarily submit the conflict
issues to an impartial third -party for a final a~d
binding decision.

A U D SO

15.

Concession-making, compromises or modification of
bargaining positions by school management are likely
to be generated when a teachers' organization threatens to strike.

SA A u D so

16.

A joint sub-committee approach, in which there are
joint study teams composed of an equal number of
teachers and school management representatives,
would be a useful means of facilitating collective
bargaining agreements.
·

SA A U D SO

17. The effectiveness of medi.ation would be improved if
fact-finding were not so readily available to the
bargaining parties.

SA A U D. SO

18.

Fact-finding with private recommendations is not
likely to serve as an effective form of reconciliation when teachers and management are still at
impasse following unsuccessful mediation.

SA A U D SO

19.

As a means to resolve bargaining disputes, compulsory binding arbitration would deter the parties
from reaching direct agreement by themselves.

A U D SO

20.

Teachers should be allowed the "modified right to
strike. That is, they could lega-lly strike but
only after either mediation or fact-finding procedures have failed to resolve the bargaining dispute.

SA

1
'

SA

A U D SO

21.

Post negotiation committees, in which final resolution of some particularly thorny bargaining issue
is discussed, would tend to diminish future bargaining conflict.

I.

t
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22.

Mediation accompanied by the threat or actuality of
the strike may stimulate settlement between the
parties in contrast to mediation in and of itself~

iI

SA

A

u

D

so

23.

I

When the fact-finding process is available in a local
collective bargaining contract, the parties at impasse
are likely to wait for fact-finding rather than
seriously endeavor to reach direct agreement by themselves.

r,,

SA

A

u

0

so

24.

Reliance upon third party arbitration, either compulsory or voluntary, would weaken the incentive
for the parties to agree at the bargaining table.

~

SA

A U 0

SO

25.

The threat or actuality of a strike during or following the mediation process would tend to increase the
number of settlements in mediation.

~
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APPENDIX B
CASE STUDY INTERVIEW GUIDE
ADDITIONAL OR RELEVANT FACTORS INFWENCING BARGAINING IMPASSE
1.

What has been the history of the collective bargaining relationship
between the teachers' organization and the school management?

2.

Were there any significant political issues or factors which had an
impact on the bargaining impasse relative to the teachers' organization?

3. Were there any significant political factors which had an impact.on
the bargaining impasse with respect to the community or board of
education?
4.

What were the basic or key issues surrounding the bargaining impasse?

5.

What impasse procedures were called for in the local collective bargaining contract?

6.

What impasse resolution mechanisms were used and the considerations
which led to the choice of those mechanisms?

7.

How did each party react to the declaration of impasse?

8.

~!hat

9.

What influence techniques were used by school management to induce the
teachers to accept management's demands?

influence techniques were used by the teachers' organization to
induce the school board to accept the teachers' demands?

10.

Describe the success or failure of mediation.

11.

Describe the success or failure of fact-finding.

12. Were there any-harmful effects of the strike with respect to relationships or the health and safety of the community?
13. Were there any psychological factors which had an impact on the dispute?
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APPENDIX C
December. 5, 1973

Dear
The Graduate School at Loyola University of Chicago has given formal
approval for a research dissertation topic submitted by Mr. Larry Halter,
a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in the Department of
Educational Administration.
Mr. Halter is using the personal interview method to collect the data
needed to complete this research project and you have been selected
as one of the interviewees. As director of this dissertation, I hope
you will cooperate with Mr. Halter as he meets with you to gather
appropriate data relevant to his topic: "Conflict Resolution Strategies
in Public Education Bargaining Disputes."
The information you provide during the interview will be kept in confidence and hopefully will be used to assist both teachers and administrators manage the delicate relationships involved in the collective
bargaining process. Mr. Halter will be contacting you in the near
future to schedule a convenient interview time in your local area.
Thank you for your help in this matter.
Cordially,

/11 (t[)f~-'1
Max Bailey
\
Assistant Professor
Educational Administration

·•

225

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation

~submitted

by Larry L. Halter has been read

and approved by the following Committee:
Dr. Max A. Bailey, Chairman
Assistant Professor of Education, Loyola
Dr. Melvin P. Heller
Professor and Chairman of Administration, Loyola
Dr. Jasper J. Valenti
Professor of Administration~ Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the
fact that any n-ecessary changes have been incorporated and that the
dissertation is -now given final approval by the Committee with .
reference to content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
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